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Sept. 30 affair, 52 years later and ahead of election year
Why are some people raising the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a current issue?
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A dark time -- Then Maj. Gen. Soeharto briefs members of the Army’s Special Forces (RPKAD, now Kopassus) prior to the removal of the bodies of the Army generals who were murdered during an alleged coup attempt on Sept. 30, 1965, which was blamed on the now defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). As the most senior military officer available at the time, Soeharto led all the operations to restore security and impose order in the aftermath of the alleged coup attempt. (JP/30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka)
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s we reminisce on experiences of Sept. 30, 1965, my friend of 56 years opened his remarks by an observation that resolved many questions. Who set off the drama? Who was to blame for the rural massacre? Was Gen. Soeharto the solution or the problem? Why are some people raising the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a current issue? His perspective cut through the noise that has enveloped social media. Here is what I learned.
In 1965, then-president Sukarno was seriously ill. The news leaked through the severely controlled media. In the present, this could be suspected as fake news.
Anyway, a team of doctors from the People’s Republic of China examined the president and gave a grim prognosis, making a lot of people nervous, because should something happen, nobody knew who would be president of Indonesia.
Sukarno had been made President for Life by the Interim People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS). There is no mechanism for succession, so anyone with bad and good intentions made every effort to secure the position. There is nothing like a vacuum of power to start a power struggle, in which there is no arbiter to judge the contestants. Whatever the methods used, politics will decide the winner.
Many wanted to be sure their side would win, and some just wanted to be sure the other side would not win. As there were only two forces who could claim a serious chance of winning, the other forces had to take sides. The choice boiled down to the Army and the PKI, who were in a standoff with president Sukarno.
People were unsure on which side the president was, so they kept claiming that they were loyal to Sukarno, calling him the Great Leader of the Revolution even as he lost power.
In the end, the Army won out and the PKI was decimated. We will never know what the PKI would have done if it had emerged as victor of the power struggle. It is obvious what the Army did after it won. What is less clear is whether it was all part of the original plan, and how much is runaway excess. Soeharto skillfully juxtaposed ambition with development management and got away with everything.
