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Myanmar: Rethinking ASEAN noninterference

The coup in Myanmar and escalating tensions in the disputed waters north of our Natuna Islands pose a two-front security issue for ASEAN. 

Harya S. Dillon (The Jakarta Post)
Jakarta
Fri, March 12, 2021

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Myanmar: Rethinking ASEAN noninterference

W

ith more than 50 killed and many more injured at the hands of security forces, the coup in Myanmar took a harrowing turn last week. Vain calls to “refrain from instigating further violence” from members of ASEAN on March 2 did not stop the security forces from firing live rounds at peaceful anticoup protesters the following day, killing 38 and wounding many others.

Last Wednesday marked a day that the United Nations has called the “bloodiest crackdown yet” on peaceful demonstrations. One cannot exaggerate the fear of escalating violence, plunging Myanmar into a fresh humanitarian crisis.

The unconstitutional takedown of Myanmar democracy and the jailing of its duly elected leaders on Feb. 1 adds to the regional tensions caused by the passing of China’s new Coast Guard Law, less than a fortnight earlier. Let me be perfectly clear: it would be an unwarrantable stretch to suggest that China should in any way be implicated in the coup and the ensuing violence in Myanmar.

But one would be remiss in failing to note that the jailing of Aung San Suu Kyi, the face of Myanmar’s democracy, took place on the same day China’s Coast Guard Law came into force. This law, which authorizes the use of weapons against foreign vessels, has triggered concerns from our ASEAN maritime neighbors namely Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. Sure enough, the coup on Feb. 1 has turned all eyes on Myanmar and away from the contested waters north of our Natuna Islands.

Again, it would not be appropriate to point fingers at China for the bloodshed in Myanmar. However, the reality remains that ASEAN now is faced with an impending humanitarian crisis in Myanmar to the west and escalating maritime disputes to the east. These are indeed testing times for ASEAN and its founding principles. Non-interference, a sacrosanct ASEAN principle, can only go so far.

Yet, in my view, Indonesia should explore other avenues in tempering these conflicts.

First, unlike Vietnam and the Philippines, Indonesia is not currently in any direct maritime dispute with China. As such, we are buffered from direct contact with the Chinese Coast Guard, although not by much. To date, there are no indications that suggest China will expand its maritime claims beyond its rejection of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration verdict in favor of the Philippines.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague found that China has no legal basis to claim the disputed waters marked by the so-called nine-dash-line. Most notably, the arbiters rejected China’s artificial islands as a basis to their claim and that it violated the Philippine’s maritime rights by interfering with fishing and oil exploration.

Given China’s non-participation in the three-year long proceeding, it is unsurprising that China refused to accept the ruling. Among ASEAN member states, Indonesia, Brunei, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia chose to take a neutral stance toward the ruling, while Malaysia, Singapore, Myanmar and Vietnam joined the Philippines in supporting the ruling. It is interesting to note that Suu Kyi was named Myanmar’s top diplomat at the time of the ruling.

The new Coast Guard Law and the tensions it creates can be interpreted as an assertion of China’s refusal to comply with the 2016 tribunal. One could argue that bullies do not respond to silent bystanders. Therefore, we should seriously consider voicing solidarity with our ASEAN neighbors who are legitimately concerned about China’s maritime security challenges. This, at the very least, would achieve ASEAN’s goal in becoming a security community.

Second, Indonesian leaders with a military background may want to offer their advice on how to remain relevant in a pluralistic democracy to their Myanmar opposite numbers. I will not go back as far as 1965, but since 1998 a series of reforms have brought Indonesia to a delicate balance where top Indonesian generals can share prestigious civilian portfolios and are quite successful at it.

Take, for example, Gen. (ret) Luhut Pandjaitan. His illustrious military career, including tours to then-East Timor, was followed by an appointment as ambassador to Singapore and trade and industry minister. In 2014, Luhut, who had been active in the coal business and politics at the time, played an instrumental role in delivering the presidency to Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. This is especially important for democracy building because, unlike his predecessors, Jokowi was the first president to start his political career as mayor of his hometown.

Luhut is currently the coordinating minister overseeing issues ranging from infrastructure to investment. Furthermore, if it is ever a concern for the Myanmar military junta, Indonesia has never been closer to China, thanks in part to Luhut.

Another example is Gen. (ret) Moeldoko, the current chief of staff who has been making news of late. To be sure, Moeldoko is no stranger to Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the current de facto leader of Myanmar. The two shook hands, military style, in 2014 when Moeldoko was still on active military duty. Some interpret Moeldoko taking control of the Democratic Party last weekend as an opening gambit toward his 2024 presidential bid.

I for one regretted the juxtaposition of Moeldoko’s move to the coup led by Gen. Min. Given the death toll of the latter, the parallelism is rather tasteless. But if the two can meet to reenact their 2014 encounter, perhaps Moeldoko can share his playbook on attempting to win the presidency without firing a single shot with Gen. Min.

Let me be clear; I am not interested in taking sides in the brouhaha within the Democratic Party. I am simply calling for ways to stop the killings in Myanmar; and if that entails the leader of the military junta learning how to play partisan politics from their Indonesian peers, that should be preferred over senseless deaths.

In sum, the coup in Myanmar and escalating tensions in the disputed waters north of our Natuna Islands pose a two-front security issue for ASEAN. In hindsight, ASEAN’s non-interference principle doesn’t make achieving regional security any easier. That is especially true if a global superpower is destabilizing one member state on one front and challenging the maritime rights of another on the other front.

At the same time, Indonesia as a champion of democracy and the largest economy in the region should stand in solidarity with its ASEAN neighbors and use creative ways to keep humanitarian crises from escalating in the region. All while staying within the confines of non-interference. At least for the time being.

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The writer has a doctorate degree from the University of California, Irvine and is a Fulbright scholar (2009).

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