The Philippines authorities announced recently that both perpetrators who blew themselves up and killed 14 people and injured 75 civilians and soldiers were Philippine nationals. There had been speculation before the official announcement that one of the perpetrators was an Indonesian, and more particularly the daughter of the couple Rullie and Ulfa, the 2019 Jolo church suicide bombers, first results of the ongoing investigation tend to show the contrary.

In fact, after investigating through CCTV footage and the remains of the bombers, the Philippines authorities came to the conclusion that the perpetrators of the Aug. 24 attack were indeed two Philippine women, assisted by two other individuals.

While the participation of women in acts of terror is obvious, it is worth noting that this attack – like previous ones – involved foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).

Both suicide bombers were actually known by the authorities: in fact, both had lost their husbands – who were ASG members – in 2019. Nanah Dara was the widow of Norman Lacusa, one of the perpetrators of the June 28, 2019 attack on an Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) camp. The second suicide bomber, Indah Nay, was the widow of Abu Talha, an Islamic State (IS) liaison officer for the ASG who was killed by the AFP in November 2019.

According to sources, both women had planned the attacks for about two months. It is worth noting that the two were actually followed by four Army intelligence officers at the end of June 2020. The four officers were shot by Philippines National Police (PNP) at a police checkpoint in Sulu.

While both the AFP and the PNP are conducting their own investigation into the shooting, this recent discovery is currently fuelling theories at the local level. Indeed, locals are speculating that the recent attack itself was some part of a hidden agenda by the authorities. As a matter of fact, many local people suggest that the pattern of the attacks was “weird”, occurring after the aforementioned shooting incident, with some details seemingly being set up.

Additionally, the same local sources also argue that the martial law in place at the request of the AFP does not really work to deter the ASG, as evident in the Jolo church bombings in 2019.

Despite the controversy regarding the latest attacks, the suicide bombing modus operandi can be seen as continuation of the ASG-Sawadjaan faction’s bid to pursue its terrorist activities. The resurgence of suicide bombings may have been in the mindset of local terrorist groups before IS emerged in the southern Philippines. 

It is worth noting that a modus operandi called parang sabil existed but was barely used by ASG militants in the past. The main reason was the ASG was able to counter the AFP operations using weapons and without relying on suicide bombings. Moreover, the ASG managed to control the area surrounding Patikul, where many supporters or relatives of ASG members live.

However, it seems that there is a shift in how the ASG-Sawadjaan faction now sees suicide bombing. Compared with Hatib Sawadjaan who has reportedly died, his nephew and successor Mundi Sawadjaan seems more quickly to be adopting and implementing the IS agenda in the southern Philippines. Based on our sources on the ground, it was Mundi who assembled the bombs that were used in the latest double attacks.

It seems Mundi was also deeply involved in the planning of the attacks, while convincing women to commit the suicide bombing. To do so, sources said he was taking advantage of the widows’ desperation over their husbands’ deaths.

ASG members are well tested in assembling bombs and planning meticulous and highly effective terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, previously they relied on armed attacks or abduction for ransom. Suicide bombing can be seen as an incremental innovation that gained traction after it was introduced into IS propaganda and among its operatives.

It is worth noting that the FTFs who have joined the southern Philippines group following the defeat of IS have come from Egypt, Morocco, Malaysia or Indonesia. Among the Indonesian FTFs, Andi Baso has been wanted by the Indonesian Police’s Detachment 88 counterterrorism squad since the Ouikumene Church attack in 2016, which was led by recidivist Juhanda. It is known that Andi helped Juhanda assemble the explosives used in this attack in Kalimantan.

The PNP is also hunting Andi for his alleged role in the Jolo attacks. The presence of FTFs in the southern Philippines, like Andi, shows that IS regards the territory as an operations hub in Southeast Asia. Suicide bombing as a modus operandi will be more prominent in the near future, due to its effectiveness in fighting the AFP and those the ASG considers infidels or thogut (those who worship anything except Allah).

The instability in the southern Philippines will create a more advantageous posture and opportunity for the ASG to act on behalf of IS, and to penetrate the local society. Other than that, the FTFs will be more interested in joining the ASG: thus, some will definitely follow the current flow and find a way to get into the southern Philippines.

As a matter of fact, this FTF problem is not only related to the ASG: it means the authorities should also be worried by other groups. This is the case with the BIFF-Abu Toraife faction, which also welcomes the added strength of FTFs. This trend is even more worrying as the ASG has developed close ties with BIFF-Abu Toraife in Central Mindanao. Andi himself allegedly was with BIFF forces before he joined the ASG in Sulu.

From this perspective, all elements seem to be combining to create havoc in the near future in the region: a shift in modus operandi, stronger involvement of FTFs, and a narrative that sanctifies the southern Philippines as the Southeast Asian battlefield for IS supporters.

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