This is not a sign of temporary governance but a clear message: the generals have no intention of relinquishing power or restoring democracy.

From the very beginning, the generals have shrouded their authoritarian rule in a veneer of legality, using the pretext of elections and emergency powers to justify their grip on power. But their actions speak more clearly than any words. They thrive on violence, deception and a systematic erosion of Myanmar’s democratic institutions.

When the military seized power on Feb. 1, 2021, it claimed the 2020 general election, in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) secured a landslide victory, was marred by fraud. It promised a return to democracy within a year, but that deadline has long passed.

Instead, the junta continues to extend its emergency rule under the pretext of instability, while opposition figures are jailed, exiled or silenced, entire villages are razed, and conflicts with resistance groups intensify.

This latest extension is not about security or stability; it is a deliberate strategy to entrench military rule. The junta’s planned elections are not a step toward democracy but a sham.

With opposition parties banned, political leaders imprisoned and large parts of the country under martial law, the very idea of a free and fair election is absurd. This is not a transition, it is a masquerade designed to manufacture legitimacy.

ASEAN, the regional body that positioned itself as the key actor in addressing Myanmar’s crisis brokered the Five-Point Consensus in April 2021. This agreement called for a cessation of violence, inclusive dialogue and unhindered humanitarian access.

Yet four years later, the junta has not honored a single commitment. ASEAN’s failure to hold it accountable has only enabled further suffering of the people in Myanmar.

The consequences are dire. Thousands have been killed, millions displaced, and Myanmar’s economy is in freefall. The kyat is plummeting, essential goods are scarce, and humanitarian aid is deliberately obstructed by the junta.

This is not merely an internal crisis. It has profound regional implications. The junta’s brutality has driven refugees across borders, fueling instability in neighboring countries.

Myanmar's lawlessness extends beyond political repression. Under the junta, transnational crime has flourished, particularly in online scam operations. The Myawaddy region along the Thai-Myanmar border has become a global hub for cyber fraud, where trafficked workers are forced into scams under brutal conditions.

An estimated 300,000 people are trapped in these compounds, generating billions in illicit profits. The junta, ethnic armed groups and crime syndicates all benefit from this unchecked criminal enterprise.

As Malaysia takes on the ASEAN chairmanship in 2025, it faces the challenging task of pressing Myanmar to implement the Five-Point Consensus. Next week, the ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy on Myanmar will travel to Naypyitaw for talks with junta officials.

However, without real consequences or sustained pressure, these engagements risk becoming mere diplomatic formalities. But I hope the Special Envoy delivers a clear message to the Junta that peace must be the priority over the elections.

Indonesia, however, has an opportunity to reshape ASEAN’s approach. During its ASEAN presidency in 2023, Indonesia adopted a more inclusive diplomatic strategy, engaging all stakeholders rather than solely deferring to the junta. Over 100 discreet diplomatic meetings were held to explore alternatives to the failed Five-Point Consensus.

Building on this momentum, Indonesia introduced the Troika Plus mechanism in 2024, an effort to move beyond ASEAN’s consensus-driven paralysis.

While there is a Troika as a mechanism that consists of the past, present and future ASEAN chairs to ensure the continuity of the collective measures in addressing the Myanmar crisis, Troika Plus allows for a smaller, more agile coalition of key ASEAN states to take decisive diplomatic action. This structure offers a critical alternative to ASEAN’s ineffective reliance on dialogue with the junta.

President Prabowo Subianto has a critical opportunity to use the Troika Plus as a platform for more adaptive and assertive diplomacy. He must take a firm stand against the junta’s manipulation of ASEAN’s diplomatic process and ensure that Indonesia does not fall into the trap of passive engagement.

Prabowo must go beyond rhetoric and push ASEAN toward concrete action that prioritizes justice, democracy and human rights. This includes suspending Myanmar’s junta-led representatives from all ASEAN meetings and advocating for stronger measures against the military regime.

It also means leading a coordinated regional response to the refugee crisis, ensuring adequate protection and humanitarian assistance while pressuring neighboring countries to provide safe havens for those fleeing violence.

If Prabowo follows ASEAN’s familiar pattern of cautious diplomacy, he risks Indonesia being seen as complicit in the bloc’s failure. Instead, he has the chance to redefine Indonesia’s role as a decisive regional power, one that leads ASEAN toward a more principled and effective response to Myanmar’s deepening crisis.

The time for half-measures and diplomatic niceties is over. With every passing day, Myanmar’s suffering worsens, and ASEAN’s inaction only emboldens the junta. President Prabowo must seize this moment to be a catalyst for change.

ASEAN must move beyond empty diplomacy and hold Myanmar’s military accountable. Anything less is complicity in the junta’s crimes.

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The writer is executive director of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR).