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eradaban Institut, a think tank led by military expert Salim Said, invited me on June 19 (along with Dr. Sjafroedin Bahar and political observer Burhanuddin Muhtadi) to review why Sukarno's influence remains politically marketable till today.

Instead of offering a direct answer to the question, I proposed a tentative hypothesis that a series and interconnectedness of historical events the incompleteness of the 1945-1949 National Revolution, the New Order's (1967-1998) development programs and the predominant traditionalist point of view among the majority of Indonesian Muslims have helped conserve Sukarno's influence within the structure of people's political consciousness.

A brief look at each of them will make this interconnectedness clear. The National Revolution resulted in military and diplomatic 'victories' rather than a changing of class structure. Thus, to quote Theda Skocpol, 'rebellions [...] that involve the revolts of subordinate class, but they do not eventuate in structural change'.

The real revolution itself should then be defined as a fundamental change in the ruling class structure that brings about new socio-economic and political cultural regime.

That is why Karl Marx saw the striking result of the France Revolution (1789-1794) as the destruction of 'medieval rubbish' (old ruling classes, together with its ancient socio-economic and political institutions).

For Indonesia's National Revolution entailed not with fundamental structural change, traditionalist point of view which was intentionally reenacted by the Dutch during the Cultivation System period (1830-1870) survives.

The greatness of Sukarno as one of the independence proclamators, Indonesia's first president and the great orator is thus perceived by the people more as a 'superhuman' rather than simply a human being.

The New Order's development programs also contributed to the mystification of Sukarno's influence on account of the extremely limited access to participating in its economic development programs.

As a result, the majority of the people who were technically unskilled, were alienated from the fruits of this materialistic-based development. This helps revive the traditional concept of Ratu Adil (Messiah) to maintain hope of their sense of justice in the future.

Finally, this set of beliefs further conserved by the traditionalist point of view of Islam largely adhered by Indonesian Muslims that states human beings are unequal spiritually.

In other words, there is a kind of spiritual hierarchy within the community. The visits of politicians and presidential aspirants to particular clerics and Islamic boarding schools substantiate this proposition.

It is this point of view that is projected onto Sukarno. His graveyard in Blitar, East Java, therefore has long been perceived as a sacred center where various people, including politicians and presidential hopeful, often visit to seek spiritual support.

As will briefly be elucidated below, Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo's rocketing political career rests largely upon this traditional political culture. It is true that in the realm of traditional political consciousness, the priyayi and ksatria (blue blood and knight class) enjoy privleged positions in society. At the same time, however, the wong cilik (lay people) have also a special place.

In the world of wayang (shadow puppets), this is symbolized by the Semar family. Convinced he is the incarnation of God, Semar often takes decisive measures to put the situation back into order as the elite fail to perform his duty well.

As seen with Semar's decisive measures, we can detect the traditional trace of Jokowi's mass-based political acceptance, a precursor of the coming of 'post-elite era' leadership. That is, a particular moment as the elite fail to perform their stately duties, pushing the masses to not only cease to admire the knight class but also set off a dream that the next leader should be derived from within their own circle.

Then, on what grounds do we see special relations between Sukarno and Jokowi? Surely, in terms of physical appearance, Jokowi is incomparable to Sukarno. In front of Sukarno, Jokowi is simply a personification of wong cilik.

However, it is precisely because of that Sukarno had idealized the lay people in his Marhaenism. It is said that Indonesia's first president once saw a man hoeing his small land on the outskirts of Bandung, West Java.

Through a brief talk with him, Sukarno concluded that Indonesia's lay people essentially possessed their own means of production to make ends meet.

And, for his activities were fully occupied by greeting people, walking from one alley to another at traditional markets and urban settlements, going into city gutters, while continuously showing the genuine manner during his stint both as a mayor of a city and governor of a province then who else is 'the living Marhaenist' that conspicuously strikes the structure of the people's political consciousness other than Jokowi himself?

In this context, it is extremely true that Jokowi wants not to imitate Sukarno's style. For he is the truest manifestation of Sukarno's concept of ordinary people now supported by his own circle to be a top leader in 'the post-elite leadership era'.