“China was, is and will always be ASEAN’s good neighbor, good friend and good partner,” Xi said in his speech at a virtual summit with leaders of ASEAN to mark 30 years since the two began a dialogue relationship.

He gave assurances that China had no hegemonic intentions, would not take advantage of its size to bully smaller states or meddle in their internal affairs.

Public statements made after the closed-door meeting, including those in the ASEAN capital, show that it was all cordial with Xi making generous offers, including financial assistance, to back up his pledges for a closer relationship.

The omission of the South China Sea nevertheless is glaring, as it is the one issue that China and the 10-member ASEAN need to address, one way or another, as they talk about building closer relations in the future. And they need to address this sooner, rather than later, given the increasingly explosive situation in the area.

Tension has grown in the vast strategic waters because of overlapping territorial claims, heightened by the growing presence of military personnel from claimant countries trying to exercise their sovereign rights and navies from other interested parties, including the United States, claiming to protect freedom of navigation. The South China Sea is an important shipping route linking East Asia and the Middle East and Africa.

There have been reported skirmishes involving Chinese naval ships with those from other countries, but each time this happened, one or both sides backed off. There is no guarantee that one of these days, these incidents would trigger bigger and wider conflicts.

Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam are the four ASEAN countries that have overlapping territorial claims with China in the South China Sea. Indonesia does not have territorial issues with China, but there have been intrusions by Chinese fishing boats, escorted by Chinese patrol vessels, in its Natuna Sea located in the southern part of the South China Sea. Beijing insists the Natuna waters are part of its traditional fishing ground.

Signals from Beijing have not been encouraging about its intentions in the South China Sea, and they seemingly are in contradiction with Xi’s claim that it has no hegemonic intentions.

China has built structures on some of the islands in the disputed waters that it now uses to house military facilities. It has sent more ships and personnel to patrol the area. Beijing has dismissed a 2016 international arbitration tribunal in The Hague, which rejected its historical claims to almost 90 percent of the South China Sea.

And China has stalled negotiations with ASEAN in drafting a code of conduct on how parties should address their territorial disputes in the South China Sea, which if agreed, would ensure that no country would resort to military power to resolve their conflicts.

China signed a Declaration of Conduct (DOC) on the South China Sea in November 2002, considered a milestone at the time even as it contained loopholes and provided no sanctions for any violation. At the most, the non-binding document has carried some moral restraints on countries to prevent escalation in the conflict.

ASEAN has since then been pushing for China to agree to a more detailed and more binding code of conduct for the South China Sea, which is expected to be a framework establishing rules and standards for regional peace and stability. Foot-dragging by Beijing meant that progress has been painfully slow. Only in 2018, the two sides agreed on a single draft negotiating text, and the first reading of the text began in 2019.

Further delays in finalizing the text would only mean more militarization of the South China Sea as more countries are joining in the fray in the name of freedom of navigation.

The US, Japan, Australia and India have formed an informal alliance they call Quad, which seeks to balance China’s increasing military power in the Indo-Pacific region. Quad has been trying to enlist other countries, including Indonesia, to join. In September, the US, United Kingdom and Australia launched the trilateral security partnership called AUKUS, which includes equipping Australia with nuclear-powered submarines.

European powers have also sent their warships to the region to conduct military exercises.

ASEAN should take up Xi’s Monday speech denouncing hegemonic ambitions as an opportunity to bring the negotiations on the code of conduct a central agenda in building their relations with China. It may be inappropriate for leaders to have raised this at their summit this week, but ASEAN and China cannot avoid discussing this urgent issue.

Individually and collectively, ASEAN has no military power to match that of China, and there is no intention or ambition for them to do so. But some ASEAN members are contemplating joining the US-led coalition seeking to balance China’s military might. This would be disastrous for ASEAN and for the region.

ASEAN has diplomacy at its disposal and this will now be put to the test, whether Indonesia and other ASEAN members could convince China that it is in its own interest to speed up the negotiations on the code of conduct, that nobody will win from the escalating tensions, and that unless reversed, these tensions could soon flare into armed conflicts.

By openly agreeing to speed up negotiations, Beijing would show its serious intention, and this would send positive vibes to the region and the rest of the world that it had no plans to use its massive military power against smaller states.

Would it be too much to set November 2022, or 20 years since the DOC, for China and ASEAN to sign the code of conduct?

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The writer is senior editor at The Jakarta Post.