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View all search resultsSham elections can’t save a fracturing Myanmar
The prospects for the people of Myanmar look grim after the multistage elections ended on Sunday, as their country is dominated by the military junta and hemmed in by competing great power interests and a softening stance among some ASEAN members.
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Members of the Union Election Commission (UEC) count ballots at a polling station in Yangon on Jan. 25, 2026, after polls closed in the third phase of Myanmar’s general election. (AFP/Sai Aung Main)
F
ive years ago on Feb. 1, 2021, Myanmar’s top generals decapitated the elected government: Democratic leaders were arrested, pushed underground or forced into exile. Since then, the economy has spluttered and foreign investors have headed for the exit. The only growth industries, mostly scam centers, drugs and other criminal activities, enrich those already well-fed.
The military junta has kept its stranglehold via draconian curbs on civil and political liberties. It has bolstered its fighting forces through ruthless conscription, including child soldiers. They now face rebellions in almost every corner of the ethnically diverse country.
It helps that the military brass can still depend on international support from Russia. China, meanwhile, is playing a careful game to ensure that its interests, including prized access to the Indian Ocean for oil and gas, are secured.
And United States President Donald Trump’s second term in office has introduced newly unpredictable and detrimental elements to great power politics.
The US government last year cited “notable progress in governance and stability [and] plans for free and fair elections” as justification for removing the Temporary Protected Status designation for immigrants from Myanmar. Although a federal judge blocked this decision a few days ago, this may eventually force previously protected Myanmar citizens to return home.
However, far from being free and fair, Myanmar’s monthlong elections that just concluded have been devoid of meaningful democratic practice. They will entrench the junta and provide little more than a patina of legitimacy that antidemocratic major powers will use to further normalize relations with Myanmar’s military leaders.
The multistage elections were held in only a fraction of the country currently under the military’s authority. Elections were not held in opposition-held territory, so many otherwise eligible voters were disenfranchised.
As such, there is no serious opposition to the military’s proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Civil and political space is also heavily restricted, with criticism of the election itself being a criminal offense.
The main opposition would be the National League for Democracy (NLD), a party that has won by a landslide in every national election it has participated in since 1990. But it has been banned, along with dozens of other opposition political parties, and its senior leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, have been imprisoned.
Citizens have been coerced into taking part in an election with only electronic voting machines, against a background of expanded surveillance and pervasive fear.
Despite recent military gains by the junta, supported by Russian military technology and Chinese government pressure, the lines of control may be starting to solidify into Myanmar’s eventual balkanization, or break up into hostile statelets. The prospects for a future, federalized democratic Myanmar seem increasingly remote.
Since the coup, there are many areas now under full opposition control. Take, for instance, a recent declaration of independence by a breakaway ethnic Karen armed group. While it represents only one part of the Karen community in eastern Myanmar, this could well precipitate a flood of similar announcements by other ethnic minorities.
Other groups might declare autonomy and seek backing from governments and commercial and security interests in neighboring countries such as China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh.
Most neighboring countries will be uneasy about any further fracturing of Myanmar’s territorial integrity. Some, however, see potential benefits. China, for example, supports some ethnic armed groups to protect its strategic economic assets and maintain stability and influence along its borders.
While the conflict continues at home, Myanmar’s military leadership is defending itself at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. It faces claims that it committed genocide against the Muslim Rohingya ethnic minority, particularly during the massacres of 2017.
During the three-week hearings, the junta has argued its “clearance operations” were merely counterterrorism activities, despite the 700,000 refugees it created.
Given the disdain for international law shown by Russia, China and the US under Trump, any finding against the junta will have limited practical impact anyway. Meanwhile, some ASEAN countries appear to be softening their opposition to the junta.
Recently, the Philippine foreign secretary met with Myanmar’s senior military leadership in the country’s first month chairing the Southeast Asian bloc. This highlights the conundrum faced by regional leaders.
In the years immediately after the coup, ASEAN sought to keep Myanmar’s junta at arm’s length. But a number of key regional players, particularly the more authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, would prefer to find a way to normalize engagement with the generals.
From that perspective, the flawed elections are a chance to embrace superficial democratization and renewal. This leaves the Myanmar people, millions of who have fought hard against the coup and its negative consequences, with invidious choices about how to best pursue their independence and freedom.
There is little positive economic news on the horizon. The International Monetary Fund projects inflation in Myanmar will stay above 30 percent in 2026 with a real GDP fall of 2.7 percent. This would compound an almost 20 percent contraction since the coup. The currency is worth around one-quarter of what it was five years ago at the time of the coup.
In practice, this means many Myanmar families have gone dramatically backward. An untold number are now entangled in illicit and often highly exploitative businesses.
As the military’s proxy, the USDP will undoubtedly form a government after the elections. But unlike the USDP-led government that formed after the similarly flawed 2010 election, this new administration is unlikely to pursue political and economic liberalization sufficient to entice opposition forces to play along. The people of Myanmar have now been betrayed and brutalized by the military far too often to believe their easy promises.
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Adam Simpson is a senior lecturer in international studies at the School of Society and Culture at Adelaide University. Nicholas Farrelly is a pro vice-chancellor at the University of Tasmania. This article is republished under a Creative Commons license.
