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Jokowi’s military transformation homework
The Constitutional Court’s decision in the dispute over the presidential election marked an end to the 2019 general elections
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span>The Constitutional Court’s decision in the dispute over the presidential election marked an end to the 2019 general elections. Reelected President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has asserted that he would “step on the gas pedal” to complete his political promises to the Indonesian people.
The President’s bold statement comes at the right time following recent military developments.
First, a new regulation was issued on June 12 to allow Indonesian Military (TNI) officers to assume knowledge- and skills-based positions at TNI headquarters. Despite notable institutional progress, some observers are still concerned about setbacks in military reform over the past few years.
Central to their concerns are the issues of political neutrality, operations other than war and the appointments of TNI officers to active positions beyond defense.
Second, an Indonesian Army helicopter carrying 12 personnel went missing late last month during a logistics mission in the Papuan highlands. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has recorded 119 similar incidents in the country’s military aviation history. At an average of three cases per year, 12.6 percent of these incidents occurred in 2014-2019.
If this trend continues unaddressed, it is not only detrimental to troop morale and the TNI’s capacity for deterrence, but also undermines Indonesia’s border diplomacy with neighboring countries.
In that context, concepts such as “objective control” and “military professionalism” remain relevant for the next five years. In theory, both work to inhibit the resurrection of a “praetorian army” and prohibit military intervention in civilian affairs. Moreover, close observation of the recent strategic landscape shows that threats to national defense are increasingly dynamic, multidimensional and technologically sophisticated. Hence, “military transformation” is likely to become the leading concept for future organizational changes within the defense establishment.
During his second term in office, President Jokowi has to finish five key tasks in terms of the military. First is to implement regulations that enforce Law No. 3/2002 and Law No. 34/2004 on defense and military affairs, particularly those concerning operations other than war. The memorandum of understanding between the TNI commander and the National Police chief on managing social unrest, for instance, has served as an ad-hoc mechanism because the law and government regulation on military secondment has not been formalized since 2004.
Parallel with last year’s amendment to Law No. 15/2003, the Defense Ministry has to prepare legal procedures for the military’s counterterrorism operation. Other required regulations include defense resources management and troop mobilization and demobilization. The idea is to reinforce the legitimacy of military operations other than war while mitigating public concerns over the TNI’s expanded role into civilian affairs.
Second is reorganizing the Defense Ministry and TNI headquarters. Good governance principles require institutional division between political and operational accountability. Administrative reforms relating to the authority for arms procurement and the plan to establish a regional defense office are among the steps under way to strengthen democratic control over the armed forces.
Still, much needs to be done in military organizational reform. The TNI leadership, for instance, has to modify its administrative structure to fill the gap between the real and required numbers of high-ranking officers and colonels. This can be done through two institutional measures: one, recalibrate the ranking of leadership positions with specific qualifications at TNI headquarters; and two, develop the existing structure or create a new military unit.
Recently, for example, the TNI high command has promoted middle-ranking officers to take charge of two upgraded airbases in Papua and has appointed commanding officers to four newly formed military commands overseeing security for eastern Indonesia.
Third is to bolster Indonesia’s military capabilities to become a regional power. With average economic growth of 5 percent, the government could afford to allocate only 0.82 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), or 5.09 percent of the annual budget, to cover defense spending in the past five years.
Another notable challenge is the relatively slow process of arms procurement. Approximately 52.1 percent of the 165 reported defense plans during the second phase of Minimum Essential Force program are yet to be put into effect or formalized as contracts.
Hence, aside from meeting the 1.5 percent of GDP target, Jokowi’s next administration has to fast-track the military modernization program, including acquiring 4.5-generation fighter aircraft, multi-role frigates, diesel-electric submarines and air-defense missile systems, as well as airborne and land-based surveillance radars.
Fourth is to foster the development of a domestic defense industry. In a presidential debate earlier this year, Jokowi viewed the modernization of military arms as an “investment” to build capacity for research, production and maintenance of military equipment at home.
This objective can be served through at least three policy measures: first, provide state funding to encourage defense research and development; second, require local weapons manufacturers to implement technological offsets for major arms imports; and third, form international collaborations in developing new military technologies, such as the Korean Fighter Xperiment/Indonesia Fighter Xperiment (KFX/IFX) program. This way, domestic defense companies will become more capable and competitive in the global market.
Lastly, improve soldier welfare. In accordance with Presidential Regulation No. 108/2018, the government has increased the military’s performance-based allowance by up to 70 percent and even increased the allowance for Babinsa (non-commissioned village supervisory officers) by 771 percent. In the future, the Defense Ministry is expected to formulate policy breakthroughs on official residences, private housing schemes and additional allowances based on dedication to the service.
As a whole, completing these tasks will not only reinforce military professionalism and bolster the TNI’s capabilities as the integrated armed forces, but also constitute the Jokowi administration’s “legacy” to the Indonesian people.
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The writer is a military expert at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta. He is also part of Working Group 8, a civilian epistemic community for security reform and defense transformation.
