The government has decided against the homecoming of some 600 former foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from Syria as “they could become a new terrorist virus” that will threaten Indonesia’s entire population.

Coordinating Legal, Political and Security Affairs Minister Mahfud MD announced the decision, a few days after President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo expressed his refusal to welcome back the returnees. The country’s largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, supports the government’s policy.

The call to fighting for the Islamic State (IS) group had enticed hundreds of Indonesians to quit their jobs, leave their hometowns, with or without their families.

The phenomenon of Indonesian foreign fighters dates back to the 1980s, when hundreds of people left the country for Afghanistan to help Muslims there fight the Soviet Union army and return as well-trained mujahideen. From there, they set up structures and engaged with local networks in paramilitary mobilization and terrorist-related activities.

At that time, Indonesia had no counterterrorism agency and lacked coordination in terms of information-sharing among intelligence agencies. Security authorities failed to detect terrorist sleeper cells.

Indonesia now faces a potential wave of foreign fighter returnees from IS, which has considerable influence on our society. This is precisely why leaving them stranded is counterproductive.

First, the statements of both Jokowi and Mahfud could potentially be new viruses themselves. They appear to defend the nation by raising security concerns. Indeed, the caliphate IS had envisioned might already be dead but the terrorist group’s ideas and doctrines are still alive in the minds of people in Indonesia. The possibility of IS sympathizers recruiting others is inevitable and could potentially give rise to extremism — exactly what Indonesians fear the most.

However, one solution to such a problem is exploiting their experience and knowledge. It will provide officials with a better understanding of their new modus operandis, strategies and finally, infiltrate their networks. There needs to be a sustainable and constant relationship between former FTFs and state officials.

Second, in contrary to popular belief, research shows that most returnees will not face criminal charges as they are more likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. On top of that, they have to face socioeconomic instability.

Still, six consecutive months of deradicalization programs are suggested, starting from the arrival of the former IS foreign fighters. Time is of the essence here.

Similarly the National Counterrorism Agency (BNPT) once claimed that deradicalization programs were time-consuming and that recent cases had shown a level of failure. But it does not mean the programs are impossible to impose.

Other research shows that most former FTFs have expressed feelings of remorse and an individual shift of consciousness, such as realizing that their participation in acts of terror were part of a vile political plot.

Third, the government will need much more resources and capabilities if they opt to leave the FTFs behind. Supporting their livelihood in temporary camps in Syria will be costly and maintaining the work force of field officers with high tech equipment will be exhausting too. They have to be persistent in the long process of identifying all actors, collecting data and monitoring the FTF movements.

Besides, there have been reports that refusing to repatriate former FTFs constitute a higher threat. Research discovered that ignoring FTFs may increase their desperation and prompt them to escape their camps and worse, become even more prone to extremism and violence.

Fourth, to date, countries such as Germany and Belgium, which are highly affected by the enlistment of these fighters, rely on their domestic law enforcement. Research argues that it is better for states to take the matter into their national jurisdiction. Moreover, terrorism is still a grey area to regulate under the international law regime, as transnational prosecution under an international tribunal is still under serious talks between states.

Taking into account the state’s responsibility, the governments of the FTF countries of origin will still be held accountable for any upcoming threats and movements. Come what may, these former FTFs are still listed as Indonesians despite their claim to have abandoned their Indonesian nationality.

Therefore what the government has been trying to do is only a short-term solution. Other countries like the Netherlands, France and Spain have repatriated former FTFs and are prosecuting them at home, with women and children given priority.

Disclaiming them is not the end of the game; it only replaces one problem with another.

Granting the right of stateless to a person is not a feasible option either. Citizenship Law No. 12/2006 says that anyone who is willing to abandon their Indonesian nationality — although with one’s own free will — must not face the consequence of becoming stateless.

Luckily, penalizing FTFs is viable under the law, specifically under Article 12 of Terrorism Law No. 5/2018, which threatens to sentence FTFs to a maximum 15 years’ imprisonment. However, enforcing the article is limited to Indonesian nationals who fought for IS and assuming that they still hold their legitimate IDs and passports. If found otherwise, immigration officials would only need to cross-check with the civil administrative data system and their family members in Indonesia.

A report by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict shows that Indonesia already operates a task force under the Office of the Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister, which focuses on repatriating FTFs. The task force involves the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, Social Affairs Ministry, Religious Ministry, Indonesian Military, National Police, State Intelligence Agency and the BNPT. Some civil society organizations have succeeded in reintegrating former FTFs into local communities.

The legal basis and capability of state institutions to repatriate the former FTFs is therefore solid and cooperation will lead to success. Not only because we can bring them home, but also because we have to.

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Research assistant for the department of politics and social change, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

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