Some analysts say the visit has broken the ice on the current lack of progress in ASEAN’s efforts to bring peace and democracy back to Myanmar. A few even insist that the encounters have ticked some boxes regarding the implementation of the five-point consensus (FPC) agreed upon in Jakarta in April 2021, as the joint statement between them, like the FPC, highlighted a ceasefire, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and facilitation of the visit by the ASEAN special envoy in the near future.

When assuming the chairmanship of ASEAN in October 2021, Hun Sen indicated his intention to bring Myanmar back into the ASEAN fold, allowing Myanmar to participate in future ASEAN meetings, which is contrary to ASEAN’s hitherto decision to only allow a non-political representative to attend. As Hun Sen only met with the SAC leaders this time, many have perceived his initiative as Cambodia’s unilateral move to give legitimacy to the junta, which launched a coup on Feb. 1, 2021 after Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won the November 2020 election.

We may have to wait to see how things unfold further. However, one thing for sure is the agreement resulting from last week’s meeting is actually unticking the boxes of implementing the FPC. The results have actually diverted the situation further from it.

There are four points to make. First, on the ceasefire. While the joint press statement mentioned about Min Aung Hlaing’s declaration of a five-month ceasefire with all Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) until the end of February 2022, which is likely to be extended until the end of this year, this is certainly not the ceasefire that was intended in the FPC.

Despite the necessity to revisit the halted peace process with the EAOs, it is very clear that the FPC ultimately aims for the military to stop the violence against the civilians and pro-democracy groups, including the attacks on the EAOs to sustain its coup against the result of the November 2020 election.

This cessation of hostilities is where it should start, while the peaceful process with EAOs will follow suit afterward during the national reconciliation process. Nonetheless, despite the military’s claim of ceasefire, it is obvious that massive attacks on EAOs have continued until now, causing refugee flows to neighboring countries such as Thailand.  

Second, the delivery of humanitarian assistance. As much as the “coordination” meeting is necessary and will gather relevant ASEAN institutions, the local Myanmar stakeholders and international agencies from the UN, the most important thing is how to ensure that such an effort will not only be dominated by one political actor, in this case the SAC.

The reality is there is no legitimate authority/government in control in Myanmar. Therefore, ASEAN should be very careful to remain impartial, ensuring that the mechanism is inclusive and benefiting all people in Myanmar. Here, the role of the ASEAN special envoy is extremely crucial in the formation of a task force that comprises all key actors whose selection is based on fair judgment, instead of being only determined by the SAC.

Third, on the ASEAN special envoy. While it looks promising from the surface as the SAC has assured the facilitation of the visit of the special envoy to Myanmar and to meet with all parties concerned, there has been no confirmation so far on whom the special envoy can actually meet and engage with.

Prior to the meeting in Naypyidaw, the spokesperson from the junta told the press that there would be no meeting between Hun Sen and Aung San Suu Kyi. It was said that “there are limitations on those who are still facing legal charge”. It is still unknown whether the special envoy will later adamantly request such access from the junta.

To gain access to meet with all parties, not only with those that the junta agree to, is extremely crucial to enable the special envoy to deliver his primary mandate, which is to facilitate the mediation of the political dialogue among the conflicting parties, with the assistance of the ASEAN secretary-general.

For this purpose, the special envoy should definitely formulate his own agenda, including a clear list of the stakeholders to meet with when he eventually makes the visit. The ASEAN member states should be consulted on the agenda and list.

Fourth, Hun Sen should never agree to Min Aung Hlaing’s statement that the implementation of the FPC should be complementary in realization of the five-point road map of the SAC. The FPC is not the SAC’s road map. It is guidance, resulting from a consensus of the nine member states, on how ASEAN seeks to address the political and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. It is based on the ASEAN principles to promote democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance.

From the outset, the junta has tried to twist the FPC when it seemed to accept it in Jakarta in April 2021. Thus, ASEAN should always be careful not to fall into this trap again and remain impartial in its role in order to become an honest broker.

Finally, it remains to be seen how ASEAN will continue its engagement in Myanmar under the Cambodian chairmanship. Many are expecting to see an intensive and dynamic discussion take place in the upcoming ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Jan 18-19 in Siem Reap.

Despite the controversy, Hun Sen’s visit has happened. We certainly hope the next step will not put ASEAN in jeopardy.

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The writer is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.