Pakistan: A reality check amid terror and chaos (Part 1 of 2)

Today Pakistan finds itself in the eye of the terrorism storm. An environment of controversies, contradictions, distortions and mutual suspicions prevails all around, polluting and weakening the war on terror.

The situation demands a clearer understanding of ground realities in South Asia, bridging the acute trust deficit and developing a unity of thought and action among all coalition players. Blame games, rigidity, arrogance and insensitivity to others’ interests will always remain counterproductive.

I would like to start by analyzing the existing environment in its historical perspective. How did religious militancy get introduced into Pakistan?

There is no doubt that Pakistan is a victim of terrorism and is certainly not the perpetrator.

In 1979, the United States, in its own interest of containing Soviet expansion, and Pakistan, in its own national interest of preserving its integrity against the Soviet design of reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean through Pakistan, initiated a jihad (holy war in defense of Islam) in Afghanistan.

We inducted 25,000 to 30,000 Mujahideen (holy warriors) from all over the Muslim world into Afghanistan and also pumped in Taliban from the tribal agencies of Pakistan after arming and training them.

In effect, therefore, for 10 long years from 1979 to 1989, we gave birth to religious militancy under the call for jihad. The freedom struggle in Indian-held Kashmir started in 1989 and continues till now. It has tremendous public sympathy in Pakistan and has given birth to several Mujahideen groups. This is another big cause of religious militancy in Pakistan.

Then there was the most disastrous period of 1989-2001 for Afghanistan when the United States summarily quit the area, resulting in the coalescing of the Mujahideen into al-Qaeda and the rise of the Taliban. During this period, four million Afghan refugees came into Pakistan.

Finally, to crown it all, there was 9/11, initiating the US military offensive in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s membership of the coalition.

In its aftermath, all hell broke lose in Pakistan, with religious militancy from the east and the west. Pakistan’s national and social fabric was torn asunder.

Why is there so much antipathy in Pakistan’s public mind against the United States? This is despite the fact that Pakistan was very consciously in strategic alliance with the United States and the West for 42 years since our independence in 1947 and together fought a jihad
in Afghanistan for 10 years from 1979 to 1989. Our relationship, and even public perceptions of each other, were pretty normal and friendly until 1989.

The abandonment of Pakistan after 1989, with a strategic shift of US policy towards India and military sanctions against Pakistan, cost US-Pakistan relations very dearly.

In Pakistan’s public mind, the United States “used’’ Pakistan and then abandoned it: This was taken as a betrayal.

The US nuclear policy of appeasement and strategic co-operation with India against Pakistan is taken by the man in the street in Pakistan as very partisan and an act of animosity against our national interest.

The continuing US military presence and operations in Afghanistan, the indiscriminate drone attacks with increasing collateral damage in the tribal agencies of Pakistan and, finally, the violation of Pakistani
sovereignty in the cross-border strike against Osama bin Laden are all now seen most negatively by the people of Pakistan.

To further complicate and indeed weaken our joint war against terror, there is an acute deficit of
trust and confidence between the United States and Pakistan at all levels of government, the military and intelligence.

This has increased manifold over the last year. It started somewhat with myself in 2004-2005. Our policy in Pakistan’s tribal agencies was to wean away Pakthuns from the Taliban. I coined a phrase back in 2002-2003 that all Taliban are Pakthun, but all Pakthun are not Taliban.

The methodology adopted was through the convening of Jirgas (gatherings of notables and elders), which are very much a tribal custom. This was seen in certain quarters in the United States and also the media as ‘’double dealing”. There were accusations against me that I was “dealing” with the Taliban.

My many exhortations that this was a baseless accusation — and the logic of how I could be dealing with people who were trying to assassinate me — fell on deaf ears. Problems also arose whenever the United States showed tendencies towards micro management.

My argument always was to co-operate and believe in strategic coordination to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban and to leave the tactics and micro management to us.

The bone of contention now seems to be the general feeling in US circles that Pakistan refused to take military action in North Waziristan against the Siraj Haqqani group of Taliban.

American accusations about Pakistan’s military and intelligence services being complicit with the Taliban basically result from this.

I am not privy to Pakistan’s strategy of not operating against the Haqqani, at least for the time being. However, I am very sure that they cannot be supporting them. The malicious role of India and the Afghan government itself in maligning Pakistan’s military and intelligence must not be overlooked.

We know what Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad especially are doing. We also know that Afghan intelligence, military and foreign service personnel go for training in India. Not a single one comes to Pakistan, despite Pakistan’s longstanding offer of free training since my time in office.

The writer is former Pakistani president and writes specially to CNN.