He worked like a camera, capturing the nation using different analytic âlensesâ â producing deep focus images that went as far back as the first appearance of the Dutch in the archipelago 1596
He worked like a camera, capturing the nation using different analytic 'lenses' ' producing deep focus images that went as far back as the first appearance of the Dutch in the archipelago 1596.
Like a photographer, Thee, who died on Feb. 8 at 78, made images of the nation's economic life that featured different resolutions and offered historical accounts etched in laser-like detail.
Thee captured his subjects from different angles, producing works with a 360-degree approach, capturing the political and social aspects of economic history.
Thee's publications were voluminous, commencing with the publication of his doctoral dissertation from the University of Wisconsin.
In 2002, he published a collaborative volume on The Emergence of a National Economy with Howard Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben and J. Thomas Lindblad, in recognition of the lack of an up-to-date textbook on Indonesian economic history.
However, four chapters he published in various books, which run from the arrival of Dutch in the archipelago in the late 16th century to the Soeharto era, deserve special attention.
Thee's 'Colonial extraction in the Indonesian archipelago ' A long historical view', begins with the late 16th century, pointing out that the newly-arrived Dutch, unlike the Portuguese and Spanish, were exclusively motivated by trading opportunities ' especially for the spices found in the Moluccas, such as highly-valued nutmeg.
He then went on to explore the evolution of the Dutch presence in what they called the Netherland Indies: the Dutch East India Company (VOC), the Cultivation System, the Liberal Era, the Ethical Policy, the Great Depression in the 1930s, the Japanese occupation in 1942 and Indonesia's independence in 1945.
Thee makes the point that institutions are path-dependent: 'Institutions and practices of extraction, leading to regressive distribution of assets, income and wealth, have been sustained during the post-colonial era [...] The abuse of public resources by rent-seeking elites (including those during the Soeharto era), has been a constant factor in Indonesian history and Dutch colonial rule set the example in its most extreme form.'
In one book chapter, 'The Indonesian Economy During the Japanese Occupation,' Thee explored the period from Dec. 8, 1941, when the Netherlands declared war on Japan, to Indonesia's independence on Aug. 17, 1945.
Unlike as in many of his other writings, Thee in this short paper addressed open-ended questions that he himself could only speculate on answering, such as why the Dutch declared war against Japan before the US. Thee often said, 'I know about a lot of things, but I don't know everything.'
In the chapter, Thee also corrects the popular misconception that Indonesia was colonized by the Dutch for 300 years, while in fact there were only four ships that initially arrived to trade spice in the archipelago.
'Indonesians even today say that Indonesia was colonized by the Dutch for 300 years, which historically is totally wrong. This statement would have implied that when Cornelis de Houtman landed in the port of Banten in 1596, he and his four ships swept over the entire Indonesian archipelago like a tsunami!', Thee writes.
As in his other writings, he portrays the cruelty of the Japanese occupation, including stringent food rationing and romusha (forced labor).
Although providing a balanced analysis, he argues that without such measures, 'it would have taken a much longer time for Indonesia to become independent.'
In a forthcoming book chapter, 'The Indonesian Economy During the 1950s and Early 1960s and America's Proposal for Economic Aid', Thee provides 360-degree insights into the post-independence period until the fall of Sukarno.
Thee argues that the US offered economic aid in the 1950s primarily to improve relations with Indonesia, which at that time were strained by Sukarno's anti-Western and anti-capitalist policies, which aligned the nation with the socialist bloc.
However, Sukarno had little capacity or interest in seeking economic advice and aid, especially from the US, despite the nation's rapidly declining economy.
Putting politics above economics with slogans of 'completing national revolutions' and 'building a socialist economy á la Indonesia', Sukarno's leadership eventually led to an economic and political collapse in 1965.
A chapter from The Emergence of a National Economy, 'The Soeharto Era and After: Stability, Development and Crisis, 1966-2000' is also notable for its insights.
In it, he divides Soeharto's time into three phases: A first phase (1966-1973) of 'stabilization, rehabilitation, partial liberalization and economic recovery', a second phase (1973-1982) of 'oil booms, rapid economic growth and increasing government intervention' and a third post-oil boom phase (1983-1996) of 'deregulation, renewed liberalization and rapid export-led growth'.
Thee makes three important points.
His first is on the importance of good governance, saying that 'the only strong institution seemed to be president Soeharto himself, who was not a sustainable institution'.
He also confronted the double-edged sword of globalization. 'The Asian crisis also showed that globalization may require institutions to change faster than they are able to.'
Finally, Thee comments on the New Order's 'growing disregard' for economic analysis in policy formulation, which led to 'the rise of interventionist policies resulting from accumulation of corrupt political power that eroded business competitiveness and rewarded rent-seeking policies'.
Thee's more contemporary works in the post-Soeharto era focused on development challenges and recent economic updates.
He often wrote about corruption, poverty and inequality as well as environmental degradation. In a short paper from 2013, Thee laid out four development challenges: 'combating pervasive corruption; overcoming critical constraints to reducing poverty, inequality and unemployment; the dilapidated physical infrastructure; and the rapid decline of non-renewable natural resources at current rates of exploitation'.
He was also often critical, saying that contemporary Indonesia was little different from colonial Indonesia given the prominence of extractive institutions that rely on natural resources for much their revenues.
Thee's analysis offers a wealth of lessons from policy failures ' and successes ' in the past, proving that economic history can shed light on current policy debates, from an overreliance on natural resources and extractive industries (the so-called resource curse), deep-rooted institutional weaknesses (corruption, in particular), and inconsistencies of industrial policy.
His works on economic history remind us of the importance of learning from history.
The writer is an economist and consultant at the World Bank. The views expressed here are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank or its affiliates.
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