P

resident Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo'€™s call on Japan and China to invest in Indonesia'€™s five year infrastructure development plans during last month'€™s state visits may fulfill his ambitious goals to build infrastructure projects across the archipelago.

These visits could also bolster foreign support for Jokowi'€™s maritime security objectives through, for instance, the signing of the Japan-Indonesia defense cooperation pact and the launching of a high-level bilateral maritime forum to increase maritime security and stability. The President'€™s visit to China suggested that Indonesia'€™s idea about the global maritime fulcrum complemented China'€™s plans of its '€œmaritime Silk Road'€.

A series of potential policy synergies and their snow ball effect of mutual gains between these two countries may be on the horizon.

But these bilateral potential gains may overshadow potential security threat perceptions from these two regional powers. Are Japan and China real friends for us, or are they friends but to some extent also enemies ('€œfrenemies'€) of our regional security and stability?

The recent 2.8 percent increase of Japan'€™s defense budget and the 10 percent increase of China'€™s defense budget may trigger regional threat perceptions toward these two giants. Additionally, China'€™s large scale reclamation projects in the Spratlys could trigger our regional insecurities and instabilities. The Philippines has been strongly opposed to China'€™s moves, arguing it has caused major destruction of marine biodiversity in the South China Sea, which it calls the West Philippines Sea.

But China'€™s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, explained in early April that this project is intended for '€œbuilding shelter, aiding navigation, search and rescue, marine meteorological forecasting services, fishery services and other administrative services'€ while the islands and reefs are intended for China'€™s military defense.

Whether or not this project is dedicated to the interests of China and neighboring countries is questionable. Indonesia should not just be walking on its tippy toes in the case of the South China Sea dispute.

After Jokowi stated that China'€™s claims to the South China Sea have '€œno legal foundation in international law'€, Indonesia could take further preventive and peaceful measures to help stabilize regional security.

Our diplomacy should work to confront exploration and exploitation activities in the disputed areas to prevent real or perceived acts of provocation from drawing military responses.

Indonesia has to remind parties involved in the disputes, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the non-ASEAN member Taiwan, to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate the disputes in the area. This step is relevant according to the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

The President'€™s visits last month should be a stepping stone for improving our ties with Japan and China as a strategic and comprehensive partner.

As a good partner to China, Indonesia needs to show continuous support to any form of management that deals with the disputes between China and the claimant states in the South China Sea. However, these arrangements should go beyond bilateral talks because there are many national interests at stake with overlapping claims on the disputed areas. Indonesia is officially not among the claimant states, since the disputed area is miles off the coast of our Natuna Island and located within China'€™s nine-dash line.

As a good partner to Japan, we should start our defense cooperation without provoking any military threats to other countries. The Philippines and Vietnam may have strengthened maritime cooperation with Japan, but the cooperation should not be seen as a decision to take sides with Japan in the light of the dispute.

Jokowi'€™s clear and real response to any provocative acts in the South China Sea is a necessity as we cannot afford a new type of Cold War in the region.

President Jokowi has reiterated that '€œall nations can become our friends as long as Indonesia'€™s sovereignty is not degraded and national interest is not jeopardized'€.

However, there have been no clear indicators on who should be our strategic or comprehensive strategic partners. With the increased tensions in the South China Sea involving regional powers, should we consider a new category of '€œfrenemies'€, when states pretend to act as friends but instead intimidate and eventually create insecurities like enemies do?

The way we approach Japan and China cautiously in the South China Sea issue is a major test case for the Jokowi administration in its bilateral and regional security policy. After conducting several shock therapies to sink foreign vessels including those of the Chinese in December 2014, we should have a more peaceful response to regional maritime security issues.

As a strategic partner for economic and maritime cooperation for Japan and China, Indonesia needs to highlight the importance of building common shared norms in bilateral cooperation and also for the sake of regional security.

Are we going to be a real dispute broker or continue to be a trust and confidence building promoter following recent tensions in the South China Sea?

These two options are better than introducing a new category of '€œfrenemies'€ to our vocabulary on diplomatic relations with other countries.