T

he 21st ASEAN Summit and its related meetings in Cambodia concluded last week, with the regional group adopting a number of initiatives. In the political area, the summit approved the Bali Concord III plan of action for 2013 to 2017 and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) and launched the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation.

The AHRD is considered a milestone in implementing the ASEAN Charter. Likewise, the AHRD demonstrates the strong commitment of ASEAN states to promote and protect human rights, although critics say many aspects of human rights principles that are internationally observed have been watered down during the negotiation process to approve the document.

In terms of economics, ASEAN leaders launched the ASEAN Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which according to the ASEAN Secretariat, will combine ASEAN’s free trade agreements (FTAs) with Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand into a major trading bloc. If successful, the RCEP will become the world’s biggest free trade arrangement. The leaders also claimed progress in implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community blueprint.

Despite many substantial achievements, there are some issues that remain unaddressed, especially the South China Sea dispute. The same issue also prevented the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) last July from issuing a joint communiqué, with many accusing the host Cambodia of succumbing to Chinese pressure.

Smarting from the split, ASEAN officials and leaders have sought a unified public appearance. They avoided arguing publicly through the mass media. However, the setback recurred on Nov. 19, when according to Reuters, Cambodia said that ASEAN member nations had reached a consensus to not internationalize territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Responding to Cambodia’s statement, the Philippines openly disagreed, saying that there was no such consensus reached concerning the issue.

We therefore can map out two different stances for ASEAN in relation to the South China Sea. The first is in favor of internalization of the issue, by seeking a rules-based and multilateral approach to settle the disputes. Some member states like the Philippines and Vietnam hold this position, with support from the US.

The second is the stance reflects the Chinese position and would prevent the issue from international handling. China’s basic position is that the disputes should be discussed on a bilateral basis. Proponents of this stance include Cambodia and Laos. They tend to prefer to confine the issue to the existing ASEAN-China mechanism.

As it is commonly known, China and the Philippines along with Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam have been long engaged in territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

ASEAN’s failure to show unity on South China Sea disputes indicates a real challenge for the regional grouping to realize the ASEAN Community by Dec. 31, 2015. This also raises questions on the centrality of ASEAN when dealing with its external partners in the formation of a regional architecture.

With the division among ASEAN states on the South China Sea, Indonesia should show its assertiveness as a natural leader and first among equals in ASEAN. The country is expected to be able to play important role vis-a-vis the various interests larger countries, especially the US and China, in the region.

It might be possible to look at the concept of Indonesia as the natural leader of ASEAN through KJ Holsti’s natural role conception (NRC) theory in foreign policy. Holsti mainly focused on the idea of the self-conception of the elites. In this case, government elites may embrace various beliefs or images of the identity of the state. Holsti’s theory provides a theory for the way that a state acts in the international system.

In line with NRC theory, Indonesia’s elites traditionally have viewed their country as a leader regionally and beyond. Indonesia’s conception of itself as regional and international leader might be congruent with the free and active principles of foreign policy. The concept of a regional leader might be said as one of the direct or indirect manifestations of the free and active policy.

With such as conception, according to Leifer, Indonesia has the conviction that it is entitled to play a leading role in maintaining peace, security, and stability in the region.

The efforts of Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to rescue ASEAN from its division in the aftermath of the AMM in July can be viewed from an NRC perspective. At that time, not long after the meeting, Marty toured ASEAN capitals to narrow the position gaps among ASEAN states, especially between Cambodia and the Philippines, on the South China Sea.

Indonesia has long been praised for its leadership in the region. Since the inception of ASEAN, there has been evidence of the country’s leadership in ASEAN. Under Soeharto, for example, Indonesia played an important role in peaceful settlements in Cambodia and the southern Philippines. Likewise, Jakarta successfully mediated claims by Manila and Kuala Lumpur over Sabah in 1970s.

Indonesia has also demonstrated its lead role through various initiatives to advance ASEAN. The country initiated Bali Concord III in 2011, to map out the interactions and engagement of ASEAN in the global community.

Indonesia also initiated the birth of the monumental Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), known as Bali Concord I, in 1976 and Bali Concord II in 2003. The concords marked the outstanding leadership of Indonesia in ASEAN.

Indonesia’s character as ASEAN’s natural leader and its remarkable record of regional leadership should boost its confidence in dealing with major external powers, particularly on the South China Sea dispute and maintain the group’s centrality in the evolving Asia Pacific regional architecture.

The writer works for the Foreign Ministry. The opinions expressed are his own.