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A post-ASEAN foreign policy for a post-G8 world
It has long been predicted that international relations in the 21st century will differ from those in the 20th century
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t has long been predicted that international relations in the 21st century will differ from those in the 20th century. And recently, that prediction has taken a step closer to reality, when leaders of the G20, meeting in Pittsburgh in the US, agreed to elevate the forum into a more strategic level, signaling an end to a world order dominated by eight industrialized nations (the G8).
The fate and future shape of global politics are now increasingly defined by both developed and developing countries. We are now entering a G20 world order.
As a member of the G20, Indonesia is part of that strategic transformation. This is an opportunity too valuable to be missed. It opens up a whole new range of possibilities for our efforts in redefining our place within the international community. It reinforces the question of whether the current foreign policy format, which still treats Southeast Asia and ASEAN as the first concentric circle, is still adequate. A new world order requires a new foreign policy. It is time to recognize that we need a post-ASEAN foreign policy for a post-G8 world order.
So what does a post-ASEAN foreign policy for Indonesia entail?
First, Indonesia should reinforce faithfully the true spirit of bebas-aktif (free and active) foreign policy as envisioned by the founders of the Republic. Indonesia's foreign policy under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda has done this, but the point needs to be emphasized further. Indonesia should free itself from any undeserving obligation to follow the wishes of any state or a grouping of states, including ASEAN, if by doing so we sacrifice our own national interests.
Indonesia has recently begun demonstrating a degree of autonomy vis-*-vis ASEAN. We are no longer hesitant about taking a different tack from other ASEAN member states if we have to. We should always be the one to compromise, but neither should we feel uncomfortable if our stance means no consensus, and therefore no agreement, is reached. That is the true meaning of a bebas-aktif foreign policy.
Second, Indonesia needs to redefine the theory of concentric circles, which guides the conduct of its foreign policy. Instead of emphasizing the geographical aspect of the concept - defining Southeast Asia and ASEAN as the first and most important circle or foreign policy theater for Indonesia - we also need to incorporate other dimensions such as strategic necessity, functionality, values and identity as parameters for defining the arena in which to pursue our national interests.
In terms of strategic necessity, for instance, countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Australia, China, India and the United States are far more important to Indonesia than any other countries, and should form the first circle of foreign relations. In functional terms, subsequent circles should be defined according to the issues at hand. The G20 should also be part of our foreign policy's first circle. Due to shared values of democracy, our relations with democratic countries need to be enhanced. Our identity as a moderate Muslim-majority nation also obliges us to play a more active role in the Muslim world.
Third, Indonesia needs to balance its commitment to multilateralism with that of bilateralism in conducting foreign relations. We need to put more emphasis on select bilateral relations within and without ASEAN. Within the bloc, we need to deepen our relations with Malaysia and Singapore (for strategic necessity) and with the Philippines and Thailand (for shared values of democracy).
Outside ASEAN, we need to strengthen our strategic or comprehensive partnerships with global and regional major powers, especially the United States, Japan, Australia, India, South Korea and China.
Fourth, Indonesia also needs to identify its international position closer to the Asia-Pacific region. By doing so, its foreign policy horizon can be expanded, and new opportunities and initiatives made possible. The way we view ourselves and define our place within the international community will enlighten us in our search for new ways to pursue our national interests. The most important agenda in this regard is to take part in shaping the emerging regional architecture in the region.
Fifth, a post-ASEAN foreign policy does not mean we have to abandon the bloc. But we do need to take ASEAN for what it really is, namely, an organization incapable of moving beyond what it was meant to do: preserve regional stability and security by maintaining good interstate relations among member states. We need to continue persuading ASEAN to change for the better, but not waste any energy if other members put up walls to ensure the bloc's noble ideals remain unattainable, an illusion. We should work through ASEAN when we need to, push through agendas when we can, and go beyond when we must.
In short, a post-ASEAN foreign policy for Indonesia should not be an extra-ASEAN foreign policy as some suggest. That still connotes the strategic centrality of ASEAN in our foreign policy, making all else "extras". It should be a new direction for Indonesia's foreign policy, in which ASEAN is no more important than other venues such as the G20. It is a blueprint for Indonesia to follow should it want to stop punching below its weight. It is a platform for a democratic Indonesia to strengthen its relevance amid rapid strategic and geopolitical transformation in Asia Pacific and beyond. President Yudhoyono's second administration is in a position to do just that.
The writer is the executive director for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.
