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here has been some talk among academic circles about the coming ascendancy of a new power in the Asia-Pacific, which has been aptly branded KIA (Korea-Indonesia-Australia).

The argument, as voiced among others by Jonas Parello-Plesner, a Scandinavian foreign-policy adviser, is that although undertakings of powerhouses such as China, India, Japan and the US would continue to dominate in the region, a new order is very much in the making, with Korea, Indonesia and Australia playing greater roles as "middle powers".

Can Indonesia be a "middle power"? Some may smirk at this suggestion, arguing that Indonesia is in no capacity to play such a role, considering its problems at home, let alone its dubious recognition abroad. Meanwhile, others may say that to aspire to become a "middle power" is akin to aspiring for mediocrity.

However, all things considered, Indonesia's rise to international stardom should indeed be pursued through playing the role of a "middle power". In doing so, Indonesia would not only enhance its image as a responsible member of the international community, but also further strengthen its national resolve in conducting a "free and active foreign policy".

Parello-Plesner argues that Korea, Indonesia and Australia have every potential to play larger roles not only in the region's economy, but also in international politics. All three countries are members of the G20, which has gained prominence in recent efforts to tackle the global economic crisis.

Indonesia's basis for middle-power status stems from its success in domestic political reform, in particular, the embracing of democracy by its multiethnic, multireligious society.

In addition, by continuing to pose economic growth in the face of the current global economic crisis, Indonesia is now in a better position to confidently assert its independent status and active diplomacy on the world stage.

In recent times, middle-power leadership has been advocated by academics and foreign policymakers in Canada and Australia to fill in the power vacuum left after the end of the Cold War.

However, the notion itself dates back as far as the 15th century, when Italian philosopher Giovanni Botero described "middle powers" as states possessing "sufficient strength and authority to stand on their own without the need of help from others".

Of course, in today's globalized world, it is difficult to imagine a country surviving in complete isolation and autarky. Nonetheless, the spirit of Botero's definition remains true in that middle powers constitute countries that have a recognized prominent place within the international system.

Some define middle powers as countries whose material capabilities, such as military and economic powers, are neither great nor small, yet which seek to bolster international institutions as a means to manage power relations.

In addition, middle power leadership is defined by a country's political clout within a region or sub-region, as well as its ability to show expertise and push forward particular issues that are of interest to the international community.

Therefore, the strength of middle powers draw not only on their actual material capabilities, but also their geographical positioning vis-*-vis other countries and functional status in international relations.

Based on such criteria, Indonesia fits nicely into the category of a middle power. Although Indonesia may not be as powerful as some great powers, it cannot be equaled to smaller countries in the international community.

At the same time, while recognizing Indonesia's middle-power material, it is important to stress that having a "middle-sized" economy and/or a "middle-sized" military does not necessarily translate to Indonesia legitimately calling itself a middle power.

To be regarded as such and to make middle-power status actually mean something, Indonesia needs to "act" like a middle power. In other words, the existence of a middle power is defined by its essence - Indonesia is a middle power only if it engages the world actively.

The question remaining is thus why should we need to "brand" our foreign policy and diplomacy as that of a middle power? The concern is that by branding Indonesia's role in international affairs as such, we would confine ourselves to a box, limiting our ability to maneuver not only in pursuit of our national interests, but also the general interest of the international community.

Others may argue that by being a middle power, Indonesia would relegate itself to inferiority. At the same time, a middle-power status would distinguish Indonesia from smaller powers, thus alienating it from countries whose interest in Indonesia is supposedly represented in the international arena.

All things considered, however, branding is important in identity building. To generate a new identity for Indonesia's post-Cold War, post-reform foreign policy and diplomacy, it is essential that some level of branding be used in its approach to the world.

To brand itself as middle power does not constitute subservience to the politics of great powers. Instead, it should be seen as a humble recognition of Indonesia's limitations, and that despite these limitations, Indonesia is determined to play an active role in pushing for change and progress in the world. Also, far from alienating itself from the developing world, a middle-power status ensures Indonesia has role in mediating and linking the small and great world powers.

In his speech at Harvard University, President Susilo Bambang Yu-dhoyono proclaimed the 21st Century was "the century of soft power", outlining "Nine Imperatives" in creating the world anew through soft power.

As a middle power, and lacking the economic and military capacity to exert hard power, it is through middle-power leadership (using soft-power means) that Indonesia's foreign policy and diplomacy can achieve greater success. And President Yudhoyono has opened the path towards this very role for Indonesia in the years to come.