In his early weeks as the 47th President of the United States, he made it clear that Europe could no longer take American military support for granted. In this context, on March 3, von der Leyen unveiled an ambitious plan originally called Rearm Europe, later rebranded as Readiness 2030 following objections from Italy and Spain.

The initiative, which seeks to unlock up to €800 billion (US$884.6 billion) for national defense budgets, was accompanied by a White Paper outlining realistic short- and long-term goals to reduce European dependence on US protection.

The proposal has sparked mixed reactions across the continent, both among governments and the public. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni voiced concerns, particularly about financing military expenditures through debt. By contrast, Germany’s chancellor-designate Friedrich Merz secured Bundestag approval for a €1 trillion (US$1.1 trillion) increase in military spending over the next decade.

This raises a critical question about whether Europe is truly shifting its defense strategy. To assess this, it is necessary to examine two key documents: The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and the White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030.

The EU’s SAFE program provides up to €150 billion in loans for joint arms procurement and allows member states to bypass fiscal constraints and to exceed the stability pact to boost defense spending. Under the “spend more, spend better” approach, the Commission aims to both increase national military budgets and consolidate the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

This strategy allows Brussels to leverage its strongest tool, economic incentives, while avoiding direct clashes with national governments. The Commission’s vision is to foster European cooperation to strengthen collective defense capabilities and support domestic arms industries. Joint procurement, in particular, is crucial to enhancing interoperability, reducing duplication and consolidating Europe’s fragmented defense market.

Despite the unprecedented scale of resources committed, which are remarkable by EU standards, the likelihood of achieving these objectives remains uncertain. There are three key reasons for this skepticism.

First, the Commission has long sought to use financial incentives to drive military investment, as seen in SAFE and previous initiatives like the European Defence Fund (EDF). Yet according to the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EDF took five years to make a meaningful financial impact. Moreover, procurement data shows that while spending has increased since 2022, much of it has gone toward off-the-shelf weapons rather than collaborative projects.

Second, financial incentives alone are unlikely to drive joint procurement. While national governments and parliaments control military budgets, two other key players, namely defense firms and the armed forces, have different priorities. Defense companies must negotiate workshare agreements, often leading to protracted disputes. Meanwhile, military services across Europe have distinct operational requirements, making standardization difficult. Despite commitments to allocate at least 20 percent of procurement spending to joint programs, the actual figure remains just 6 percent.

Third, as defense economist Keith Hartley has observed, budgets measure input, not output. Increased spending and greater efficiency are necessary but not sufficient to guarantee military effectiveness. The real test of these initiatives will be whether they translate into credible deterrence and defense capabilities against external threats.

At least in principle, the White Paper seeks to address these concerns, recognizing that military spending is a means to an end rather than an objective in itself. It sets out both short- and medium-term goals, with a focus on supporting Ukraine, closing capability gaps and strengthening European security.

To achieve this, it prioritizes key areas such as air and missile defense, artillery systems, ammunition stockpiles, drone technology, military mobility and advancements in artificial intelligence, cyber warfare and electronic warfare. It also emphasizes the need to enhance strategic enablers and protect critical infrastructure.

Beyond capability development, the document proposes measures to reinforce the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB). These include efforts to boost demand for European defense production, secure supply chains, establish a common defense market, simplify bureaucratic processes, drive innovation and attract skilled talent.

While these ambitions are logical and align with previous strategy papers, they are not entirely new. Similar initiatives have been pursued in the past, notably through the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) in the early 2000s, and more recently in the 2022 Strategic Compass. Given the limited success of these earlier efforts, it remains to be seen whether the White Paper will deliver more tangible results.

As the document itself highlights, timing is another crucial factor. Some objectives, such as increasing artillery stockpiles, can be achieved relatively quickly. Others, particularly the development of next-generation weapons systems, require a decade or more of sustained investment, making long-term planning and resource allocation essential. Mismanagement in this area could significantly delay or even derail key programs.

Ultimately, defense policy is a function of foreign policy, and while the European Commission may push for greater military integration, member states continue to pursue their own strategic priorities. 

As a result, these initiatives are unlikely to lead to full European defense integration. At best, they may encourage limited convergence among certain countries on specific capabilities, but this falls short of the broader ambition of a truly unified European defense framework.

From a military standpoint, the Commission’s approach appears fraught with uncertainties and hurdles. While its long-term vision is ambitious, there are doubts over the feasibility of achieving the desired military-industrial capabilities.

That said, the immediate implications of Rearm Europe should not be underestimated. The initiative serves a diplomatic purpose, targeting two key external actors: The United States and Russia.

In the case of Washington, the focus on boosting the defense budget seems designed to meet the US President’s demands and avoid a diplomatic crisis at the upcoming NATO summit. Meanwhile, in relation to Moscow, the goal appears to be demonstrating a deterrent capability, whether for defense or retaliation; though its effectiveness remains unclear without direct US involvement.

No European leader would want to test these military capabilities in a real combat scenario. However, most would likely be willing to invest significant sums to avoid such a situation. Paradoxically, then, Rearm Europe’s most notable achievement may be political, rather than military in nature.

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The writer is a professor of political science at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, where he teaches Strategic Studies. The article is republished under a Creative Commons license.