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here is nothing new in international fora concerning illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, as it greatly reduces fish stocks, creates an unfair situation for legitimate fishermen and destroys marine ecosystems. The International community recognizes these threats and has been actively working to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

International instruments on IUU fishing include the 2001 Food and Agriculture Organization International Plan of Action (FAO-IPOA), the 2007 Regional Plan of Action (RPOA) in Southeast Asia and the 2009 agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU fishing (the 2009 Agreement)

Nevertheless, the POAs are only recommendations in nature and hence do not create legal obligations.

Similarly, the 2009 Agreement is not yet binding because, as of 2014, of 25 instruments of ratification required for its entry into force, only 11 had been submitted. Ironically, Indonesia belongs to the countries yet to ratify the 2009 Agreement.

This situation allows room for unilateral responses, particularly from coastal states. Take the EU'€™s banning of fish imports (red-card mechanism) from states failing to combat IUU fishing or Indonesia'€™s '€œSink the Vessel'€ policy for foreign vessel practicing IUU fishing in its waters.

In essence, the international fight to tackle IUU fishing continues. To what extent the forms are accepted remains unclear, which in the end may create tensions among states leading to potential threats to peace and stability.

For a country where 30 percent of worldwide IUU fishing takes place, the situation can be challenging. On the one hand, Indonesia is faced with domestic issues such as erosion of sovereignty in its territory and depletion of fish stocks and derivatives, while on the other there is a need to maintain peace and stability in the region.

Indonesia could always argue that its vessel-sinking policy is a matter of enforcing the law and pay no heed to other states'€™ response, if any. Legal experts have warned, however, that affected countries may challenge Indonesia'€™s vessel-sinking policy as cases of similar nature have been submitted previously to international tribunals in past years.

The challenge does not necessarily come in legal form from a state. It can also come from foreign independent or state-sponsored groups. The media have reported an attack on Indonesian fishermen by foreign fishermen in Indonesian borders area, in revenge for their burned and sunk vessels.

Having started in the government domain, the vessel-sinking policy has begun to have repercussions in the public domain. To assume that enforcing domestic laws on foreign citizens will not affect bilateral relations is naive, if not politically incorrect. Surely, we can learn something from human trafficking and death penalty cases.

If Indonesia is to continue combating IUU fishing by means of its vessel-sinking policy, it needs a balancing effort. One of the proposed efforts is to frame IUU fishing as a crime in the transnational organized context. There are at least three reasons to support the framing, namely political, legal and practical justifications.

Framing IUU fishing as a transnational organized crime will be a show of serious commitment from the Indonesian government. If Canada and the EU are well known for their commitment to establishing FAO-IPOA, Indonesia can be the pioneer in pushing the international agenda to recognize IUU fishing as a transnational crime.

Indonesia'€™s vision as a maritime state and fulcrum adds perfectly to the equation. Framing IUU fishing as a transnational crime will provide a binding mechanism, something that the international community is presently lacking. The binding mechanism not only will contain unilateral responses but also help create the legal regime necessary to combat IUU fishing.

Furthermore, the fact that the international legal regime of transnational crime has already been established under the 2000 UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crimes (UNTOC) makes it more feasible for IUU fishing to be considered as such. This way, efforts do not have to start from scratch.

The last justification is the practicality, probably the hardest part because there has to be an analogy made between IUU fishing and existing transnational organized crimes. Preliminary reading of Articles 2 and 3 of the UNTOC indicates that IUU fishing meets the major elements, namely among others, transnational in nature and involves an organized criminal group.

IUU fishing is a transnational offence because it is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state. Also, in practice, IUU fishing is carried by a group of more than three persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert to achieve financial or other material benefit.

Transnational organized crimes include people trafficking, people smuggling and firearm trafficking '€” which have an immediate social impact. Analogous to these crimes, IUU fishing immediately impacts legitimate fisheries or depletion of fish stocks. The list can go on and so can the analogy.

Although IUU fishing can be considered a transnational organized crime theoretically, in practice the efforts may be sensitive and complex. Indonesia will have to rely once again on its fine diplomats to make it work. For a country that once successfully pushed archipelago as a binding status in international fora, it should be a walk in the park.
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The writers work for the Foreign Ministry. The views expressed are their own.