A

s the new commander of Indonesia'€™s vast resources, it is interesting to see what President Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo might contribute to a field that he has never influenced before '€” the politics of Southeast Asia.

Jokowi, a former mayor and governor, is unique. He is not part of the typical Southeast Asian political elites who dominate the region'€™s politics. Southeast Asia, a fast-growing region marked with governments ranging from functioning democracies, communist leaderships, to autocratic monarchy, generally has a recurring pattern where its leaders are somehow part of the political elite with ties (again, either positive or negative) to previous governments.

Therefore, we should settle down for a little while from the euphoria of Jokowi'€™s formal ascension to the presidency and take a look at how this could turn out for our neighbors.

Arguably, there are only two functioning democracies in Southeast Asia: Indonesia and the Philippines.

Although both are severely tainted with corruption cases, poor governance and separatist movements, their evolution into democratic states is not fully followed by their neighbors. Singapore and Malaysia retain their pseudo-democracy single-party domination; Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos preserve their communist way of ruling; the military still plays a pivotal role in Thailand and Myanmar; and Brunei'€™s absolute monarchy persists.

While their counterparts in Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) have moved toward high-income and fully functioning democratic states, most of Southeast Asia still follows a Cold War-style political system to maintain regime stability and elites'€™ power. Thus, when Jokowi was proven victorious against the New Order-connected Prabowo Subianto, a new and interesting case spawned in this region. Will this development influence Indonesia'€™s neighbors?

The renowned ASEAN principle of '€œnon-interference'€ seems to be implemented by Southeast-Asian nations. The People'€™s Power Revolution in the Philippines that toppled Ferdinand Marcos'€™ dictatorship did not affect neighboring dictators. The Asian financial crisis during the late 1990s that marked the fall of Soeharto'€™s regime also did not give a similar effect to other regimes, although a failed reform movement did take place in Malaysia.

Thus pessimists might see that Jokowi'€™s rise to Indonesia'€™s top position would not have any impact on the politics of neighboring countries. After all, domestic politics in Southeast Asia are almost always confined within each country'€™s territorial borders.

However, we might see something new. On his inauguration day, the first foreign dignitary that Jokowi met was Singapore'€™s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, followed by Malaysia'€™s Prime Minister Najib Razak. Both countries, regardless of their current political systems, of course play pivotal roles as Indonesia'€™s main partners in a wide array of fields.

Interestingly, both countries face possible democratic change in the future. Malaysia'€™s growing middle-class supported the opposition that might change the United Malays National Organisation'€™s (UMNO) dominance in the country, with the latter suffering a major defeat in parliament in the 2013 election. In Singapore, many people are intrigued to see what would happen to the city-state'€™s political regime should its '€œgodfather'€ Lee Kuan Yew pass away.

Two main factors that might bring new changes in Southeast Asian politics are the rise of the critical middle class supported by new media, especially social media. Just like no one in the world thought the Arab Spring could happen few years ago, the burgeoning young, educated masses of Southeast Asia might challenge their governments if the momentum is right.

The '€œJokowi effect'€ is perhaps not strong enough to push for change in neighboring countries. Nevertheless, the board is set, the world has seen the changes and Southeast Asia cannot escape from it.

Only time will tell whether there will be democratic change, or continuation of the old regimes.