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Does firebrand cleric have a place in RI politics?
Rizieq is unlikely to win enough confidence from Islamists to contest the 2024 election.
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illboards depicting the self-exiled leader of the Islam Defender Front (FPI), Rizieq Shihab, have been dotting the streets of Jakarta. They were erected by his supporters in response to a rally in July in the capital city, in which people burned an image of him.
To some extent, the billboards are sending a message that the firebrand preacher’s clout remains intact, especially among hardline Muslims and adversaries of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Among the resolute and bold statements written on the billboards are “Supporters are ready to fight in defense of religion [Islam], religious preachers and the state” and “One poster is burned down, thousands more will emerge.”
The endeavor by Rizieq’s supporters also aimed to shore up his popularity among Islamists as they search for a viable candidate to represent them in the 2024 presidential election. This can be clearly seen from the way Rizieq’s image is presented on every billboard. His large image fills up almost the entire billboard.
Promoting Rizieq as an alternative presidential or vice-presidential candidate is timely for Islamists, who have lost a patron and strong presidential candidate in Prabowo Subianto. After losing to Jokowi for the second time in a row last year, Prabowo accepted his rival’s offer to join the government coalition, to the dismay of Islamists. Prabowo’s “act of betrayal” has parted him from Islamists, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the 212 Alumni Brotherhood.
Anies Baswedan seems to be a promising candidate for the Islamists. As the governor of Jakarta, the political and economic Mecca of Indonesia, Anies has unrivalled access to the media. Anies also has outstanding Islamic credentials. As a student, he was active in the politically wired Islamic Student Association (HMI) and a scholar. He was a former rector of Paramadina University in Jakarta, a progressive Islamic institution.
Recent surveys show that he has been performing quite well. In a survey released in February, he was even touted as the strongest contender against Prabowo in the 2024 presidential election.
However, unlike Rizieq, Anies is neither an ulema nor a mass-based politician. Hence, in this sense Rizieq has received a certain level of popular support to contest the election as an alternative representative of Islamists. Rizieq has enjoyed growing popularity because of his pivotal role in a mass movement that resulted in the downfall of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok, a former governor of Jakarta who is of Chinese descent and a Christian.
Rizieq’s ascent in politics started from a peripheral role as the leader of a small but notorious vigilante group, the FPI, known for its crackdowns on nightclubs during Ramadan and acts of intolerance against Islamic groups it deemed deviant or non-Muslim.
Rizieq is unpopular in many segments of the political spectrum, particularly moderate Muslim groups, due to his fiery speeches that often cross the line of moderate Muslim acceptability. He was sentenced to jail twice, once for inciting violence in 2008 and once for defamation in 2003.
While Ahok was serving as Jakarta governor from 2014 to 2017, Rizieq and his relatively small band of followers often held street protests against Ahok’s personality and policies but failed to make an impact. Only after Ahok made an allegedly blasphemous speech in the Thousand Islands regency in late 2016 were Rizieq and his company able to spearhead a movement that led to Ahok’s prosecution and downfall.
Rizieq and his traditionalist camp joined forces with Salafist-modernists to initiate an anti-Ahok movement in the run-up to the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. This movement won huge support from Muslim groups, including now-Vice President Ma’ruf Amin.
Rizieq’s role as one of the movement’s initiators catapulted him from an infamous fiery cleric with a small band of followers to someone who was adored by lower-class urban Muslims who felt economically sidelined and oppressed by the prevailing political system.
Despite his popularity among Islamists, it remains to be seen whether Rizieq is electable. Following Ahok’s ouster, Rizieq has become known as an icon for economically weak and oppressed urban Muslims. However, two survey institutes in 2018 found that Rizieq’s electability rate was below 1 percent, far below that of Jokowi and Prabowo. These surveys indicate that a steep rise in popularity does not necessarily impact electability.
Despite his followers’ recent efforts to boost his popularity among Islamists, Rizieq is unlikely to win enough confidence from Islamists to contest the 2024 election, either as a presidential or vice-presidential candidate, given his low electability. His penchant for divisive statements further limits his chances of getting support from voters from other categories beyond traditionalists, Salafist-modernists and poor urban Muslims.
Having fled Indonesia to Saudi Arabia in 2017 to avoid criminal charges deals a further major blow to Rizieq’s political aspirations. If he wishes to be nominated by Islamist elites, his presence in the country is mandatory. That’s why Islamist figures have persistently demanded that the government bring Rizieq home, while accusing Jokowi of criminalizing ulema.
Failure to return to Indonesia will only cause Rizieq’s popularity, hence electability, to dwindle, however noisy his megaphone campaign against Jokowi’s government is from afar.
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The writer is visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, and the author of The State and Religious Violence in Indonesia: Minority Faiths and Vigilantism (London & New York: Routledge).
