Indonesia cannot hope to reach its eight percent growth ambition by 2029 with coal and gas alone. Today, the country operates about 90 gigawatts (GW) of installed capacity, with nearly 50 GW fired by coal and less than one-fifth from renewables. The state utility’s new plan, the 2025–2034 RUPTL, envisions 69.5 GW of additional capacity, three-quarters of it clean energy. Yet, the first five years remain dominated by fossil projects.

This contradiction makes nuclear not a curiosity but a candidate for necessity.

Across the world, more than 80 small modular reactor designs are advancing, with Russia and China already operating them. For an archipelago of 17,000 islands, modularity is a gift. Units of a few hundred megawatts (MW), built in factories and shipped like maritime cargo, can be installed gradually to match demand.

The attraction is clear. New reactors promise electricity at or below the price of imported liquefied gas, modular units bring flexibility to a nation where power must cross seas, and mastering the atom signals that Indonesia is no longer only an exporter of commodities but a maker of technology. It is the portrait of a nation seeking to define itself not only by its geography but by the power of its ideas.

Grand visions are hollow without institutions. Indonesia needs a program office with a presidential mandate to coordinate utilities, regulators and ministries. A single line in the official power plan naming nuclear with a clear date—such as 500 MW of modular reactors by 2032 in Sumatra or Kalimantan—would transform aspiration into a calendar. Longer term, the government has set its sights on 10 GW of nuclear by 2040 and up to 40 GW by mid-century.

The legal framework must also catch up. The energy policy of 2014 still labels nuclear as a last resort. Liability rules remain modest compared with global norms. The nuclear statute itself was written before today’s institutions even existed. Updating these rules would not only clear the way for investment; it would show citizens and investors that the state has the confidence to govern the atom responsibly.

Indonesia’s electricity market has one buyer: The state utility. Independent power producers succeed only if their contracts are bankable. For nuclear, they must be honest from the start. Waste and decommissioning cannot be afterthoughts.

Reliability must be written in, with rewards for consistency and consequences for failure. Investors will watch whether procurement is transparent and predictable. Communities will watch whether projects bring jobs and local development. Both will watch whether oversight is strong enough to keep promises real. The lesson is simple: bad tenders kill good projects, but good contracts can turn ambition into steel and light.

Indonesia's choice unfolds against a backdrop of regional developments. The Philippines has reactivated its long-dormant plant, Vietnam is reevaluating and Singapore has signed cooperation pacts. Meanwhile, China and South Korea are racing ahead, bundling reactors with financing. In a world where supply chains are weapons, choosing a reactor is not only a technical act but a diplomatic one.

Indonesia’s geothermal reserves are vast, its floating solar potential immense. Yet, intermittency and land disputes slow progress. Coal still supplies more than half of the power, and even as the president pledges to phase it out within fifteen years, plans still include almost 27 GW of new coal in the coming decade. Without firm, clean capacity, both climate targets and growth ambitions are at risk. Nuclear is not a cure-all, but it may be the keystone that allows the arch to stand.

Handled well, nuclear power could demonstrate that an emerging democracy can industrialize without carbon and without illusions. Mishandled, it could become another generation’s deferred dream, a Muria project replayed in slow motion.

This is about more than MW. It is about resilience and credibility in a century where energy defines power more than oil ever did. For a nation of 280 million, endurance will be measured not only in export statistics but in kilowatt-hours that are clean, steady and decisively its own.

Picture a fishing boat off Bangka Island, nets spread over waters once scarred by tin dredging. Behind it, a compact reactor hums quietly. Homes glow. Workshops run late. Children study under light that never falters.

That is not a fantasy; it is a wager, one that depends not on decisions 50 years from now, but in the next five.

Indonesia’s nuclear path is not only a domestic experiment; it is a parable for every emerging economy caught between coal dependency, renewable potential and geopolitical rivalry. If a sprawling democracy of 280 million can design rules, update laws and mobilize private capital for nuclear energy, others from Africa to Latin America may find a road map. If it stumbles, the world will take note of how even the most ambitious climate pledges can dissolve under the weight of political hesitation.

This debate intensifies as a new administration settles into Jakarta. President Prabowo Subianto has promised rapid industrial growth under his Asta Cita vision while balancing fiscal realities and social expectations. His ministers speak of phasing out coal within 15 years even as state companies still plan nearly 27 GW of new coal plants.

The House of Representatives debates revisions to the nuclear law, while regulators jockey for influence. These contradictions show why the nuclear wager is ultimately political. It is not just about MW but about whether a new government can translate ambition into durable institutions.

What Indonesia decides in this decade will echo far beyond its grids. It is not merely an energy policy; it is a declaration of national confidence, the resolve to be a maker of destiny rather than a taker of circumstance.

If managed wisely, the atom will not be a symbol of fear but the quiet script of a nation’s ascent.

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The writer is the executive director of the Indonesian Renewable Energy Society (METI), principal advisor to the public works minister on infrastructure investment and environment and is a doctoral candidate at Bandung Institute of Technology specializing in nuclear power plant. The views expressed are personal.