T

he appointment of former trade minister and PT Astra International CEO Rini Soemarno as State-Owned Enterprises Minister has drawn many skeptical comments regarding her commitment to the reform of state companies.

But President Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo may not have been in any position to oppose her inclusion in the Cabinet as Rini, after all, is the BFF (best friend forever) of Jokowi'€™s patron, the supreme leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) Megawati Soekarnoputri.

The relationship between Rini and Megawati, according to many reports and accounts, extends to the point where Rini has functioned as her wealth manager and as well as holiday and shopping companion while on overseas trips.

Now, with Rini in charge of overseeing 138 state companies with combined assets worth more than Rp 4,500 trillion (US$371 billion), how far can she ensure that noPDI-P politician or member of Megawati'€™s family or inner-circle will '€œbenefit'€ from these companies.

If the past serves as any guide, we may note that many state company executives during Megawati'€™s administration ended up in jail, including the influential Bank Mandiri president director, ECW Neloe, and PT Bulog president Widjanarko Puspoyo.

Rini came to Megawati'€™s attention in 2000 when she opposed a plan by the then government-sanctioned Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (BPPN) to sell the controlling stake of troubled Astra International to foreign buyers.

Astra'€™s founders, the Soeryadjaya family, were forced to relinquish the company'€™s ownership to the government after a default by the family'€™s bank led the government to provide bailout funds to keep it afloat.

Amid reports of poor accountability in Astra, including allegations of irregular deals between Rini and former dictator Soeharto'€™s golf buddy Bob Hasan to profit from the flagging company, Rini made her name as an icon in the campaign against so-called '€œforeign business imperialism'€.

After the BPPN removed her from the helm of Astra in 2000, Rini was appointed in 2001 as trade and industry minister by Megawati, who came to power after president Abdurrahman '€œGus Dur'€ Wahid, was toppled by the People'€™s Consultative Assembly (MPR) for alleged graft.

But the euphoria of her appointment was short-lived. Rini, along with her most trusted underling, Sudar SA, the ministry'€™s director general for international trade, became the object of intense ridicule by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin) as well as many business associations.

During her tenure as minister not only was the levying of illegal fees rampant at her ministry, the nation was also gripped by protracted shortages of such basics as cooking oil, rice and sugar. While Rini was not the only minister to blame, her policies were deemed as detrimental to the interests of the domestic economy.

Indonesia'€™s foreign trade policy was also equally poor and without clear direction. It was during her time that Indonesia agreed to sign the ASEAN'€“China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) in late 2002, for full implementation in 2010. Losses from that policy have outweighed any benefits.

It was primarily due to Rini'€™s mismanagement that Kadin and then the government-sanctioned National Economic Committee (KEN), headed by tycoon Sofjan Wanandi, threw their weight behind Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when he challenged Megawati in the 2004 presidential election.

Aside from being widely disliked by the business sector, Rini also found herself in the spotlight due to several controversies.

Among them was her role in the purchase of Sukhoi jet fighters from Russia in 2003. The House of Representatives formed a special committee to investigate the issue, but law enforcement agencies have never followed up on the lead.

Rini was also among the architects of Megawati'€™s '€œrelease and discharge'€ policy for Bank Indonesia liquidity support (BLBI) debtors, freeing them from the obligation to fully pay their debts.

The BLBI issue revolved around the fate of Rp 702 trillion ($57.9 billion) of Bank Indonesia bailout funds, during the 1997-1998 financial crisis. Misuse of the funds led to state losses in the hundreds of trillions of rupiah.

The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) questioned last year several of Megawati'€™s former ministers, including Rini, in relation to the case.

While Rini'€™s anti graft credentials might be questionable, many believe her much-vaunted expertise when managing Astra can at least be replicated in her management of state companies. But such assumptions may have doubtful validity.

First, the challenges Rini will confront in the 21st century business climate are far more complicated compared to her days in Astra in the 1990s. Today, big companies are more transparent with better governance and less of a role for oligarchs.

Second, many of her business ventures have had disappointing performances, including the production of low-cost motorcycles under the Kanzen brand. Rini'€™s pay-for-view satellite TV company Aora remains among the smallest in the industry despite having been operating since 2008.

Third, due to her '€œspecial relationship'€ with Megawati, Rini'€™s loyalty is likely to lean more toward her shopping and holiday pal than to Jokowi '€” a modest, down-to-earth figure whose nomination as president she initially opposed.

Given all these drawbacks, Jokowi must prove to the public that he can be tough with Rini and that he will not need Megawati'€™s prior approval if he eventually decides to dismiss her.

But as this Cabinet has been formed on the basis of compromise and caution, Jokowi and Vice President Jusuf Kalla may be in for a rough ride when it comes to dealing with '€œMadame'€™s'€ BFF.