L

ess than a month before the 45th anniversary of ASEAN, the regional organization failed to conclude its routine ministerial meeting with a usual joint communiqué. If we are to find an excuse for this failure, ASEAN is analogous to a 5-year-old boy – given the establishment of its Charter in 2007.

As reflected in a comment made by the first US Ambassador to ASEAN, David Carden, the tension among the member states is indeed “normal” in the growing process of ASEAN.

What are the implications for ASEAN after this failure, however?

First, it is obvious that there will be a lack of an agenda to be affirmed in the next ASEAN Summit in November since the communiqué usually sets the key points for the leaders to be followed up at the highest level.

Moreover, some important agenda items, i.e. the drafting process of ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the direction for East Asian Summit will significantly be affected by this failure.

Second, the failure of Cambodia’s chairmanship to come up with the joint communiqué “positively” pushes ASEAN to rethink of its consensus-based decision making process, which has been repeatedly criticized.

The consensus process allows any member to have veto power and to impose its own views even if its position differs from the other nine member states.

It is interesting to compare the case with Indonesia’s decision in 2009 to finally sign the terms of reference of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, although it still reserved many disagreements with the draft due to the minimum articles aimed at the protection of human rights because of this consensus mechanism.

If this mechanism persists, it will definitely set a bad precedent for the next chairman and also any member state in the future to maintain their stands when a difference of opinions occurs.

Third, again, it is important to reemphasize that what has been feared by many has materialized — external actor can, indeed, steer and divide ASEAN.

Whether it is because of the external actor’s sheer size and power from which none of the member states can escape or the fact that since ASEAN’s establishment it has never had a common vision to become one community bound together.

Perhaps it is both. It is indeed a major blow for ASEAN despite some of its achievements in the past few years.

What next then? The initiative of Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to conduct “charm diplomacy” by visiting Manila, Hanoi and Phnom Penh is laudable.

But, rather than just listening to their views and expectations, it is crucial to continue the process of realizing the code of conduct (CoC).

We cannot wait any longer to present ASEAN’s common position on this CoC draft to be negotiated further with Chinese counterparts.

Any delay will result in a worsening of the situation, as China gets bigger in terms of its power and influence, making negotiations even more difficult to manage.

Now is the right time to really start thinking about the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Part II to affirm member states’ commitment to maintaining the region’s neutrality from the influence and competition of major powers, which attempt to divide ASEAN along lines of external interests.

If it is part of the growing process, then ASEAN should quickly recover from this failure — or hiccup, to borrow the secretary-general’s term. But, as always, it depends on each member to reflect and think about whether they really wish this ASEAN boat to continue sailing toward its ultimate goals.

The writer is currently a researcher in the department of politics and international relations at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and guest lecturer at the graduate school of diplomacy, Paramadina University, Jakarta.