T

he commemoration of Pancasila Sanctity Day every Oct. 1 observes the '€œvictory'€ of the state ideology over those behind the bloody Sept. 30 Movement (G30S) of 1965.

This was an aborted coup where six generals and a first lieutenant of the Army were kidnapped and murdered in Lubang Buaya near Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base.

Fifty years later, we should reflect on the dynamics of the local and international political constellation before the G30S, to at least understand the complicated situation at the time.

To prevent such violence from recurring naturally the political elite should prioritize the national interest above all. Regardless of any foreign interference, the 1965 tragedy was in part a result of political deadlock in parliament between the equally strong political forces of those times.

Various attempts at dialog had failed, resulting in then president Sukarno'€™s Decree of July 5, 1959, which reinstated the strong presidential system, ending parliamentary powers.

During the Cold War era, Indonesia inevitably received special attention from the great powers '€” including the US and its allies '€” because of the huge influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) at the highest levels of government as well as at the grass roots.

Some scholars like Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey of Cornell University were among those involved in serious research soon after G30S. Yet, both felt unsatisfied with the limited resources and cooperation from Indonesia'€™s military government

At the international level there emerged what scholars call the '€œtriple-polarity'€ of the US, Soviet Union and China. This international situation significantly affected the PKI members in government.

After the split in Sino-Soviet relations, PKI members looked to China as a better friend rather than Soviet Union though they obtained full support in conquering West Irian (currently the provinces of Papua) from Dutch colonial rule.

At the grassroots level, there was tension between communist groups and Islamic groups.

Further, the approval of the Agrarian Law was perceived as a victory for the PKI. However, the PKI members'€™ disrespect toward Islam was seen as the main trigger of the horizontal tensions.

At the highest level of politics there emerged tension as a result of the rumors of the emergence of a Dewan Jenderal (Generals'€™ Council), suspected of attempting a coup against Sukarno'€™s government.
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The 1965 tragedy was in part a result of political deadlock in parliament between the equally strong political forces.

The issue became serious after the discovery of the '€œGilchrist Memorandum'€ at the British Embassy in Jakarta, as cited by a former Sukarno minister, Soebandrio.

Moreover, the rumors of the establishment of the Angkatan ke V (Fifth Force) with weapons support from China also created new tension between the PKI and the Indonesian Army (TNI-AD).

The PKI versus TNI-AD tensions were more complicated after a broadcast report that president
Sukarno was sick and probably would die.

The further key factor was the economy amid this difficult political situation. Prior to the outbreak of the G30S, Indonesia was hit by inflation of up to 650 percent.

Under Sukarno and his Guided Democracy, people had to struggle to meet their family'€™s basic needs as food prices skyrocketed.

Consequently, many struggled to survive, only consuming foodstuffs such as banana weevils, tubers, cassava and other items much of which was unfit for consumption.

Clothes were fashioned from sacking. In the middle of all this Sukarno declared the Konfrontasi (confrontation) against Malaysia in 1963, allegedly to distract public attention from the worsening economy.

Konfrontasi could also be considered an important factor that led to the G30S, because the conflict with Malaysia was not totally supported by all senior military officers. It was believed that Konfrontasi itself failed because of army sabotage.

This situation was used by the US to embolden the anti-Sukarnoists in the TNI-AD.

The intelligence operations of the US, Britain and that of the Indonesian Army itself were strongly behind the collapse of the G30S and the PKI.

The provocation of media outlets against Indonesia through the BBC, Radio Malaya, Radio Australia and the Voice of America also played a key role in increasing anti-Sukarno sentiment.

Finally, on Oct. 1, 1965, the G30S occurred and many Indonesians, particularly those suspected of communist activists, were killed, with various estimates from 150,000 to 2 million killed.

Clearly the Cold War, marked by the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US, was a key factor in the G30S event.

Furthermore, the real involvement of external powers through intelligence operations had complicated the situation in Indonesia'€™s domestic politics particularly before the break of the G30S.

Following increasing revelations of the roles of foreign powers in the events of the 1960s, the US and its allies need not issue an official apology, as this would make worse our endless wounds.

However those foreign nations should actively support us in our efforts toward national reconciliation, so that the 1960s violence is no longer a burden of history on a nation that is continually trying to develop itself.

They could become engaged in dialog in negotiations for reconciliation, based on our uniting state ideology of Pancasila and the rights of citizens guaranteed under the 1945 Constitution.
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The writer is a political analyst in Ponorogo, East Java, and a researcher with the Centre for Policy Research and International Studies, University of Science Malaysia, in Penang, Malaysia.