S

o many commentators have expressed opinions about the selection by President Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo of Badrodin Haiti as chief of police candidate and Taufiequrachman Ruki as acting head of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Many are concerned that within just months of becoming President the furniture maker/ex-mayor of Surakarta has been captured by the corrupt elite in Jakarta.

While recognizing the evidence they put forward, I hang onto a hope that there is a different scenario for what we are witnessing.

Reform of a widely corrupt police force requires not just getting rid of the bad guys '€” what if none are left? It requires each cop to declare himself or herself a good cop on the side of good police-work.

In Hong Kong more than 40 years ago, the whole police force went on strike against their new anticorruption agency ICAC. The government gave an amnesty to low-ranking cops who promised to forego their corruption and reveal where the money went. When they got the rank-and-file police on their side, the battle against corruption was virtually won.

Imagine Jokowi working a similar deal, but starting from the top. His instinct tells him that if the top is made right, the rest will follow. He did it in Surakarta and Jakarta.

But he cannot find a person who stands out with the highest integrity, so he goes for those with the highest leverage.

Jokowi selects Badrodin and Ruki and offers them a deal. Make the decision regardless of your past, I imagine the President told them, to work for me, knowing I demand performance and integrity. To assure integrity, the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPTAK) and the KPK and whoever can continue any investigation, but as long as you are performing and retaining your integrity, we will delay prosecution.

But if you fail to perform, or if you continue to accumulate suspicious wealth, or if you move your wealth, or keep your associations with bad guys, or leave the force, then the deal is off and you face the music.

Remember Hadi Purnomo, who had been a relatively effective head of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK). He was named a suspect the day he retired last year for past corruption. Maybe that is the example that Jokowi is following.

Is there any evidence that this may be the scenario we are watching now? Former police chief candidate Budi Gunawan may remain a target of investigation, whether by the KPK or police or the Attorney General'€™s Office.

And we will all be watching. Badrodin may become a target, depending on what he has done to deserve it. Ruki may have to face the KPK ethics committee. And we will all be watching.

Regardless, they have agreed to boost KPK activity with new investigators. And Badrodin has asked Ruki to help the police prevent corruption.

These decisions deserve our respect, with our closest monitoring. They know that Jokowi has promised to fight corruption and it is fair that we conclude he is determined to clean up the police force.

But how will Badrodin reform the police? Worldwide, the reform of police forces that are riddled with corruption, protectionism, case-rigging, links to drugs and the sex trade, smuggling and gross neglect of duty is notoriously hard to achieve.

Badrodin most likely will fail, so he will need all the help he can get.  Here are some ways for giving him support, while keeping a close watch:

Reform the National Police Commission (Kompolnas) so that it becomes the catalyst of good policing. Kompolnas should run an ongoing national and regional and very public discourse on police reform and provide advice to the President on reforms based on that public discourse.

Where there is international support to the police (from the UN, the US, New Zealand and Australia, at least), redirect some so that both Kompolnas and Badrodin have the best international police reformers in the world beside them to advise on whatever they need.

Shift the current complaint-handling from Kompolnas to each regional police office and get Kompolnas and the Ombudsman to watch their performances closely.

This will make the head of each police station responsible for fixing problems, with nowhere to hide and whatever help they need.

Strengthen local accountability by requiring regional police heads to make regular public reports on their performances and requiring them to prove they are improving.

These reports should be presented to and scrutinized by governors, regents and mayors, legislatures (DPRD) and the public across the country.

There is also a scenario in which Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) chair Megawati Soekarnoputri'€™s role in this situation has been misunderstood. In this scenario she has encouraged Jokowi in his policy on Budi.

The lunch between Jokowi and party leaders before he made his famous announcement on Budi, Badrodin and the KPK could not have happened without Megawati'€™s endorsement.

And we have all watched just how far so many members of the PDI-P and almost every other elected representative of the people are out of tune with the people.

This has demonstrated that any political reform will come from the likes of Jokowi and Jakarta Governor Basuki '€œAhok'€ Tjahaja Purnama rather than them.

In this scenario Megawati wants her party to reform ahead of the pack, to get an electoral advantage in the coming local elections and, from that base, an electoral advantage in 2019.

So how will the PDI-P reform? Only by more struggle. And here are some more ideas:

Get parties to prepare their own anticorruption strategies and plans, nationally and locally. Prepare these plans from the grassroots. Announce them to the public and report on their implementation.

Get local party members more active on soliciting community aspirations.

Change the development planning process to engage parties more, not to give politicians more to talk about, but more to listen to.

Now is the time for upping the ante on anticorruption and for raising the bar for members of Cabinet and parties on amputating corruption and for political reform.

Jokowi and Megawati will continue with their strategy, which may or may not be according to these scenarios, but whatever the scenario is, success will depend on continuing close public scrutiny and sharp public criticism.
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Badrodin most likely will fail, so he will need all the help he can get.
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The writer is a professional associate at the Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, the University of Canberra, Australia.