T

he chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), DN Aidit, arrived in Jakarta from Beijing on Aug. 6, 1965, and visited the sick president Sukarno on Aug. 7 and 8.

As coordinating minister, he had direct access to the president. He introduced the two doctors whom he brought from China to Sukarno, who immediately examined him thoroughly.

Aidit then had a long conference with the two doctors from Beijing plus the team of Chinese doctors who had already been in Jakarta since July 22.

They told Aidit: First, Sukarno had deteriorated seriously to the point that his death could occur at any time; and second, even if Sukarno recovered, he would be totally paralyzed.

It was not the first time that high-ranking medical teams sent from Beijing to treat VVIP'€™s in targeted countries manipulated their diagnoses according to the instructions they received.

Aidit immediately convened the PKI'€™s politburo where he reported on the president'€™s condition. Aidit added that there was a sort of stalemate between the Army and the PKI thanks to Sukarno'€™s position as commander-in-chief.

If and when Sukarno became incapacitated, the Army was certain to wipe out the PKI.

Thus, according to Aidit, '€œthe PKI must strike first'€. On Aug. 12 Aidit called in Sjam who headed the party'€™s special bureau. His job was to infiltrate the Armed Forces and to prepare plans for a forced takeover. The special bureau reported directly to Aidit, bypassing the politburo. Thus the '€œSept. 30 Movement'€ (G30S) was born.

On Oct 1 when the leadership of the G30S and Sukarno started to waver, the quick response of then Maj. Gen. Soeharto, commander of the Army'€™s Strategic Reserve was unexpected. Especially, when information circulated that Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, coordinating minister for security (a fancy title but with no power) had managed to escape the kidnapping spree designed to eliminate the Army'€™s general staff.

Nasution had reportedly joined Soeharto at his command center on Jl. Merdeka Barat. Nasution had a reputation as a smart tactician since he was commander of the Java command leading the fight against the Dutch in 1948-1949. The Soeharto-Nasution team was simply too formidable to resist.

Sukarno ordered the G30S to cease their actions and to stop the bloodshed. Obviously, he was trying to create political space in which to maneuver.

Aidit, who was staying at the Halim Air Force Base with the plot leaders, kept sending messages, including to Sukarno. However, by midday when the G30S announced the membership of the so-called Revolutionary Council, it was obvious that an attempted coup d'€™etat had taken place.

Sukarno'€™s name had not been not included. The political motives of both Sukarno and Aidit require deeper analysis. I imagine they both tried to use each other.

Sukarno was keen to get rid of the general staff, including the elusive Nasution. Aidit, through Lt. Col. Untung of the presidential guard, promised Sukarno that he could carry out that assignment. And Aidit? Apparently, he and the PKI had more ambitious plans after eliminating Sukarno.

Toward the midnight of Oct. 1, Aidit'€™s problem was, however, how to save himself. He commandeered an Air Force plane with the permission of the Air Force chief Air Marshall Omar Dhani.

The frustrated Sukarno kept asking where he should go. Johannes Leimena, doctor, elder statesman and senior Cabinet member, who was also at Halim, persuaded the president to go to his Bogor Palace where one of his wives, the charming Hartini, was waiting.

Thus Leimena managed to prevent Sukarno from flying to Yogyakarta '€œto continue the revolution'€ with Aidit.

After reaching Yogyakarta, Aidit looked up his comrades, roamed throughout Central Java and went into hiding somewhere outside Surakarta.

He was captured and wrote a report of his views and intentions with the G30S. He was later shot after he kept taunting his guards, '€œShoot me'€.

In Beijing, Mao Zedong blamed the PKI for the failure. In Mao '€“ The Unknown Story it is reported (page 520) that Mao told the Japanese communists, '€œThe Indonesian communist party made two errors.'€ First, they blindly believed in Sukarno and overestimated the PKI'€™s strength within the Army.

The second error, Mao said, was that the PKI wavered without fighting it out.

Thus Beijing and Mao'€™s involvement in the failed Sept. 30 1965 movement was quite extensive.

The article in this paper by A. Dahana, professor of Chinese Studies at the University of Indonesia, '€œChina and the Sept. 30 Movement'€ (The Jakarta Post, Oct. 1), helps us to pursue this theme a bit deeper.