This way of thinking became more problematic when it emphasized the use of jihad as the highest form of “rejection” of the thaghut. The dissemination of this thought, particularly through the digital realm, became a powerful tool for recruiting new members and supporters — until today.

The doctrine outlining that the ultimate expression of faith was through fighting the enemies of faith (the thaghut) became a dangerous virus spreading throughout the extremist community. This was because in attacking the thaghut there was little concern for ordinary Muslims caught up in the crossfire — the most important thing was to fight against the thaghut.

For a group of extremists who were obsessed with jihad and martyrdom, the theology and ideology espoused by Aman gave them greater freedom in selecting targets that were within their capability. They no longer had to attack foreigners or the US allies, but instead could target other religious communities and everyone involved in helping support the ongoing rule of those who did not implement Islamic law, namely the Indonesian government.

This gave rise to a spate of attacks from 2010 onward, including a series of attacks targeting the police in Cirebon, West Java; Bima, West Nusa Tenggara; Surakarta, Central Java; and Jakarta from 2010 to 2013.

Then, in 2014, many “truth seekers” online, namely those that shared Abdurrahman's views, found a new home in IS' “false caliphate”. Many of IS' propaganda releases were in accordance with Abdurrahman's thinking. As a result, Aman and his followers flocked to pledge their allegiance to IS and its leader at the time, Abu Bakar al Baghdadi.

The “proof” offered by the existence of IS' caliphate as well as their pledge of allegiance to the nascent statelet provided a stronger justification for IS supporters' acts of terrorism. They could claim to be acting as “soldiers of the caliphate”, when perpetrating attacks in Indonesia and each of their attacks would receive official recognition as an IS attack.

Thus saw the era of IS attacks in Indonesia, with the Thamrin shooting and bombing in Central Jakarta (January 2016) being the first officially recognized IS terrorist attack in Indonesia. This was soon followed by the Surakarta Police headquarters bombing (July 2016) and then the Kampung Melayu suicide bombing (May 2017) in East Jakarta. All three of these attacks targeted police officers.

There were also several other small-scale attacks on police and religious communities throughout 2017. Then 2018 saw a relatively significant attack, namely the suicide bombings targeting three churches and a police headquarters in Surabaya, East Java. Following the Surabaya bombings, the next major attacks were those we have witnessed in just the past month: the Makassar Cathedral suicide bombing and the shooting at the National Police headquarters. All of these attacks were heavily promoted on IS social media chat groups, providing stories, images and messages that inspired further attacks.

Targeting the police and religious communities is the fruit of thinking that has developed slowly over time. If we follow the current train of thinking, it is entirely possible that if terrorist cells are no longer capable of attacking police stations and churches they may soon turn their attention to even “softer” targets, such as civil servants. Views like this have already been circulating on social media chat groups for years.

But the perpetrators of these attacks do not emerge out of nowhere. Within the extremist community there are several levels of supporters, each seeking to reject and resist the thaghut in different ways.

At the top level are the most dangerous: those who want to “prove their faith” by attacking something that they believe is a legitimate target, or more precisely which they force to become a legitimate target. Why there are people willing to attack police posts armed only with slingshots or knives? The answer is that they want to prove the extent of their faith. It does not matter if they fail or if they are imprisoned, what is most important is that they took action.

The next level down are those who help fund terrorist cells commit their attacks or those who provide donations to the families of imprisoned terrorists. 

Below this, at the lowest level, are those who are unable to provide financial assistance to networks but instead help by disseminating extremist propaganda and thought on social media in the hope that this will attract new recruits to their cause. It is at this level that online radicalization is at its most intense and will remain so, as long as there are people who continue to hold extremist beliefs.

Taking down accounts, chat groups or websites disseminating extremist thought will not have a great impact in the long run. Where one chat group or website falls, extremists can create new ones in a matter of minutes. For them, spreading their group's propaganda and thought is the most basic form of “proving their faith”.

My colleagues at Ruangobrol.id and I believe that a more promising approach to reducing online radicalization is by increasing the volume of alternative narratives and content which can educate the community. We need to flood the internet with works espousing positive messages or moderate and more contextual understandings of Islam, so that when people want to learn about Islam on the internet they will find positive content first.

Search engine algorithms — whether this is on web-based search engines like Google or those within social media platforms — will automatically display articles that have high levels of engagement and traffic. This means that if extremist groups are more active in producing content compared with their moderate competitors, extremist content will be pushed up the list of search engine results. For example, if someone searches for the word tauhid (Islamic monotheism), the writings of Abdurrahman or IS may appear first if they have produced more content on this topic than those seeking to provide a correct understanding of tauhid.

But how will we be able to do this if most people deny that extremism even exists? Public education campaigns are also needed to ensure that the issue of online radicalization receives the attention it deserves. At Ruangobrol.id we are attempting to do this by educating the community about terrorism issues through involving credible voices — former terrorists who have repented and now wish to make a positive contribution to the community.

At the very least, in the short term, we want to increase public awareness that terrorism is a challenge which we must face together.

As more people take up this kind of awareness-raising work, online radicalization will begin to decline, little bit by little. The role of religious scholars, preachers and organizations will be vital, because they have strong networks and a large base of supporters in the broader community. Ultimately, it will be critical that moderate activists collaborate and complement one another's efforts to break the chain of transmission of extremist ideas online.

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The writer is a repented terrorist, the author of Internetistan and a contributor to Ruangobrol.id. This is the second and final part of a series.