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How will Biden’s foreign policy in Indo-Pacific shape up?

Biden’s preference for multilateralism, however, might mean that ASEAN has Biden’s ears. 

Irman G. Lanti (The Jakarta Post)
Bandung
Fri, January 22, 2021

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How will Biden’s foreign policy in Indo-Pacific shape up?

T

he United States has officially entered the post-Trump era with the swearing-in of President Joe Biden. While it is easy for Biden to undo some of Trump’s controversial populist domestic policies,  there are issues that might be difficult to reverse, and most of them lie in the foreign policy realm. This includes American foreign policy in our neck of the woods.

Trump inherited the concept of Indo-Pacific from his predecessors, and took it up a notch by adopting the concept of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in 2019. FOIP was considered widely as a policy to contain the belligerent rise of China, seen by many as to have increased rapidly during the past decade, especially in the waters of the South China Sea.

FOIP received wholehearted support from America’s allies in the region, including Japan, India, and Australia, which along with the US, formed what is known as the Quad countries. FOIP also received support from the EU, South Korea, and while not openly, many Southeast Asian countries also applauded FOIP for its tenacity in standing up to the aggressive China. In short, US Indo-Pacific policy might be one of the few Trump policies that received wide support.

Members of the Trump administration probably realized this. In his final public appearance, then- vice president Mike Pence, speaking in front of US Navy sailors in a military facility on Jan. 16, urged the Biden administration to keep “eternal vigilance” in standing up to China. This followed the declassification of a document detailing the thinking and strategy of US Foreign Policy on the Indo-Pacific region early last week.

The document entitled “US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific” mentions the need for America to strengthen its military presence in the region through alliances with the Quad countries and South Korea. It also lists China and North Korea as threats to the region’s stability and vital American interests.

The document views Southeast Asia and ASEAN in a different light. Instead of treating ASEAN as a united entity, the document tends to treat Southeast Asian countries in different categories. Thailand and the Philippines are classified as treaty alliance countries; Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam are identified as countries with which relationships should be deepened; Myanmar is singled out as a country in need of democratic transition support; and there was no mention of the rest of Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia and Laos, which are known to have close relationships with China.

Ironically, the document emphasizes the need for ASEAN countries “to speak with one voice” as one of the US foreign policy’s key objectives in Southeast Asia.

What seems to be more disheartening was the fact that ASEAN did not actually figure highly in Trump’s foreign policy calculation. Some of ASEAN’s or ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministry Meeting (ADMM) and East Asian Summit (EAS) were mentioned, but strangely put under the context of how the US should help India play a more active leadership role in the mechanisms.

Furthermore, while ASEAN centrality is referred to, it is made on how such centrality matters only in the case of ASEAN’s support for FOIP. There is no single reference made in the document to the concept of ASEAN Outlook on Indo Pacific (AOIP). This probably reflects the general disdain that Trump had for multilateralism.

Unlike the US, ASEAN countries are next door neighbors of China and generally are not protected by treaty alliances with the US (with the exception of Thailand and the Philippines, whose treaties predate ASEAN’s establishment). As such, ASEAN needs to approach the rise of China pragmatically, acknowledging that China’s rise is a reality that ASEAN, like it or not, needs to live with.

ASEAN of course prefers China’s pacifist rise, and therefore tacitly approves the US to play a counterbalancing act if the rise produces a belligerent China, as demonstrated by Chinese action during the past decade in the South China Sea, where many ASEAN countries have overlapping territorial claims with China.

However, ASEAN would be the one affected most adversely by an open conflict between the major powers in the region. Therefore, ASEAN needs to ensure that peace and stability are ensured in the region according to inclusive and cooperative principles set out by ASEAN states, hence, the concept of ASEAN centrality.

While agreeing with the intention of FOIP, ASEAN faces difficulties in accepting its aggressive posturing as it might invite more aggressive counter-posturing by China.

It was with the intention to mediate the interests of the great powers while preserving ASEAN centrality that ASEAN produced an alternative document to FOIP, known as the AOIP, in 2019. ASEAN hopes that AOIP could provide the norms that all countries adhere to, pretty much in the same fashion with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) that has preserved peace and stability in the region for so long. It must have been disappointing for ASEAN to learn that the Trump administration did not seem to recognize AOIP a credible document.

Now the opportunity presents itself for ASEAN with the arrival of Biden administration. On his campaign trail, Biden promised to return the US to the fold of cooperation with allies and multilateralism. It is important to note, though, that Biden is highly unlikely to adopt a turn-the-other-cheek policy toward China. This has already been indicated by a statement made by Biden’s nominee for Antony Blinken as secretary of state in the confirmation hearing on Jan. 19, in which he stated the need to “outcompete China”.

Biden’s preference for multilateralism, however, might mean that ASEAN has Biden’s ears. Therefore, it is high time for ASEAN to launch diplomatic initiatives to convince the US, as well as China, that AOIP presents the best option to avert open conflicts in the region. ASEAN also needs to present to the major powers examples of how AOIP can operate on the principles of inclusivity and cooperation that it espouses.

To date, AOIP remains a document, without significant effort to actually carry it out in real life. This has to change. One or two areas could be prioritized as pilots for regional cooperation based on AOIP principles, to demonstrate the virtues of the concept.

In short, to ensure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN must go on the offensive and work hard to convince both Washington and Beijing.

 ***

The writer is a lecturer, Graduate Program on International Relations, Padjadjaran University.

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