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fter its success in redefining Indonesian civil-military relations, the subsequent agenda of military reform — defense transformation — in the country has been stagnant. This is a call for the increased capacity of the civilian political elites to deal with defense-related issues and revitalize the role of the community of defense experts.

Indonesian Military (TNI) reform can be partly seen as a remedy to the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine that had allowed the omnipresence of the military in non-military roles during the New Order. The initial reform agenda following president Soeharto’s resignation was thus aimed at dismantling the military’s socio-political role and business network.

These objectives were achieved with the 2002 State Defense Law, the 2004 TNI Law as well as the 2009 presidential regulation on the takeover of military businesses.

The first two bills guarantee the characteristics of the TNI as a professional military within the country’s democratic framework. The presidential regulation, meanwhile, reflects the political consensus that denies military involvement in business — directly and indirectly, legally and illegally — which had undermined the military’s professionalism.

Throughout these early years of military reform, one notable theme was the active role played by the defense expert network. This “defense epistemic community” itself was formed through sustained interaction among representatives from the civilian community, including scholars and NGO activists, lawmakers, Defense Ministry officials and a number of reform-minded military officers.

Working closely together, the alliance had pushed forward the military reform agenda, raised public awareness on the necessity for objective civilian control over the military and ensured continuous public support for reform.

In doing so, the defense epistemic community took a nonconfrontational approach built upon constructive analysis, intellectual capacity, social networks and impartiality. It developed a critical collaboration to engage both the military and defense-related civilian institutions in a series of negotiations.

These principles guided programs that included policy discussion and advocacy, public awareness campaigns, capacity building and public empowerment. Thus, the defense epistemic community played a major role as both a counterbalance and supporter of the reform that would have otherwise been dominated by the military itself.

The active collaboration between the epistemic community and other reform stakeholders led to important changes.

The military headquarters, for instance, modified the curriculum in the military academy and colleges.

Instead of learning about the military’s socio-political roles, cadets and officers are now taught subjects on humanitarian law. The military’s judiciary has now been integrated into the Supreme Court, at least in administrative and financial management. Finally, Indonesian military officers are now required to resign before becoming active in politics.

The first generation of military reform, however, is only part of the story. The next agenda is to ensure that the TNI, now officially out of politics and business, can undertake its core function as the state’s instrument for defense. This involves a reconceptualization of how the military should think about contemporary characteristics on security and conduct of war.

The second generation of the military reform thus aims to transform the TNI into a truly capable armed forces.

Defense budget increase and modification in its composition notwithstanding, the TNI is still struggling with its transformation agenda.

A presidential regulation was issued in 2008 outlining the plan to achieve the “minimum essential force” (MEF) by 2024 and the law on the defense industry was passed in 2012.

More, however, is needed in terms of intellectual and legal framework to guide Indonesia’s defense transformation.

With only five years left before the deadline, the prospect of the TNI achieving the MEF goal is highly unlikely. In addition there is growing concern among Indonesian defense analysts that Indonesia still relies heavily on the doctrine of defensive warfare, which has prohibited the formulation of policies required to transform the military into a more advanced force.

What went wrong? A closer look at TNI reform would reveal that insufficient attention has been paid to the civilian part of the reform process. Most of the political elites are still used to issues related to the military’s old political roles. More substantial issues such as the development of Indonesia’s strategic environment or military innovation to strengthen TNI’s combat capability are often overlooked. The lack of capacity has resulted in the lack of direction, especially regarding defense transformation.

Indeed, in a democratic system, objective civilian control over the military requires not only a professional military but also civilian authority with capacity and expertise in strategic and defense issues. A well-informed civilian authority would ensure better quality of legislation, budgetary oversight and strategic planning.

Lack of capacity among civilian political elites in defense-related matters has also resulted in the inability to manage sustained public support for pending reform agendas. The public and media seem to be more obsessed with issues such as political maneuvers of former generals or rumors surrounding new appointments of defense officials.

To progress with military reform, two challenges need to be addressed. First, the capacity of political elites and broader civilian community needs to be strengthened. Democratic civilian control over the military should be reflected in the capacity of the state institutions to formulate well-informed defense policies. An informed public would also be able to check policy implementation, especially when it comes to budget allocation and use.

A second and related point is that the role of the defense expert community must be revitalized. After all, the community has accumulated knowledge and experience over the last two decades of military reform. This would be a critical factor in assisting both the civilian authority and the military to formulate and implement future defense policies.

Apart from policy advocacy, the defense epistemic community would also be helpful in raising public awareness and understanding on democratic civil-military relations.
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