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Insight: South China Sea: Indonesia needs new strategy
When the Chinese Communist Party confirmed in 2017 President Xi Jinping as the paramount leader — a status only enjoyed by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping — I predicted that China would become more assertive in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, the two most contested zones in the region
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span>When the Chinese Communist Party confirmed in 2017 President Xi Jinping as the paramount leader — a status only enjoyed by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping — I predicted that China would become more assertive in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, the two most contested zones in the region. Regional countries should always take this political reality into the equation in their dealings with China. (See my article, “Anticipating China's leadership shake-up”, in The Jakarta Post, Oct. 16, 2017)
The recent flare-up in the South China Sea is one of the strongest indications yet of this assertiveness. Indonesia can no longer brush aside the fact that it has become and will continue to be part of the problem.
Chinese fishing boats and coast guard vessels will not stop intruding into Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), regardless of Indonesia’s diplomatic and naval maneuvers. It must be understood that China’s continued fishing expeditions to this contested zone are meant to back up its claim on the territories and seas enclosed by the so-called nine-dash line.
Since Indonesia derived its sovereign right to manage the EEZ and all resources contained therein from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982, Article 56) and China’s claim is historical, there is no common ground for negotiation between the two friendly countries.
Therefore, the most viable way of moving forward is to urge China to exercise self-restraint and immediately complete the negotiations on the code of conduct in the South China Sea, taking onboard the concerns of ASEAN claimant states. Negotiations are presently moving at a snail’s pace, regardless of claims to the contrary by both ASEAN countries and China.
If the incursions continue unabated, China may run the risk of pushing the ASEAN states to forge much closer strategic ties with the United States in order to balance and tame China’s assertiveness in the region (Financial Review, Jan. 12).
A containment policy will then reemerge against China, a reality that China may have to face one day.
As a genuine partner, it is critical that Indonesia employs all ways and means to prevent this from happening, including by conveying a strong message to China that flare-ups in the two contested seas are actually working against its core interests in the region.
More urgently, however, Indonesia needs to form a coherent strategy on preserving peace and stability in the region, as our Constitution mandates. Indonesia’s previous inability to convince China to exclude the nine-dash line from a map contained in its 2013 passport design is indicative of diplomatic failure. Hence, relying solely on diplomacy as if it could resolve the dispute can be seen as a mere act of domestic chest-thumping.
The Indonesian strategy should encompass both tactical and strategic measures while avoiding direct confrontation with China, the second biggest economy in the world with awesome military strength and with which Indonesia signed a strategic and comprehensive partnership in 2013.
As a matter of priority, Indonesia should first develop the capacity of its blue-water navy fleet to patrol the EEZ regularly. It is indeed puzzling that, as an archipelagic state with an ambition to become a Global Maritime Fulcrum, the Indonesian Navy is neither designed nor well equipped to carry out this gigantic task. Even Thailand has long had a commissioned aircraft carrier (HTMS Chakri Naruebet) as part of its naval fleet.
It is widely known that the Indonesian Navy is struggling, even to reach Minimum Essential Force. A limited budget has always been held to blame, but possessing clear vision and determination is far more essential to developing a blue-water navy, especially after the government established the Third Fleet based in Sorong, in Indonesia’s easternmost province of Papua.
At the regional front, it is again timely to suggest that Indonesia establish another forum that groups Indonesia, Japan, Australia and South Korea to constructively engage China. The four countries are solid enough to sustain Chinese pressure in their quest to maintain regional peace and stability, which is needed primarily to confront the imminent global economic crisis.
ASEAN has long been ineffectual in engaging China, as some of its members are heavily dependent on China, economically or otherwise. Consensus is therefore elusive when it comes to ASEAN’s core interests vis-à-vis Chinese interests.
Initiating multilateral military exercises in the contested zones is also worth Indonesia’s consideration in order to instill a sense of regional confidence, notably among the claimant states, Indonesia and China, keeping in mind that the US, whose freedom of navigation and involvement in the region cannot be second-guessed.
Once Indonesia puts all of these measures in place, China will most likely avoid taking actions that may not only disrupt regional stability, but also work against its national interest. Indeed, a revived containment policy is a nightmare for China.
In the meantime, China still has the time it needs to gather and produce clear and convincing evidence (i.e., internationally acceptable) to back up its claim over the imaginary nine-dash line, which the world continues to refuse to recognize.
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Former Indonesian ambassador to Australia (2003-2005) and ambassador to China (2010-2013)
