ASEAN has not been able to push the junta to move even an inch toward the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (FPC) issued at the emergency ASEAN summit back in April. The junta continues to ruthlessly perpetrate brutal violence against its own people. Consequently, the relevance and utility of the FPC as the basis for ASEAN’s approach to solving the Myanmar problem are now at stake.

ASEAN needs to make some progress in 2022, a year after the coup. However, as Cambodia starts its chairmanship of ASEAN, it is not immediately clear how ASEAN’s efforts will lead to a different result. For sure, it is impossible to expect that the junta will suddenly have a change of heart, take concrete steps to implement the FPC and restore democracy in Myanmar.

So far, the junta has been stubbornly patient, playing a long game of holding on to power, hoping that it will eventually win gradual acceptance and recognition from ASEAN member states. However, if the junta and ASEAN are moving along this trajectory, a war of resistance in Myanmar could escalate and ASEAN’s own reputation will be severely damaged.

Recent developments do not inspire any confidence. Cambodia’s plan to approach the Myanmar problem through “quiet diplomacy” and its willingness to support the inclusion of the junta in ASEAN summits, for example, has caused concern in some ASEAN capitals. Allowing the junta to attend ASEAN meetings would mean abandoning ASEAN’s own consensus, create unnecessary divisions within ASEAN and undermine what is left of ASEAN’s credibility on this issue.

Prime Minister Hun Sen has also appointed Cambodia’s foreign minister as a new ASEAN envoy on Myanmar. While this appointment is well within Cambodia’s privilege as a chair, and does not violate any of ASEAN’s rules and consensus, it exposes a major flaw in ASEAN’s approach.

Indeed, ASEAN’s approach to the Myanmar crisis has been flawed from inception. ASEAN is never meant to resolve “internal” problems of its member states. It was formed to manage inter-state relations so that no member states would ever contemplate using force to resolve bilateral problems between them. That is why ASEAN jealously upholds the sanctity of sovereignty and non-interference.

Despite the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, ASEAN has not seen the need to develop a coherent mechanism on how to approach and resolve internal conflict in a member state.

While some member states have been involved in post-conflict peacebuilding in a member state, such as in Aceh in Indonesia, ASEAN as a collective entity has no experience in this area. Therefore, it is not surprising when the Myanmar crisis occurred ASEAN muddled through to find the best way to deal with the problem.

The first flaw in ASEAN’s approach to the Myanmar crisis is the absence of a clear objective of ASEAN’s involvement. It is not clear what the final outcome is that ASEAN wants to see. Some members would argue that the objective of ASEAN’s involvement should be the restoration of order and stability in Myanmar. Others, however, might want to see the return of democracy. Judging from the scale of resistance to the coup, it is clear that the majority of Myanmar people want the military to respect the results of the November 2020 elections and return the country to civilian rule.

In order words, stability in Myanmar will be achieved only after democracy is restored. ASEAN should make it clear that it will respect the wishes of the Myanmar people.

Second, after ASEAN decided that it must work to find a solution it came up with the FPC. It is clear that ASEAN wants to see the cessation of the use of force, the delivery of humanitarian assistance and inclusive dialog among all stakeholders. The fulfilment of these three objectives requires the appointment of a special envoy of the ASEAN chair and a visit by the envoy and delegation to Myanmar to meet all stakeholders.

ASEAN, however, did not come up with a concrete strategy or plan on how to achieve those objectives. In fact, ASEAN has no mission plan. The so-called terms of reference drawn up by previous ASEAN chair, Brunei, were far from adequate.

The absence of a mission plan leads to the third flaw, namely, the absence of institutional structures and technical support, such as funding and personnel, to implement the FPC. Without some sort of organizational support, both on the ground in Myanmar and at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, it would be hard to imagine how the mission could be carried out in a serious manner.

ASEAN apparently relies on hope and encouragement that the Myanmar junta will implement the FPC on their own and, until today, hope and encouragement have not produced any results.

The final flaw is the typical ASEAN problem of the tension between the need for consensus on the one hand, and the privilege of the chair on the other. ASEAN needs to sit together again and discuss the problem of strategy and plan how it should implement the FPC. In this process, Indonesia should make it clear to Cambodia, and to other ASEAN members, that it is a collective endeavor, not an individual undertaking of a member state or the chair.

It does not make any sense, for example, to have the special envoy changed every time the ASEAN chair changes. An effective ASEAN role in finding a solution to the Myanmar problem requires continuity and consistency. The current ASEAN approach provides neither.

Without a clarity of outcome, a coherent strategy and mission plan, and institutional and financial support, Cambodia will face a difficult challenge in bringing about change in Myanmar. Indonesia, as the ASEAN chair in 2023, will face the same problem too.

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The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta, and former Indonesian ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the International Maritime Organization (2016-2020).