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Ma’ruf factor and Indonesia’s democracy
Recently, The Jakarta Post published a crucial and timely debate on the Ma’ruf Amin factor in April’s presidential election and its potential effect on Indonesian democracy
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span>Recently, The Jakarta Post published a crucial and timely debate on the Ma’ruf Amin factor in April’s presidential election and its potential effect on Indonesian democracy.
While Ahmad Najib Burhani (May 9) argued that Ma’ruf, a Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) top figure, had failed to boost Jokowi’s electability and potentially degraded Indonesia’s democracy, Azis Anwar Fachrudin (May 18) emphasized the role of Ma’ruf and the NU factor in increasing Jokowi’s share of the vote in East and Central Java.
Furthermore, Azis implied that there was no need to worry about Jokowi’s alliance with the NU, because Indonesia was a Pancasila state, rather than a liberal democratic state, and indeed the alliance was better, when we consider the Indonesian political reality, than Prabowo Subianto’s Islamist-backed coalition.
Emphasizing the “shield” perspective, Azis argued that Ma’ruf’s VP candidacy shouldn’t necessarily be regarded as a move to reap votes but rather as a defensive maneuver that successfully saved Jokowi from losing a huge number of votes, especially in West Java. Ma’ruf’s nomination was also defined as the key factor behind a significant rise in electoral support in East and Central Java, as well as in Yogyakarta and among non-Muslim voters.
Indeed, measuring the Ma’ruf effect against the reelection of Jokowi is difficult, as it requires clear and complex indicators. We need to distinguish between the increase in votes for Jokowi in Central Java as a result of the Ma’ruf factor and as a result of the political consolidation of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), since this province is the party’s traditional stronghold.
Compared with the 2014 election, the map of support for Jokowi has not changed much in Central Java and Yogyakarta this time around. Data from the General Elections Commission (KPU) show that, in 2014, Jokowi-Kalla won in those two provinces with 66.65 percent and 55.81 percent respectively. In 2019, Jokowi-Amin won in both provinces, following nearly the same pattern as the 2014 election.
This suggests that Jokowi still enjoys huge support from voters in those regions, despite the change in VP candidate. The same pattern of votes could also be seen in Jakarta; there was no significant difference between the number of votes cast in the 2014 and 2019 elections.
The claim that the Ma’ruf factor accounted for the massive increase in votes for Jokowi from non-Muslim voters is also debatable. The fundamental reason to doubt this claim is that, when he was the chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), he played a prominent role in the arrest of Christian, Chinese-Indonesian former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) on blasphemy charges. Non-Muslims’ support for Jokowi can be best explained as a rational choice by voters rather than as a result of the Ma’ruf factor.
Therefore, placing emphasis on the “shield” perspective when examining the Ma’ruf factor implicitly recognizes its minimal role and effect in the presidential election. The claim that there was a Ma’ruf factor is an expression of the defensiveness and low expectations of the NU and Jokowi’s supporters with regard to Ma’ruf’s VP candidacy, especially after Jokowi’s failure to retain Mahfud MD as his first choice of running mate.
With this in mind, Najib’s argument on the failure of the Ma’ruf factor can be clearly understood.
Regarding Azis’ second point in his response to Najib’s argument, he does not deny Jokowi’s tendency to favor the NU by emphasizing the close ties between the government and the country’s largest Muslim organization, including the appointment of several NU-linked ministers in Jokowi’s Cabinet and the provision of aid to NU educational institutions.
Despite Azis expressing his concern regarding improvements to Indonesia’s democracy, he does not regard the close alliance between Jokowi and the NU as requiring a balance.
Rather, he argues that the alliance is necessary to protect the government from Islamist attacks. At this point, Pancasila democracy doesn’t endorse the practice of favoritism.
Azis puts his argument in the context of the dilemmatic political situation: Jokowi’s alliance with the NU vis-a-vis Prabowo’s alliance with the Islamist groups. Within the context of a presidential candidacy, this political reality must be taken into account when deciding which of the two candidates to support.
However, continued use of this narrative would be problematic in the postelection context. Now that Jokowi has officially won the election, no more should we ask: Had Prabowo won, would his presidency have employed authoritarian policies? Instead, we should consider how we can respond to Jokowi’s presidency if it takes a turn toward authoritarianism.
Simply explaining Jokowi’s close ties with the NU as being the lesser of two evils would be to slip into acceptance and tolerance of favoritism and authoritarianism.
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The writer is a PhD researcher at the University of Leeds.
