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n its third year, the Jokowi administration has achieved much. But there’s a lot of work left. What lessons have we learned, and how can we apply them to the remainder of the term?

Three years ago, I said that the new government should come up with a bold plan and action. Instead, we saw a burst of activity, all with good intentions. But some were not based on careful plans. So, there were some early setbacks.

General Patton said: “A good plan executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week.” But in the end, he did not win the war in Europe. That took the longer view of the less flashy General Eisenhower.

We will see how some policies could have been better with a good design.

Forced and unforced errors: This is an example of not being sensitive enough to changing circumstances. The new government made a bold move in late 2014 to cut the wasteful fuel subsidies. The savings funded infrastructure. But then oil prices tanked, wiping out those savings. The result was a severe shortfall in government revenues in 2015. In hindsight, oil prices were already weakening since 2013, when the United States Federal Reserve announced its upcoming rate hike. It was only a matter of time before commodity prices took a nosedive.

Next, is an example of underestimating bureaucratic sluggishness. One early policy was to slice and dice several ministries. As a result, these ministries were busy shuffling desks around for more than six months. Particularly impactful was the merging of the public housing and public works ministries: Only from the third quarter of 2015 were efforts in transportation infrastructure started.

In 2016, in the face of a tax revenue shortfall, an idea surfaced on how to enlarge the tax base, especially on how to bring home the assets Indonesians had stashed abroad. Later dubbed the tax amnesty, it was quite successful in alleviating some shortcomings. Taxpayers revealed assets with an unprecedented value close to 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), but less than one million taxpayers participated. And the repatriated amount was less than 15 percent of declared offshore assets.

Why? The best practice in tax reform is to first lift banking secrecy. Then, install an automatic information exchange system with other countries, and only then offer the tax amnesty. In other words, instill fear first, and then offer a way out. By reversing the order, some taxpayers felt the government had given them the short end of the stick.

The government knows that it alone cannot finance the necessary infrastructure investments. Yet, in its haste to ramp up implementation, it failed to address this constraint.

There are two parts to the solution: First, build up the financial sector for domestic players to tap. Second, package the projects to attract foreign participation.

This problem has now come home to roost. Leverage at several state-owned companies tasked with infrastructure development has risen to prohibitive levels, hence the scramble for alternative schemes like securitization. In a short while, we will likely run out of suitable assets for this scheme. Other instruments like project finance need preparing now. For non-state actors to take part, the regulatory framework requires a thorough review. Laying down quotas alone will not be effective.

The Finance Ministry recently voiced its worries about the financial condition of PLN, the state electric company. Electricity sales have plummeted to below economic growth — something unheard of in the past — and PLN has recently asked if it could buy coal at a fixed price. These facts appear connected. The issue is a divergence of projected versus actual electricity demand.

Projecting the demand for power and building large power plants are huge tasks. It is very tempting to want to build big power plants, as they enjoy economies of scale. Economic growth dwindling from 7 to 5 percent caught many by surprise. Even less predictable was the decline in industrial electricity demand; yet, the slowdown was there from 2013. Going ahead, we need to focus on incremental increase in the electricity supply. For this, we can rely on smaller, more efficient renewable energy power plants.

One trend beginning here is households installing solar panels. Not only do they reduce demand on the national grid, but households can also be small power suppliers. But this requires a revisit of the taxation scheme, which currently treats solar panels as luxury goods. This is one example illustrating the need to revisit the tax scheme on the renewable energy supply chain.

The pressure to achieve a lot in the remaining two years of this administration is high. Pushing ahead with more infrastructure projects is laudable. These projects are visible and hence, politically imperative. But there are other longer-term issues that also need attention; for example, education. The Education Law stipulates 20 percent of the state budget should go into education. Yet, many indicators show that the quality of our graduates has actually declined.

Universal health coverage is another long-term issue. As the population ages, health care will become burdensome in the future.

Speed and focus are the strengths of this government. Infrastructure, especially transportation, is its crowning achievement. But there are a host of other longer-term issues that must be handled starting now. Neglecting them today will constrain decision-making tomorrow. At the same time, policies should be better designed.

Don’t overestimate what you can achieve in two years; but don’t underestimate what you can achieve in seven.
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The writer is chief economist at PT Danareksa. The views expressed are his own.