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resident Yudhoyono again denied allegations of human-rights violations and widespread abuse in Papua (The Jakarta Post, Jan. 21, 2012). The problematic justification and framing of abuses as discretionary law enforcement and proportionate military retaliation towards Papuan armed groups has again raised doubts about Jakarta’s actual commitment and readiness for dialogue.

The establishment of the Special Unit for Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B) and the appointment of the President’s special envoy should not be taken at face value and romanticized as “the long awaited dialogue” between Jakarta and Papua. At this point, Jakarta’s policy makers, activists, and academics engaged with Papua’s problems should already realize that shattered hopes are the seeds of future enmity and that minting out peace initiatives often comes at a price — especially when they publicly fail.

I argue that Jakarta’s paradigm in solving Papua’s problem is inherently flawed due to (1) inexistence of shared understanding and expectations toward what constitutes a dialogue, (2) an unchanging and dictating approach towards development from Jakarta and (3) the total absence of a “security” component in Jakarta’s peace prescription. Unless these three interrelated dimensions are addressed, the prospect of a true and sincere dialogue between stakeholders entangled in Indonesia’s resource-rich easternmost province is bleak.

There is a possibility of the current peace initiative spiraling down into another “Melian dialogue” for Papua — an artificial dialogue, a one-way conversation, a piece of theater in which the strong simply demand what they want and the weak are then forced to accept what they must. Three things need to be kept in check.

First, realistic expectations and caution should always be emphasized despite the need for optimism towards Jakarta’s initiative for dialogue. Until now, the call for dialogue has often invited an insincere nod from Jakarta and a smirk of distrust from its two easternmost provinces. Such dismissive gestures reflect the lack of common understanding and expectations of what actually constitute a dialogue, its method of implementation, its expected outcomes and the range of local, national as well as international stakeholders to be included in it.

Nevertheless, the appointment of Farid Wadji Husein as the President’s special envoy for Papua is a very positive development, allowing Jakarta to re-establish contacts and consolidate a pre-dialogue platform. The President’s special envoy, formerly an Aceh peace negotiator, will soon face his own challenges upon facing the complex entanglement of multiple stakeholders and their interests within Papua.

A number of local stakeholders are already offering their helping hand, but many — including those abroad, exiled, or taking refuge — might remain unconvinced, dismissive and uninterested in another dialogue in which Jakarta “talks to” instead of “talks with” Papua. If Jakarta is looking for more than another public relations gimmick, it will need to anticipate the limits of dialogue for transnational actors, especially since previous peace conferences have demanded the inclusion of Papuans abroad.

Second, development through the UP4B should not be Jakarta’s way of yet again imposing and dictating how Papua can and should develop itself. The unit readily assumes that underdevelopment is the root cause of the Papuan problems therefore making “development” a commonsensical cure.

This approach does not consider the fact that it was an Indonesian developmentalist state that allowed excessive transmigration from the main islands as the most rational, quick fix, strategic and cost-efficient way of providing the skilled and educated workforce necessary to “develop” the resource-rich but sparsely populated province — a decision which later proved to be both counter-productive as well as immensely disruptive for its local population.

Academics doubt the unit’s intellectual capacity to map out Papua’s problems let alone finding a comprehensive and participative development strategy that is tailor-made for Papua.

Furthermore, activists commenting on the unit see a tendency towards bureaucratic sluggishness, an unsustainable ad hoc presence, and a project-oriented mindset with skeptics even claiming that UP4B is the new mask for old failed governmental projects. Although perceptions are not always based on objective and hard facts, they do have the ability to shape both behavior and expectations.

Lastly, the absence of a “security” component in Jakarta’s peace prescription is entirely discomforting for academics and national observers alike. Security here refers to the problematic justification of the presence of security actors and their actions within Papua. The defining of “security from what” and “security for whom” seems to be entirely different from how it is defined elsewhere in Indonesia.

The lack of a clear and coherent political-military command structure within the ranks of dissenting Papuans remains a double-edged challenge for both security and defense. Claims of “discretionary law enforcement” do not make sense when practices of sweeping, arrests and investigations continue to violate international standards and the National Police chief’s own directive on implementing human rights standards and principles in investigations.

Furthermore, any “proportionate military retaliation” should not be intended to target civilian groups, non-combatants or non-violent protesters, and should never be done without first establishing a clear linkage with Papuan armed militias. Although Indonesian sovereignty is important, it is never a blank check for impunity.

Yudhoyono’s denial of human rights violations and abuse in Papua are indications of the Indonesian government’s low political commitment to high integrity truth-seeking on abuses in Papua. Arguably, such practices of systematic lying are not always ‘bad’ nor are they necessarily counter-productive to Jakarta’s current dialogue initiatives.

In practice, it actually makes possible an inclusive peace by not singling out the Indonesian police and military as the present culprit and future spoilers of peace. Such practice of “non-truth” is defined as the intentional forgetting — and even lying — to help achieve reconciliation (Braithwaite et al. 2010). In fact, such practices are very commonly found in post-Soeharto Indonesia where civil society has had to continuously make concessions in order to achieve reconciliation.

Jakarta must now strive to maintain the coherence of its own peace initiative. Peace will only be possible when its three interrelated dimensions — dialogue, development and security — are considered. Furthermore, the President needs to make sure that his practice of “non-truth” on human rights issues actually contributes to peace and reconciliation in Papua; otherwise, it will simply be an unacceptable barefaced lying in front of the international community.

The writer is program director of Pacivis at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Indonesia, Depok, West Java.