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ince the memorandum on the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1990, bilateral ties between Indonesia and China have been on the up and up.

Not only have ties expanded to include a strategic partnership agreement in 2005, the adoption of a free trade agreement '€“ via the ASEAN-China FTA in 2010 '€“ and most recently visa-free privileges for Chinese tourists have exemplified how at ease Jakarta now is with the dragon to the north.

It was arguably during the term of former president Abdurrahman Wahid that relations began to kick into high gear, as he made China his first foreign country to visit as president.

Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo followed suit in his first five months as president by visiting Beijing twice.

Not bad when you consider that less than five decades earlier Indonesians were told that Beijing was complicit in the failed communist coup in 1965, or that in 1998 anti-Chinese riots swept several parts of the country.

A solid network of relationships too has been formed at the formal diplomacy (Track 1) and informal intellectual (Track 2) level.

Perhaps not as wide or in-depth as Indonesia'€™s other web of bilateral connections, which involve civil society and a strong NGO network, but for the foreseeable future it should suffice to overcome the potential bumps which are bound to occur.

While it is unlikely that relations will ever lapse to pre-1990 levels again, two issues serve as bilateral flashpoints, which if not managed carefully will quickly ignite an emotional, and potentially irreversible, powder keg of domestic political fervor on each side.

For China it relates to Taiwan.

Since 1990 Jakarta has maintained a strict '€˜One China'€™ policy recognizing only Beijing as '€˜the sole legal government of China with Taiwan as an integral part of China'€™. Based on the memorandum,

Indonesia is also committed to only economic and trade relations '€˜of non-governmental nature with Taiwan'€™.

While there is no question of a retreat from the '€˜One China'€™ principle, in practice there are often relapses due to economic opportunism or down-right ignorance of the required set protocols.

The implementing guidelines stipulate, among other matters, refraining from the use of the term '€˜Republic of China'€™ and flying the Taiwanese flag, and no Cabinet members visiting Taiwan without the permission of the president.

Frequently the flexibility of these guidelines, which also acknowledge the importance of economic ties with Taiwan, are pushed to the limit as the differentiation between '€˜official'€™ and '€˜personal'€™ are blurred.

Industry Minister Saleh Husin'€™s trip to Taiwan in March '€“ supposedly with the knowledge of the President '€“ less than a week before Jokowi'€™s visit to Beijing caused consternation in many quarters and was potentially counterproductive with regard to much sought after Chinese investment.

In the pursuit of economic benefits, it is sometimes hard for Indonesians to fully comprehend the sensitivity of Beijing when it comes to Taiwan.

To understand this, Indonesia can draw parallels from its own history in the same way it used to be ultra sensitive pre-1999 when the issue of East Timor ever came up in international fora.

On the other hand perhaps it is time for Beijing to also act evenly in reacting to these '€˜incidents'€™ as it knows full well that Jakarta will not in any foreseeable future join the less than two dozen countries that have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

There is an impression that China treats Indonesia differently when compared, for example, to Singapore on this issue.

Singapore is only one of two countries that has a free-trade deal with Taiwan. Based on a 1970 agreement, Singapore'€™s military continues train in Taiwan. And in March, Taiwan'€™s President Ma Ying-jeou made a rare excursion abroad to Singapore on the death of Lee Kuan Yew.

Indonesia'€™s officials certainly need to synchronize its code of conduct when dealing with Taiwan, while China also needs to perceive these engagements with less agitation.

The other flashpoint that has increasingly become an issue in recent years is ambiguity over China'€™s supposed territorial maps, which encroach on Indonesia'€™s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Natuna Islands.

The map, which first came to the fore in 1993 and infamously later known as the '€˜nine-dash line'€™, showed what China claimed were '€˜historic waters'€™ that overlapped the Natuna economic zones.

Beijing has maintained a degree of ambiguity despite Jakarta'€™s assertions. It has tended to play down the issue recognizing the potential stalemate that would occur.

But in the not too distant future, clarity must be established and Beijing too needs to clearly assert recognition of Indonesia'€™s territorial waters, which ultimately delineate the EEZ.

As the primus inter pares in ASEAN, if China loses Indonesia it loses all goodwill that Indonesia can forge through the grouping. China already has unresolved territorial disputes with half the group'€™s members. It cannot afford to incite one with Indonesia.

On the economic side, Indonesia'€™s Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) said that in the first quarter China for the first time broke into the top-ten list of foreign investors. And while there remain problems in the realization rate of these investments, the potential can only get bigger.

It is time both sides looked within to assuage the other'€™s external worries and avoid mutual confusion that could lead the '€˜One China'€™ policy to seemingly become a '€˜No China'€™ policy.