T

he Iraqi government exuberantly declared victory over the Islamic State (IS) movement in Mosul on Monday, exactly three years after the militants seized the city and made it the stronghold of their “Islamic caliphate.”

It was such a bold achievement of the allied forces, which had enjoyed air and ground support from a United States-led coalition in the offensive launched in October to recapture the northern Iraqi city, as it also meant that they had managed to weaken and carve up the movement.

Yet, the success of rooting IS out of Iraq does not mean that the movement has completely disappeared. Similarly, the assassination of Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad in May 2011 proved that his loyalists and supporters could continue to exist despite the death of al-Qaeda’s supreme leader, with some even shifting allegiance to the then emerging IS.

It is therefore also highly possible that IS loyalists and supporters would persist in the country, especially because it remains to be seen whether its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was really killed in the latest offensive.

What does the defeat of IS in Iraq mean for Indonesia?

Setting aside the possibility that survivors of the latest offensive in Iraq would flee to Syria, the defeat in Iraq would likely mean the homecoming of Indonesian members and sympathizers of IS. Earlier estimates were that some 500 Indonesian citizens had joined IS in Iraq and Syria.

One immediate indication of their intention to return to Indonesia was a report that 17 Indonesian members and supporters of IS in Syria had revealed they intended to do just that, although none of them, most of whom are women, are key persons in the IS. People like Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian computer expert who reportedly joined IS in Syria to become an important member, were not among those talking to the media of their planned homecoming as they would likely attempt to secretly re-enter Indonesia.

We have a precedent for the return of Indonesians escaping such offensives against terrorist organizations. Imam Samudra and Ali Gufron, two of those convicted for involvement in the 2002 Bali bomb blast, returned to Indonesia in the early 2000s following the US-led coalition’s invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Claiming to have gained their terrorism and bombing expertise during the Afghan wars in the late 1990s, both these Afghan alumni were executed in 2008 for the Bali bombing.

The end of Iraq’s armed conflicts would also potentially increase terrorist threats in Indonesia, the telltale sign being a series of assaults on the police. One case involved the arrest of four men associated with Bahrun in December for allegedly plotting attacks against senior police officers and Shiite institutions in Indonesia.

Those indications are more than enough to sound the alarm that the return of “Iraq or Syria alumni” to Indonesia would increase the potential terrorist threats here because of their improved experience and expertise gained while engaging in conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

Apart from anticipating the potential return of Indonesian supporters and sympathizers of IS and the increased terrorist threats here, there is indeed an important lesson for Indonesia to learn from the Iraqi conflict. Despite the country’s social, cultural and religious differences with Indonesia, conflicts in Iraq could also happen in Indonesia.

As many terrorism analysts and experts have said, religious and communal conflicts are among several triggers for terrorist attacks or for people joining terrorist organizations.

The 2003 US-led invasion had toppled Saddam Hussein and made the Shiites politically dominant in Iraq, but the country had thereafter been racked by ethnic conflicts until the emergence of IS in July 2014, which had even worsened the conflicts there. Conflicts in Iraq should therefore be considered as a clear warning to the socially and religiously heterogeneous Indonesia.

Other triggers for terrorist attacks or for people joining terrorist organizations, experts and analysts have said, are poverty and injustice.

Statistics revealed a decrease of the numbers of Indonesians living below the poverty line by 2.11 percent to 28.01 million as of March 2016, compared to March 2015. Yet the figure still indicates there remains the potential threat of crimes — and also terrorist acts — unless poverty is no longer an issue here.

Injustice also serves as a trigger for increased crimes and terrorist acts unless the government can ensure that all legal cases, including corruption and other high-profile cases, are equally processed in accordance with laws and regulations. Apart from the controversial ongoing House of Representatives inquiry into the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), there have been concerns about the commission being “picky” over prosecuting corruption cases that could harm the public’s sense of justice.

Law enforcement is key to combating crimes — particularly terrorist acts. However, factors that contribute to increased crimes and terrorist acts are also important to prevent those crimes and acts of terrorism.