The military coup in Myanmar on Feb. 1, 2021 thus had a direct impact on Indonesia's hard-earned democratic reputation and commitment.

Indonesia frowned upon the incident during which Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing displaced Aung San Suu Kyi before the state counsellor, together with the thousands of elected officials from the National League for Democracy (NLD), could gain any traction, as the coup put ASEAN centrality into a pickle.

The regional grouping has now been disemboweled by the value of centrality that Jakarta favors and was previously agreed by all member states. How?

First and foremost, despite being the biggest democracy in Southeast Asia, especially since the end of Soeharto’s autocratic rule in 1998, Indonesia has rarely let out the fact that it has had eight successive peaceful elections and transitions of power over the last 22 years.

What is more remarkable, as The Atlantic has noted, that Indonesian elections are held in a single day when it currently has 275 million people with a median age of 29.7, according to Worldometer.

If any contenders are unhappy about the outcome, as former Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto was in April 2019 over Joko Widodo being declared the rightful winner by the election commission, Indonesia has electoral dispute mechanisms in place. In the case of the mass dissent mounted by Prabowo loyalists, then-National Police chief Gen. Tito Karnavian tactically quelled the movement by first severing their internet connection, thus depriving them of any chance to form a mob of any size, as The New York Times reported.

Second, instead of resting on its laurels as the biggest Muslim-majority democracy as regards the shocking upheaval by the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, Indonesia has been at the forefront in calling on Aung Hlaing to step down and respect the results of the November 2020 general election, in which the NLD won by a landslide of more than 60 percent of the votes.

Quick to follow on this initiative was the reversal of Aung Hlaing, who asserted that a new general election would be held in two years instead of one year as he had said previously.

On both occasions when Aung Hlaing spoke about either a one-year or two-year transition, however, he made no reference if this was a "new" electoral window calculated from Feb. 1, 2021 onward, so huge ambiguity still remains.

Indonesia is obviously displeased. Hence, it was the first ASEAN member state to convene a special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on Myanmar in April 2021, in Jakarta.

This led to a five-point consensus, the first of which is the immediate cessation of violence, with the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) reporting that some 936 civil demonstrators had been killed as of July 28, 2021.

Third, whether openly or behind the scenes, Indonesia had pushed early on for the appointment of an ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar by ASEAN Secretary-General Dato Paduka Lim Jock Hoi, to accelerate the process of reconciliation between the Tatmadaw and the people of Myanmar over the physical and psychological wounds. The appointment of the special envoy has been incorporated into the five-point consensus.

On these three points alone, Indonesia has to the best of its capacity tried to attenuate the quagmire in Myanmar; and this despite the fact that ASEAN has had a long tradition of "quiescent diplomacy".

To be sure, perhaps Indonesia's silence on Myanmar does not mean acquiescence. Instead, it implies complete opposition.

The fact that Indonesia did not introduce a note verbale at the ASEAN-China meetings did not mean its endorsement of the Tatmadaw either, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi invited Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore to a meeting in Fujian on April 2 and ASEAN members called for a special foreign ministers’ meeting on regional issues, including Myanmar, in Chongqing on June 7 (Nikkei Asia).

Indeed, since the ambit of the issues discussed ranged from SARS-CoV-2 to regional development, Indonesia stood out by saying nothing on Myanmar so China could feel the consequences of allowing the junta to continue with its indiscretions in Myanmar. One of these is the proliferation of COVID-19 cases in the country just next door to China.

To be sure, while the coup in Myanmar is fast reaching an impasse, Jakarta still stands resolutely opposed to the dysfunctional dynamics in that country. Indeed, an ASEAN special envoy has yet to be appointed with a sense of utmost urgency.

Given the strong character of Foreign Minister Retno L.P. Marsudi, she could not have allowed Indonesia's displeasure to go unnoticed at the two meetings in China.

Aung Hlaing's noncompliance with the spirit of the ASEAN Charter has undermined ASEAN as a "rules-bound body". This has also dented the grouping’s plan to create the ASEAN Community by 2025.

At the recent G7 meeting in the United Kingdom, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and United States President Joe Biden agreed to “renew” the Atlantic Charter established 80 years ago, key to which are free trade and decolonization (anti-imperialism).

Since Indonesia will host the G20 in 2022, being consistent with the G7's central thrust is vital.

Thus, if the condition in Myanmar remains "frozen", then President Jokowi must continue to highlight the issue.

Biden affirmed on June 11 at the G7 meeting that the future fault line would be democracy against "autocratic leaders, models and values”. Jokowi will not let the US President down.

The G7 is part of the G20. Indeed, Johnson’s "D10" group of democratic countries is ostensibly formed by G7 plus Australia, India and South Korea. With its US$1 trillion gross domestic product, Indonesia wants to be a part of the D10 to make ASEAN centrality meaningful: to be part of the platform where democratic dialogue can take place, even among the great powers.

It is also a platform to obtain vaccine commitments to help Indonesia's titanic battle against COVID-19, especially the Delta variant, under the guidance of Coordinating Maritime and Investment Minister Luhut Panjaitan, who has Jokowi’s complete trust.

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Phar Kim Beng is founder CEO of the Strategic Pan Indo-Pacific Arena (SPIPA); Osman Erdoğdu is SPIPA chief knowledge officer.