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Behind the Sigi terror: Three phases of MIT evolution

Although the terrorists in Indonesia are very few in number compared to counterterrorism officers, terrorists remain powerful symbols of resistance against the state.

Noor Huda Ismail (The Jakarta Post)
Singapore
Fri, December 18, 2020

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Behind the Sigi terror: Three phases of MIT evolution

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lthough it no longer appears in national headlines, the heinous attack late last month during which four innocent people were killed in Sigi regency, Central Sulawesi, allegedly committed by the East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT), one of the groups in Indonesia inspired by the Islamic State (IS), has left its victims with deep wounds and has left Indonesia’s Christian minority traumatized.

Given its immeasurable human impact, the government should not underestimate this terrorist attack in Sigi. Even though it occurred in a remote village, on tracing it closely, we can see that the attack has a long genealogy intertwined with international developments and power relations between the state and religion, particularly Islam in Indonesia.

The MIT, a terrorist organization that was originally linked to Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), evolved in three phases.

The first phase was the group’s birth, when it became a new home for disparate terrorists and a training ground after a 2010 counterterrorism raid exposed a jihadi training camp in Aceh that was intended to develop unity. Soon after, authorities carried out sweeping arrests of members of the same network at a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Bima, on the eastern Indonesian island of Sumbawa.

According to an interview with a former MIT member, the two incidents triggered a new effort to establish a qoidah aminah (secure base) in Poso, Central Sulawesi, from which terrorist groups could carry out their next mission.

The initial narrative in this phase was “i'dad”, a code word for paramilitary training and a subculture that became deeply entrenched among MIT supporters.

For them, jihad is fardhu ain or jihad fardiah (individual duty). This means that jihad is placed on an equal footing with other religious duties such as praying, fasting, zakat and the haj.

In this context, i’dad is positioned like the obligatory ablution before prayer. The full concept is “la jihada illa bil i’dad” (there is no jihad without training). Therefore, almost all terrorist acts in Indonesia are conducted after members of these groups have undergone paramilitary training, either openly or privately.

The strength of the i'dad concept is supported by a specific interpretation of Surah Al Anfal verse 60, which reads: "Prepare against them what you [believers] can of [military] power and cavalry to deter Allah’s enemies and your enemies as well as other enemies unknown to you but known to Allah."

This can be interpreted as believing that i'dad is a religious command that must be fulfilled. This is more so if this verse is overlaid with a narrative of "resistance" against a regime that does not obey the laws of Allah, the Quran and the Sunnah. From the MIT’s perspective, the Indonesian government is not a government that true believers would support.

The jihad fardiah narrative is not new in the history of Islam. For example, the great Islamic scholar Ibn Taimiyah used this narrative. However, it is important to note that Muslims were under attack by the Mongols and the Crusades in his era.

Abdullah Azzam used a similar narrative to mobilize Muslim youths around the world to fight in Afghanistan against the Soviet communist regime in the 1980s during the Cold War. IS used the same narrative to defend its “worldwide caliphate” program around 2014.

The second phase of the MIT was when millennials joined the jihadist group. Their presence gave the group a new color. For example, millennial jihadists were actively discussing the MIT on the Al Busro online forum in early 2013.

One of the MIT’s campaigns was called "Resistance Against the Dholim Satanic Army and Its Affiliates", as reported by the Global Islamic Media Forum (GIMF). This was a significant achievement for the terror group because the GIMF is Al-Qaeda's global jihadist communications arm, and is serious about curating jihadist narratives from small terror groups with undeveloped media capabilities around the world.

"With the MIT recognized by the GIMF network, we can immediately receive many donations, both material such as funds and even goods such as solar cells or solar energy to help MIT logistics in the forest," explained an ex-MIT member who is now a peace activist.

This shows that although the terrorists in Indonesia are very few in number compared to counterterrorism officers, terrorists remain powerful symbols of resistance against the state.

Not infrequently, the life stories of members of terror groups are used as inspirational and even bedtime stories for their children. Their masculine style fascinates some of the women in the movement. Therefore, being a second wife to an MIT leader is not seen as a disgrace but as an honor among its supporters.

Women, who are basically victims of the MIT's violent extremism, are in essence saying: “Where are you, dear men? Do we women need to fight the jihad ourselves?"

The third phase was the impact of the June 2014 declaration of the IS in Syria. From within the walls of the Nusakambangan maximum security prison, Indonesian IS leaders Aman Abdurrahman and Abu Yusuf established communications with the MIT in Poso to declare support for Iraqi IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's caliphate program.

The video of Santoso declaring his allegiance to al-Baghdadi marks the start of the relationship between the MIT and the core movement of the IS in Syria and Iraq, facilitated by the Indonesian national who was already there, Abu Jandal.

After the IS declaration, several MIT members such as Bagus Maskuran alias Abu Muqbil moved to Syria and developed the group’s network with the Uighurs, who later joined the MIT in Poso.

The Sigi attack cannot therefore be separated from the MIT’s international connections. The IS regards the Sigi attack as an act by its components. In this regard, terrorism in Indonesia will remain unresolved if a national security approach is the only option.

There is an urgency to challenge and debunk the terrorists’ religious narratives and metaphors associated with these attacks and to interrogate them against the backdrop of the cultural, historical and structural factors of the area where they are embedded.

Lastly, counterterrorism organizations also need to understand the regional and international networks that provide ideological and logistical support for domestic terrorist groups such as the MIT.

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The writer is Monash University doctorate and visiting fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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