The history of this arrangement stems from the colonial period, when British aviation authorities in Singapore and the Dutch colonial administration in Batavia, now Jakarta, divided responsibilities for air navigation services in Southeast Asia. This colonial arrangement persisted after Indonesia’s independence, leaving parts of the country’s western airspace under Singapore’s control.

In 2015, then-president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo issued an unequivocal instruction, Indonesia must reclaim control of the FIR above its sovereign territory. Yet seven years later, the 2022 agreement once again extended this delegation, with the government citing technical readiness and diplomatic considerations.

This paradox raises a critical question: Can a sovereign state justify surrendering control of its own airspace to another country?

Since the Paris Convention (1919) and the Chicago Convention (1944), international law has affirmed that sovereignty over airspace is complete and exclusive. For Indonesia, the continued delegation of its FIR raises serious concerns in three domains: Law, politics and defense.

Three theoretical frameworks illuminate this problem. First, Jean Bodin’s theory of absolute sovereignty defines sovereignty as the indivisible and permanent authority of the state. Second, C. Wright Mills’ Power Elite theory explains how strategic national policies are often shaped not by public will, but by a small circle of elites. Third, Graham Allison’s decision-making models provide a lens to analyze why governments often arrive at suboptimal or compromise outcomes.

Complementing these perspectives are the contributions of international air law scholars. Pablo Mendes de Leon underscores sovereignty as a critical legal instrument for safeguarding state authority over airspace, while Atip Latipulhayat identifies three inseparable pillars of sovereignty control of the air, use of airspace and law enforcement.

Bodin (1530–1596), in Six Livres de la République (1576), emphasized that sovereignty is absolute, indivisible and non-transferable. Thus, the delegation of Indonesia’s FIR to Singapore directly undermines the essence of sovereignty. Airspace is not merely a matter of technical air navigation, but the state’s ultimate right to regulate, utilize and defend its territory.

Mills, in The Power Elite (1956), argued that policies in modern states are often dictated by small groups of elites in politics, the military and business. The FIR case exemplifies this, as the decision to delegate control was not the product of public deliberation, but of elite negotiation.

Allison’s Essence of Decision (1971) proposed three models of decision-making, Rational Actor, Organizational Process and Governmental Politics. Applying these to the FIR case reveals that the 2022 agreement was not a purely rational choice to enhance national security. Instead, it emerged as a bureaucratic compromise and diplomatic bargaining chip, particularly since FIR discussions were tied to unrelated issues such as extradition and defense cooperation treaties.

De Leon stresses that reliance on sovereignty serves as a legal mechanism to safeguard airspace and national security. When Indonesia cedes part of its FIR, that legal safeguard is eroded.

Atip outlines three interdependent pillars of sovereignty, control of the air, use of airspace and law enforcement. In practice, Indonesia cannot fully exercise any of these in the Singapore FIR, rendering its sovereignty incomplete.

Politically, the decision reflects inconsistencies within Indonesia’s own governance. Despite a presidential instruction in 2015 to reclaim the FIR, the 2022 extension contradicts this directive. Moreover, by placing FIR negotiations under the Office of Coordinating Maritime Affairs and Investment Minister, an institution without direct authority over airspace, rather than the Defense Ministry or Transportation Ministry, the government weakened its own institutional coherence.

The delegation of Indonesia’s FIR to Singapore represents more than a technical arrangement. It symbolizes a contradiction of international law, which affirms that sovereignty over airspace is both complete and exclusive; an inconsistency in Indonesia’s national policy, where presidential directives are undermined by subsequent agreements; and the persistence of a colonial legacy, where arrangements dating back to British and Dutch colonial administrations remain in place; and a deficit in Indonesia’s independence, as the nation cannot fully exercise control, utilization and enforcement of law over its own airspace.

These issues underscore that Indonesia’s independence is not yet comprehensive. As long as foreign powers retain control over portions of its airspace, Indonesia remains trapped in the remnants of colonial governance, raising profound questions about sovereignty, defense and national dignity.

From the perspectives of Bodin, Mills and Allison, combined with the legal analyses of de Leon and Atip, the delegation of Indonesia’s FIR cannot be justified. It contradicts the concept of absolute sovereignty, represents elite-driven policymaking and reflects bureaucratic compromise rather than rational national interest. 

Ultimately, the continued delegation of Indonesia’s FIR demonstrates that the country’s independence remains incomplete. Sovereignty over airspace is not merely a technical matter of navigation, it is a core element of statehood. As long as portions of Indonesia’s skies are controlled by another state, the promise of full independence remains unfulfilled.

The continued delegation of Indonesia’s sovereign airspace, embodied in the so-called Singapore FIR, is nothing less than a living reminder of colonial procedures carried into the present. It exposes the inconsistency of our nation’s commitment to stand firmly against every form of domination.

For Indonesia, the fight is not yet finished. Colonialism and imperialism, together with their modern faces, neocolonialism and neo-imperialism, must be confronted and eradicated once and for all.

Time is opportune for President Prabowo Subianto to right the wrong, although it is very unlikely that Indonesia under him would ever withdraw from the agreement given the political sensitivities and potential diplomatic repercussions.

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The writer is former Indonesian Air Force chief of staff and founder and chairman of Indonesia Center for Air Power Studies. The views expressed are personal.