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fter much stalling, it now seems that the controversial and highly restrictive bill on mass organizations is expected to be presented to the House of Representatives for approval on Tuesday.

If passed, it will unduly constrict the space that civil society organizations (CSOs) can operate in, impose unnecessary limitations on them and effectively curtail the rights to the freedoms of association, expression and religion.

There have been token revisions to the draft, but they do little to guarantee the exercise of basic and fundamental human rights.

At the outset, the official logic for the law was to rein-in '€œmob violence'€ and '€œfundamental groups'€.

However, as the problematic provisions are laid bare, it is increasingly clear that the mass organization law is intended to control and suppress groups that are '€œantagonistic'€ to the government. While it is framed as an administrative exercise to streamline organizational operations and enhance future cooperation with the government, the repressive levers of control under the proposed law indicate otherwise.

Should the bill be passed the government would wield discretionary powers to forcibly suspend or dissolve mass organizations without legal order or recourse if their activities are deemed to conflict with the state ideology of Pancasila.

Such vague and broad restrictions, which assign blanket powers and expand executive discretion and control, can easily be exploited to limit the type and scope of activities of mass organizations.

This is reminiscent of the New Order regime where criticism was suppressed. It has no place in democratic Indonesia today.

Invoking Pancasila renders any group '€” human rights, religious, labor, environmental and even community-based and informal networks '€” susceptible to crackdowns and operational challenges.

Furthermore, by stipulating that the activities of organizations do not encroach into the sphere of government, it suggests that behavior such as monitoring corruption or advocating for security sector reforms would potentially run afoul of the mass organization law.

It certainly appears that the government perceives civil society to be an adversary of the state. If passed, the law risks turning into a State apparatus that increases and legitimizes control, intimidation and harassment of all mass organizations.

It is no small irony that elsewhere in the region, similar tactics employing the rhetoric of combating '€œterrorism'€ or '€œanti-state'€ activities have been used to control a robust and thriving civil society.

Instances of laws that cripple funding, impose onerous bureaucracy, limit the scope of activities and heighten government interference are growing.

In Tamil Nadu, India, similar groups have had their accounts frozen and registration canceled under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act for actions deemed '€œprejudicial to public interest'€ allegedly for protesting the construction of a nuclear plant over safety concerns.

Meanwhile, Cambodia has been contemplating the enactment of the Law on associations and NGOs (LANGO), which imposes excessive restrictions on the rights to freedom of association and expression.

The law has been heavily criticized and vociferously opposed by civil society groups inside the country as well by the international community. The overwhelming opposition toward the bill in Cambodia has stalled its passage into law for the time being, although it would be naïve to rule out its possible reintroduction in the near future.

Similarly, if passed, the mass organization law will be a constant threat that could be enforced arbitrarily. The dangers are worrying and numerous '€” from the criminalization and disbanding of groups to the creation of unnecessarily burdensome and lengthy (re)registration processes, increased administrative and judicial harassment and restricted cooperation with partners.

We must bear in mind that the mass organization law should not be viewed in isolation. Together with the intelligence and social conflict management laws passed in the last two years, the government now has a wide array of instruments conducive to an almost unfettered exercise of power at its disposal.

As the House prepares to deliberate the mass organization bill, again, it is imperative that all existing concerns and problematic provisions in the bill must be duly addressed, or rejected altogether.

Otherwise, the claim by Abdul Malik Haramain, chairperson of the House'€™s Special Committee deliberating the bill, '€œwe will show the public that we never meant to restrict freedom at all'€ is hollow.

Conversely, it will shrink the hard-won democratic space in Indonesia. After the dismantling of the New Order regime, the exercise of the right to freedoms of expression, association and assembly was integral to ensure Indonesia'€™s democratic transition.

The government should instead focus on creating and ensuring an enabling environment for civil society and all citizens to exercise their democratic and fundamental rights without fear of reprisals or harassment.

A return to the New Order era is certainly not welcome and neither is it inconceivable if the government continues to insist on enacting the mass organization law in its current form.

The writer is chairperson of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), a Bangkok-based regional human rights NGO representing 47 member organizations in 16 countries across Asia, including Indonesia.