Prabowo broke with the tradition for all new ASEAN leaders to make an introductory tour of all the other nine capitals immediately after they take office. He has visited some but not all of the capitals since his inauguration in October, including Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, to leave the impression that he puts these bilateral relations ahead of the group.

In his speech at the opening of the Kuala Lumpur summit, Prabowo called for a stronger ASEAN to face the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. He sprang a surprise by proposing that Papua New Guinea, which currently has an observer status, be admitted following the expected accession of Timor-Leste in October. The addition of the two new members would strengthen ASEAN’s hands in global diplomacy, he argued.

As ASEAN’s largest member, Indonesia is regarded as the natural leader of the group. Most major initiatives, including the move toward a community, have come from Indonesia. But Jakarta has resisted flexing its muscles, which many argue could have made ASEAN move more quickly. ASEAN makes its decisions by consensus and Indonesia has had to rely largely on its persuasive diplomacy to get what it wants. This is important to ensure ASEAN unity.  

There have been calls for Indonesia to exert more leadership in the group given the increasing challenge the region faces today. Prabowo, the former Army general who was Indonesia’s defense minister in 2019-2024, would fit that bill. But whether he is keen on taking up this role, depends greatly upon how he sees ASEAN.

Although he has made his point that ASEAN is important, we still have to figure out his precise intentions. All we know for now is that Indonesia’s foreign policy, including on ASEAN, is changing under Prabowo.

Indonesia has already invested heavily in ASEAN, perhaps more so than the other nine members that don’t give high priority to their foreign policy.

But there are limitations on ASEAN’s capability to resolve problems, for example on the Myanmar war and the South China Sea territorial disputes, to raise the question whether Indonesia should invest even more time and resources when the dividends are low.

The prolonged civil war in Myanmar has become a huge embarrassment for ASEAN, to the point that many around the world blame the group for its inability to resolve the conflict. Indonesia and ASEAN have done all they can in their power. The problem is with the junta, and ASEAN is not designed to deal with belligerent regimes. ASEAN should send the Myanmar problem back to the United Nations or the big powers.

On the issue of the South China Sea, negotiations with China for a code of conduct in dealing with maritime disputes have dragged on for more than two decades with no clear end in sight. On this, Prabowo’s decision to explore joint development cooperation with China in the South China Sea offers a fresh alternative in dealing with the issue.

On the move toward ASEAN community, the group has decided to go gradually. From the original target of 2015, it shifted to 2025 and now, 2045. The region is becoming more integrated over time but it is moving largely on autopilot. Indonesia’s leadership will not make that much of a difference.

Indonesia under President Prabowo is not abandoning ASEAN. Far from it. The group remains important for Jakarta to channel its foreign policy goals, but it is no longer the most important. Expect more changes in the coming months in the way Indonesia approaches ASEAN. And be prepared for a little surprise or two.