S

ince the current governor of Jakarta, Basuki '€œAhok'€ Tjahja Purnama, decided to run for his second term as an independent candidate, many political actors have started to worry about the existence and performance of Indonesia'€™s political parties.

Two facets can be proposed in terms of the existence of popular independent candidates. First, Indonesian electoral democracy, which is dominated by political parties highly determines the political outcomes of elections.

Thus, the rise of popular candidates with no party affiliation, particularly in Jakarta, will challenge such established political power in the future.

Second, even though public trust in political parties is at its lowest point, Indonesian political parties are not necessarily in a period of de-legitimization.

Degrading the role of political parties in shaping the course of a democratic system follows systematic changes, not a temporary phenomenon like the case of Ahok.

The situation is nothing like what happened in the 1950s when Sukarno disbanded the parliamentary system, where some parties later established a single authoritarian-guided approach to democracy.

Nonetheless, the existence of an independent candidate, such as Ahok in Jakarta, will prompt many political scientists to gauge the extent to which his political leverage can shape the local political landscape.

Accordingly, figures like Ahok and a few other local independent candidates are good examples of the role floating elites have played in coloring Indonesia'€™s democratic consolidation process, since the downfall of Soeharto in 1998.

Important to this argument is the concept of the floating elite, the phenomenon of Ahok, and the mobilization of power prior to the gubernatorial election next year.

The term '€œfloating elite'€ describes elites without a party base for attaining power in office. Nevertheless, as Robert Michels argues in Iron Law of Oligarchy, through power resources '€” such as finances, office position, popularity and mobilization capability '€” these elites display the ability to mobilize grassroots level support and compete in elections.

As such, the internal party elites may allow the floating elites to run in order to achieve a majority come election time.

This process is particularly likely when a party'€™s image is suffering decline as is currently the case with Indonesia'€™s political parties.

Floating elites are different from embedded elites, which have ties to constituencies whose interests they represent or defend based on certain types of ideologies or ideas.

Embedded elites may head political parties, social movements or even be part of religious organizations. Floating elites may direct social organizations, but only ones without a strong political ideology '€” merely with temporary interests that binds members together.

Since he embarked on his governorship, replacing former governor Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo who took presidential office in 2014, Ahok has tried to distance himself from political party-based interests.

For example, in 2014 he ended his membership of the Gerindra Party led by the retired New Order general, Prabowo Subianto.

Although he repeatedly says that he maintains good relationships with other parties, like the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) chaired by former president Megawati Soekarnoputri; the Hanura Party led by another the New Order retired general, Wiranto; and the Nasdem Party led by media mogul Surya Paloh, Ahok has carried out his duties as an independent governor.

Since 2014 he has been a floating elite figure, relying on office position to run the capital. His relations with residents of Jakarta are based purely on constitutional principles. Like typical professionals in Jakarta, Ahok spends his time efficiently, and often amid the people, to address many complicated problems in the city, such as flooding, traffic jams and garbage, among others.

He has repeatedly tried to push for deeper reforms in the spheres of bureaucracy and policy. Accordingly, he can easily reassign or fire many local civil service officers who do not perform their duties appropriately, an action that previous governors hardly undertook.

Even while Ahok'€™s style is relatively emotional and causes outrage on the part of some groups, his popularity and electability remains high, according to surveys.

Given his performance and integrity, some Jakarta residents have voluntarily mobilized support
and formed the Friends of Ahok (Teman Ahok) with the aim of buttressing Ahok to run for a second term by collecting copies of identity cards (KTP).

... floating elites ... may become a crucial phenomenon to improving ... fairness of the electoral system.

This type of group is a model for other regional independent candidates seeking to gather public support before an election.

Friends of Ahok is run enthusiastically by Jakarta'€™s youth who have seen how Ahok is managing the city with courage, integrity, and complete dedication toward solving its problems.

However, the key concern for this group is the extent to which it can maintain its own initiatives amid strong pressure from other political actors. On the one hand, this group lacks ideology, focusing merely on short-term interests for the local election.

As a result, no long-term political concepts are being proposed, such as whether to remain a volunteer group or to transform itself into a social organization, which can play the role of watchdog for Ahok'€™s governorship if he is reelected.

On the other hand, apparently Ahok does not have a political vision for this group. In this regard, along with his office power, Ahok can supposedly mobilize support from these youth to back his policies through the end of his term in 2017 or even longer if he continues in office.

Thus, he does not take the chance to create a social or political organization, rather relying merely on his office power as a typical floating elite does.

One critical problem in building a productive relationship between elites and Indonesia'€™s grassroots is the lack of a genuine political channel that can direct people'€™s interests, views, and critiques of government performance.

Since the New Order regime demobilized people'€™s political aspirations, the rise of Friends of Ahok can be used as a productive channel along with other interest groups. This type of volunteer group is not new, since Jokowi had a similar group called Relawan Jokowi (Volunteers of Jokowi) to boost his presidential bid in 2014.

However, when he became president, the group became a floating group without a political basis or an ideology; thus it is unable either to oversee the president nor to transform itself into a social or political organization with a clear agenda. The same concern will likely apply to Ahok and his volunteer group.

All in all, the gubernatorial election next year will be a high stake event for political parties, independent candidates, and potential interest groups.

Every election has its own features, and this one will reflect Jakarta, the capital of the world'€™s fourth largest democracy.

Whoever wins the 2017 local election with support either from political parties, volunteers, or interest groups, will have a mandate to address the aforementioned problems with full dedication and integrity.

Moreover, the existence of floating elites in Jakarta and other regions may become a crucial phenomenon to improving the freedom and fairness of the electoral system.

This should not only shape the local but also the national political landscape of the future, and most importantly pave the way for alternative policy vision and its impact on the public.