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PKB rift: Gus Dur fails to tame his own greed

The image of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia and probably in the world, founded by Hasyim Asy'ari on Jan

Mohammad Yazid (The Jakarta Post)
Jakarta
Wed, April 9, 2008

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PKB rift: Gus Dur fails to tame his own greed

The image of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia and probably in the world, founded by Hasyim Asy'ari on Jan. 13, 1926, is hanging in the balance. This is because, among other things, one of Hasyim's grandchildren, Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, has imitated the authoritarianism of Soeharto -- the former New Order ruler he consistently criticized -- in settling a conflict within the National Awakening Party (PKB), set up by Gus Dur and other NU clerics.

The PKB cannot be separated from the NU, which was also chaired by Gus Dur before he became the country's fourth president in 1999.

One of his daughters, Yenny Zannuba Wahid, the PKB's secretary-general, is alleged to have been considerably involved in this dispute. Tragically still, the evidently undemocratic stance was not resisted by his supporters, particularly those within the PKB, as they consider Gus Dur the virtual "god" of the party.

In his capacity as the head of the PKB's supreme body (Syura), Gus Dur last month fired his own cousin, Muhaimin Iskandar, as PKB's chairman (Tanfidz). This authoritarian move will certainly affect the PKB's image especially ahead of the 2009 general elections, and Gus Dur's own image as an advocate of democracy and human rights.

The blind cleric insisted Muhaimin was dismissed because he prioritized his own interests over those of the PKB. The dismissal, according to Gus Dur, was legitimately determined in a central board meeting.

Gus Dur's authoritarian step was not a first. Two previous general chairmen, Matori Abdul Djalil and Alwi Shihab, were also ousted owing to the dominant influence of Gus Dur. Matori was dismissed in 2001 for being considered too close to (then vice president) Megawati Soekarnoputri, who was seen as having brought down Gus Dur's presidency. In 2004, Alwi Shihab -- Gus Dur's former foreign minister -- was discharged after his association with the Yudhoyono government.

Those outside the PKB have deeply regretted these actions, which should not be taken by a figure and politician of Gus Dur's caliber. Minority groups, which have often expected his defense when subjected to oppression, may doubt his commitment as a human rights proponent if he continues to be authoritarian toward his loyal backers.

Furthermore, Nahdliyin, as NU followers are known, outside the PKB, like members of the Ulema National Awakening Party (PKNU) and those joining the Golkar Party and the United Development Party (PPP), will find justification in doubting Gus Dur. They can question whether the founding of the PKB by NU figures on July 23, 1998, was aimed at accommodating the voices of Nahdliyin sidelined by the New Order regime.

Is it true that Gus Dur's obsession to return to the NU basics of 1926 should mean that NU followers' aspirations, individually as well as institutionally, have to be channeled only through the political organization born out of NU -- the PKB?

Such questions, which tend to be seen as anti-Gus Dur, particularly within the PKB and NU, will be increasingly raised unless Gus Dur changes his authoritarian approach.

The PKB appears to be Gus Dur's personal property. As one of its leaders and founders, he has inherited the charisma of his grandfather Hasyim Asy'ari, the NU founder. This makes the relationship between Gus Dur on the one hand, and the PKB and NU on the other, hardly separable.

With this asset, the pluralist-nationalist PKB tried to sell Gus Dur in the 1999 general elections. The move succeeded in unifying the majority of Nahdliyin and the party won 51 seats in the House of Representatives, fourth after the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Golkar and the PPP. In 2004, it only secured 52 seats.

The time has come for Gus Dur to face the dynamics of political change. And as a leader of a vast community, Gus Dur should avoid settling PKB conflicts by simply dismissing people, as this will affect the leadership style of succeeding generations in the party and run counter to the NU principle of consultative approach.

Conversely, the PKB should have the courage to be rid of its reliance on Gus Dur if it is to become independent and competitive in the coming elections. The core issue being faced by the PKB involves its over dependence on Gus Dur and the reluctance of Gus Dur to let the party go on its own. The same problem of in the NU-Gus Dur relationship emerged when he led the organization for two terms.

Gus Dur must control his ambition to regain the presidential post, which he lost in 2001 mostly because of his confrontational style. He is also blind, and has suffered from several strokes.

The best way to save the PKB and Gus Dur is to position him as a revered guru of the nation rather than a presidential candidate or general chairman of the party's Syura council. By making him a senior guru, Gus Dur will be capable of positively contributing to far broader segments of Indonesian society.

Unless Gus Dur shows his statesmanship, not just the PKB, but also the NU, will be in great danger.

The writer is a member of The Jakarta Post's opinion desk. He can be reached at yazid@thejakartapost.com.

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