T

he continuing disconnect between political objectives and military strategy in Afghanistan is taking its toll and is virtually the reason for the ever-increasing distrust and lack of clarity for all stakeholders, especially Afghans.

The indication that the focus of US counterterrorism efforts would be on using “targeted force” against threats, without the need to “deploy large armies overseas”, change in Afghanistan? The continuing disconnect between political objectives and military strategy in Afghanistan is taking its toll and is virtually the reason for the ever-increasing distrust and lack of clarity for all stakeholders, especially Afghans.

 The indication that the focus of US counterterrorism efforts would be on using “targeted force” against threats, without the need to “deploy large armies overseas”, marked a move toward the so-called “Biden Plan”.

Associated with Vice President Joseph Biden, this plan questions Obama’s 2009 decision to deploy more troops for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and instead advocates a narrower counterterrorism mission, using drone technology and covert forces.

As widely anticipated, President Obama overruled the advice of his military commanders for a slower, more modest troop drawdown. Instead, he announced the full withdrawal of the “surge” force of 33,000 troops by the summer of 2012. This signaled a winding-down of the counterinsurgency effort he announced 18 months ago.

Citing progress on the goals he had set including a refocus on al-Qaeda, reversing the Taliban’s momentum and training Afghan security forces, Obama claimed he was beginning the drawdown from “a position of strength”. Obama prevailed over the Pentagon because his hand had been greatly strengthened by the killing of Osama bin Laden.

This development provided a compelling rationale for a speedier and more substantial troop reduction. Obama’s troop-withdrawal decision was shaped more by domestic political imperatives and his looming 2012 reelection bid rather than considerations of strategy. This has left unexplained gaps in US policy including between political goals and the military course of the war in Afghanistan.

His political considerations were dictated by war fatigue in both political parties and the growing unpopularity of the military mission among the public. With the cost of the Afghan war running at over US$100 billion a year at a time of budget cuts in America, President Obama also justified his decision by what he called the need for nation building at home.

There is as yet no indication that Washington is prepared to contemplate confidence-building measures with the Taliban that can produce a mutual de-escalation of violence and set the stage for serious talks. The US is still focused on setting “tests” for the Taliban to meet rather than explore the possibility of an agreed stand-down or “strategic pause” in fighting.

Any shift to the Biden strategy will likely entail frequent and more extensive drone attacks in Pakistan’s border areas, even clandestine operations like the one that killed Bin Laden. This will risk inflaming tensions further with Islamabad. An expansion of covert operations will pitch Pakistan-US relations into uncharted terrain, with ties already having hit rock bottom and in a state of disrepair.

What is already apparent is that without resetting Pakistan-US ties on the basis of reciprocity, the search for a negotiated political solution in Afghanistan will become more problematic.
Peter J.
Jakarta