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View all search resultsBIN in the shadows of ultra vires
In Indonesia, policymakers have remained unable to formulate a national security legal umbrella that clearly defines the duties, functions and authorities of national security actors and coordination among them.
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Show of force: Rajawali troops from the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) demonstrate their skills during a ceremony at the National Institute of Intelligence (STIN) in Sentul, Bogor, West Java on Sept. 9. (Courtesy of/Bambang Soesatyo)
T
he public was shocked again by the recent maneuver of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) through the appearance of the Rajawali troops. Of many comments in response to the event, some wonder why the Rajawali troops are not clearly defined by their profile, qualifications and designation. The public only knows the troops demonstrated their skills during an inauguration ceremony held by the State Intelligence College (STIN).
From these facts, sharp observation is needed to identify the problem behind the troops’ title. First, does BIN have the authority to form special forces or units that qualify as combatants? Second, what justified the formation of the troop? Finally, what kind of solutions are in store?
Article 30 of Law No.17/2011 on BIN says the agency exercises a series of powers, one of which is the authority to form a task force. This is specified further in the implementing regulation, namely Presidential Decree No. 90/2012, Article 4 Letter e of which states that BIN has the authority to form a task force. The two regulations provide an understanding that the formed task force is in the capacity to carry out the duties of BIN.
The BIN Law stipulates five main tasks of the spy agency, namely (1) conducting studies and formulating national intelligence sector policies, (2) delivering intelligence products as material for consideration in determining government policies, (3) planning and implementing intelligence activities, (4) making recommendations related to foreign individuals and/ or institutions and (5) providing considerations, suggestions and recommendations related to the security of the government administration. In addition, Article 3 of the 2012 Presidential Decree adds that BIN’s duties include coordinating the delivery of intelligence.
Thus, the formation of a task force by BIN must comply with the mandate of the prevailing law, which defines these tasks as more inclined to the review of policies, the distribution of intelligence products for consideration in policy-making, coordination, and planning and intelligence activities. In other words, there is no single article that provides space for a task force to carry out combat duties like the Rajawali troops. Thus, the establishment of the Rajawali special forces is inconsistent with BIN’s duties.
Even if the Rajawali special forces were to emulate the paramilitary unit of the Central Intelligence Agency, or Special Activities Center-CIA, the BIN unit needs reviewing. The Rajawali special forces are not comparable to the CIA’s paramilitary unit for several reasons.
First, the US legal instruments related to the intelligence sector detail the activities of the intelligence community, including the CIA, through the National Security Act (1947), the CIA Act (1949), and Executive Order 12333 regarding US intelligence activities.
