Takeover: New foreign minister Marty Natalegawa embraces his predecessor, Hassan Wirajuda, after his installment at the Foreign Ministry in October. JP/Ricky Yudhistira
The appointment of Marty Natalegawa as the new foreign minister in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s second cabinet signifies a new era for Indonesian foreign policy for two reasons.
First, it symbolizes the arrival of a new generation of diplomats at the helm of Indonesia’s foreign policy-making and the conduct of diplomacy.
Second, it reflects the recognition by the President that the country needs new blood and energy to address a range of new challenges facing Indonesia’s foreign policy in the years ahead.
The year 2010 would be the first year for Indonesia to lay the foundation to enter a new era in conducting its foreign policy. Natalegawa, in his first foreign policy speech at the opening of the 7th General Conference of the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) in Jakarta on Oct. 16, has clearly and eloquently outlined the government’s foreign policy priorities and direction for the next five years.
As a matter of fact, continuity will become the main theme of Indonesia’s foreign policy in 2010 and beyond. President SBY and Natalegawa are not going to change the course of Indonesia’s foreign policy in a fundamental way. In fact, the government believes there is no compelling reason to do so.
However, it does not mean that Indonesia’s foreign policy will not see any change. In a typical Indonesian way, elements of change will be inserted under the overall theme of continuity.
First, as a rule of thumb, Indonesia’s foreign policy will continue to adhere to the principle of bebas-aktif (free and active). But the principle of bebas – which was meant to provide the basis for a non-aligned foreign policy when the term was originally conceived in September 1948 – would now significantly emphasize the freedom for Indonesia to make its own decision according to its own national interests.
In Natalegawa’s words, it should denote “the capacity for independent decision-making”.
Second, Indonesia will continue to consolidate the ongoing changes in the way new domestic democratic values are projected onto foreign policy.
Natalegawa said Indonesia “would want to be sure that our foreign policy reflects our own domestic internal preoccupation with matters to do with democratization and human rights”.
However, Indonesia has no appetite for imposing democracy on others. It would work with other countries – democratic or otherwise — to promote regional conversation on democracy through the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) in order to place “democracy as a strategic agenda in Asia”.
On this point, it remains to be seen if Indonesia would also act as a true democratic state when confronted with anti-democratic practices and violations of human rights by other states in the Southeast Asian region such as Myanmar.
Third, ASEAN will continue to occupy an important place in Indonesia’s foreign policy. However, it seems that Indonesia would emphasize more on the importance of “delivery” rather than “declaration”.
Natalegawa has made it clear that Indonesia “does not want to see a situation where we simply have more documents emanating from ASEAN. It is time to do the thing that we say we want to do”. This is indeed a bold statement, and reflects Indonesia’s growing impatience with ASEAN’s less-than-impressive record in implementing its agreements and promises.
However, it is here where the challenge for Indonesia’s foreign policy will be greatly felt in the years to come.
Fourth, Indonesia is aware of dramatic changes taking place within East Asia and therefore will be more engaged in shaping the emerging regional architecture in the region.
It recognizes the importance for the region to accommodate the rise of China and India, and manage the relationship among the major powers.
While it has not officially proposed what kind of architecture would be suitable for coping with the new strategic challenges, Indonesia has begun to expand and deepen its relationship with all major powers (US, EU, China, Japan and India) and regional middle powers such as Australia and South Korea.
Fifth, Indonesia would also be more active in contributing to the global efforts to find solutions to global issues such as climate change, food and energy security, and global financial challenges. In this context, Indonesia’s membership within the G20 would become a new foreign policy priority.
For this, Indonesia would need to define its role and function within the G20, and start thinking about what kind of bureaucratic institutional support it needs in order to seize this opportunity so that Indonesia would matter more in the global arena.
It is very likely that Indonesia’s foreign policy in 2010 and beyond will be directed to manage and implement the five agendas above.
This is not an easy task. Indonesia is now presented with the opportunity to rectify its image as a country “that always punches below its weight”.
Former foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda has prepared a strong foundation for that. It is now time for Natalegawa to build on it.
The writer is the executive director for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.
