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From Bandung conference to Indo-Pacific strategy (Part 1 of 2)

As the late minister mentor Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore once said, "If you name an enemy, you will get an enemy." 

Phar Kim Beng and Osman Erdoğdu (The Jakarta Post)
Kuala Lumpur
Mon, March 29, 2021

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From Bandung conference to Indo-Pacific strategy (Part 1 of 2)

W

hen the Bandung Conference was concluded in 1955, president Sukarno of Indonesia, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, president Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, president Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia and foreign minister Zhou Enlai of China succeeded in speaking out against the evils of imperialism, colonialism and hegemony.

While only 29 official delegations attended the Bandung Conference, this was the first summit bringing together leaders of Africa and Asia. At the event, PM Nehru and president Nasser struck up a good rapport.

Foreign minister Zhou, subsequently, had a better impression of Southeast Asian countries, and later on the formation of ASEAN. Zhou knew that ASEAN was not necessarily an adversarial organization against everything China stood for, since it was anticolonial in character too.

How then is the Bandung Declaration related to the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the so-called Quad, which held its first virtual summit on March 12, 2021, between the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States?

If one were to go through the Indo-Pacific Strategy of Japan and Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), one will notice that they have two important features.

First, not unlike the Bandung Declaration, the FOIP and the Quad reflect an aspiration to do what it takes to mutually work with the international community to produce win-win projects in east coast of Africa, Asia and the Pacific

However, as the late minister mentor Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore once said, "If you name an enemy, you will get an enemy." Rather wisely, the March 12 virtual summit made no mention of China at all. Rather, four leaders spoke about providing solutions on climate change, the importance of protecting supply chains and stopping the pandemic together. All generic talking points.

Second, at the Bandung conference, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was literally afraid that the event would enhance the influence of the Soviet Union. This, however, did not occur. Instead, to the total surprise of Dulles, and Turkey, attendees were highly critical of the Soviet Union's domineering attitude toward Eastern Europe. The attendees of the Bandung Conference, in other words, became more aware of their differences on domination. Anticolonialism does not have to be country specific.

Thus, just as the virtual meeting of the Quad, will organically enhance the clarity of each other on how to move forward, the goal is to prevent any power in league perhaps with another to lord over others. The global media said the Quad was against a Sino-Russian threat. Yet, the virtual summit itself did not name them.

The Quad, after all, is a motley collection of four democracies, both in the Trans-Pacific Arena or Trans-Atlantic Arena. If it is the latter, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Germany all have their Indo-Pacific Strategy already.

Since ASEAN has its "ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific" (AOIP), the question is, would the two "Quads" distance themselves from the institutional arrangements of ASEAN-related summits, or, would they try to subtly entice its biggest member, Indonesia, to become the "Quint"?

A "Quad" that can become a "Quint" is exceptionally powerful, at least in concept, since all ships going into the South China Sea have to pass through a choke point of Indonesia, which is Natuna Island in the North Natuna Sea.

No one will know this answer immediately. Indonesia is a vibrant democracy. It is open to having a future president being even friendlier to China and the Quad in Indo-Pacific.

Alternatively, instead of seeking more funding from China, Indonesia could also get it from the Quad, since the March 12 virtual summit spoke of providing development assistance.

Furthermore, Indonesian sentiment can be further inflamed if there are more mainland Chinese incursions into its EEZ near the North Natuna Sea of Natuna Island.

One thing is certain, the Quad is aware of the importance of enabling key member states of ASEAN, especially Indonesia, to make a successful transition to an even more developed democracy.

When the median age of Indonesia is only 28, the "youth bonanza" of Indonesia must not be squandered by the Quad. The future leaders of Indonesia can either support an authoritarian state that can handle Indonesia well, like China did with its first wave of COVID-19, or, a democracy like Australia, South Korea, Taiwan and New Zealand that also kept the fatalities to a trickle.

The Indonesian youth would decide the future of Indonesia based on inspirations either from China or the Quad's presence in Indo-Pacific.

As things stand, it is certain that Southeast Asia cannot become a fully meaningful ASEAN Community by 2025. There are not enough vaccines to go around globally.

Another thing is certain, when it comes to creating an entity that might inadvertently provoke China and Russia, as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) once did, internal cohesion is key. When the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed in 1954 only to dissolve in 1977, it is worth remembering that the Quad had yet to prove itself.

Indeed, the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), originally formed as the Baghdad Pact or the Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO), was a military alliance of the Cold War, too. Yet, the CENTO or the Baghdad Pact formed in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the UK was also dissolved in 1979, a fate similar to SEATO’s.

The fact is this: Just as the Bandung Declaration was against imperial-like foreign policy, the Quad in Indo-Pacific definitely imposes the same standards.

The Quad may not say it openly, but it stands against any external dictate on the Indo-Pacific countries, whether by China alone, or with Russia.

The SEATO and the CENTO may have been dissolved, but if one looks deeper the Quad is not unlike the Bandung Conference in 1954, with one exception. The current Quad in Indo-Pacific is poised to have more war games, naval exercises and Freedom of Navigation (FON) missions in the South China Sea.

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The writers are, respectively, the founding CEO and chief knowledge officer at Strategic Pan Indo-Pacific Arena (Strategicpipa.com).

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