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Corruption doesn't pay, or does it?
Recently, the Corruption Court sentenced a defendant in the vehicle simulator procurement case, Insp
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ecently, the Corruption Court sentenced a defendant in the vehicle simulator procurement case, Insp. Gen. Djoko Susilo, to 10 years imprisonment, fined him Rp 500 million (US$52,000), and seized his assets.
Some believe the verdict is historical as it is the first time an active Indonesian police general is sentenced for his involvement in a corruption case. Many believe that Djoko's sentence is an achievement for the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in combating graft in Indonesia. Back in the day before the commission was established, high ranking law enforcement officers like Djoko would have been untouchable by the law regardless of the offense they had committed. KPK has appealed the verdict, saying it is too light to give sufficient deterrence effect.
Many believe that the high perceived 'net benefit' is a major cause on why corruption is rampaging in Indonesia. The desire to live a high life which, unfortunately, has been many people's creed nowadays, seems to have shaped our generation's mindset into tolerating unethical or even unlawful conducts for the sake of fulfillment to such a desires. Big houses and fancy cars are now perceived by many as a standard of living and proof of success. Children are often spoiled by their parents in ways that would lead them into believing that material wealth is the true representation of happiness in life.
Just like other white collar criminals, corrupt people are rational beings (at least in their own way). So far as the rational choice theory is concerned, their actions are always guided by rationality in deciding the best action for them. Each potential offender will subjectively weigh the benefits and costs of each option of action in a circumstance where, as advocated by criminologist Donald R. Cressey, pressure (or motivation), opportunity and rationalization (justification) are present and form a fraud triangle.
In reality, however, the net benefit calculation that occurs in an offender's mind is much more subtle and complex than any expert can fully explain as it involves weighing different factors subjectively based on his or her perception of the realities of the world he or she lives in.
Although different offenders may consider different cost-benefit elements, some elements appear to be commonly used to calculate the net benefits of engaging in corrupt acts.
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Corruption will disappear in Indonesia if everyone perceives the 'net benefits' of not engaging in corrupt acts outweigh those of committing corruption.
For example, in the case of bribery in Indonesia, evidence suggest that the common benefit that may have been expected by Indonesian public officials who accept bribes include, but are not limited to, extravagant life, high status, power and prestige.
On the other hand, they may also recognize the risk of detection and prosecution, guilt, fear, disappointment, humiliation and possible restitution as the costs or negative consequences that may come with the action. Additionally, a potential offender will also measure the benefit and costs of not doing such an act.
Whereas low income (compared to those of corrupt officials), low power and prestige and intimidation from corrupt co-workers and superiors can be considered the costs of not engaging in a corrupt act, peace of mind, long lasting career and respect from the society may be considered among the benefits from being an honest public official.
For every perceived cost-benefit element, a potential offender will determine its weigh by assigning a 'subjective value'. The option with the highest perceived 'net benefits', either engaging in corrupt act or not, will be the chosen action.
As an important part of a potential offender's consideration, the perception of risk of detection and prosecution is mostly influenced by the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives in a country. KPK's ability to bring a police general to justice, for example, will increase potential fraudsters' perceived risk of detection and prosecution.
Evidence shows that the majority of offenders in corruption cases in Indonesia received light sentences compared to the damages they had caused to the country. Many hope that the KPK's decision to appeal Djoko's jail sentence to the High Court will succeed and thus create an effective deterrence.
To add to the problem of light jail sentences, even if an offender is sent to prison, there is no guarantee that he or she will have a 'harsh time' from the deprivation of liberty in the institution. This is evident from the corruption convicts in Indonesian who apparently receive special treatment and facilities in prison compared to ordinary street criminals.
Experts have long been discussing about the concept of 'punishment' for crime offenders. Some argue that crime offenders must be punished because of the crime they committed in the past and that the punishment has to be in proportion to their so-called 'blameworthiness', also known as 'retributivism' view. Others who support the 'consequentialism' view believe that whatever punishment crime offenders receive, it has to yield future benefits in particular to the society as the victim.
The two perspectives have been incorporated in particular into the prison systems all over the world. Despite the difficulty in its measurement, an expected output from any prison anywhere in the world would be the reduction of crime rate in the society.
Unfortunately, in the case of corruption in Indonesia, the higher number of incarcerations of high profile public officials since the inception of KPK does not seem to result in the disappearance of the crime in the country which suggests that more extensive and comprehensive measures need to be taken. Among such measures is the improvement of the Indonesian prison system so as to give sufficient 'harsh time' for the corruption convicts and at the same time benefit the society by reducing corruption in society.
To tip the 'corruption decision scale' in favor of the 'not committing corruption' decision, multiple approaches must be employed to decrease the 'net benefits' of committing corruption and increase those of not committing the offense. In addition to strengthening the existing legal system and anti-corruption agency, other measure such as nurturing ethics and morality through education and building healthy organizational culture in public offices should be seriously considered in combating corruption in Indonesia.
Corruption will disappear in Indonesia if everyone perceives the 'net benefits' of not engaging in corrupt acts outweighs those of committing corruption.
The writer is the director of the Centre for Forensic Accounting Studies of the Islamic University of Indonesia Yogyakarta. He obtained his masters and doctorate in forensic accounting from the University of Wollongong, Australia.
