For Indonesia, Myanmar becoming a "Southeast Asian Syria or Afghanistan” would be a nightmare, leaving its leadership of ASEAN – the linchpin of Jakarta’s strategic outlook – effectively in tatters.
ince early February, Indonesia has been calling for an ASEAN-led response to the post-coup crisis in Myanmar, with President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo on March 19 requesting a high-level meeting of ASEAN to address the situation even as he urged an end to the violence and a return to dialogue.
While many support such an ASEAN-centric solution, time is running out. The death toll in Myanmar has already surpassed 400 as both the military and civilian protesters harden their positions.
Multiple new players – from leaders of the civil disobedience movement to the various ethnic armed groups – have also emerged over the past month, confusing the previous rigid dichotomy of the early post-coup days which set the Tatmadaw, as Myanmar’s military is known, against the National League for Democracy of ousted civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
Indonesia, meanwhile, finds itself in a tough spot diplomatically. On the one hand, it cannot afford to do nothing. If the crisis escalates into a full-fledged civil war with regional powers playing proxies, the strategic environment in Southeast Asia would deteriorate drastically. For Indonesia, Myanmar becoming a "Southeast Asian Syria or Afghanistan” would be a nightmare, leaving its leadership of ASEAN – the linchpin of Jakarta’s strategic outlook – effectively in tatters.
But Indonesia does not have the strategic heft or resources to push for a diplomatic initiative on its own. While Jakarta has helped lead breakthroughs on Myanmar in the past, it has not developed consistent and deep diplomatic, economic, political and security investments in the country. In other words, it does not have significant leverage over the various parties involved in the crisis.
Relying on ASEAN, however, means being constrained by its institutions – from the role played by that year’s chair, to the consensus decision-making process, to the absence of crisis management mechanisms or membership sanctions. ASEAN as a group also does not have significant leverage over Myanmar. While the organization has offered the country plenty of diplomatic cover in the past, the government in Naypyidaw – whether military or civilian – is unlikely to simply listen to what ASEAN has to say when its very survival and legitimacy are at stake.
Read also: Four top ASEAN diplomats head to China as Myanmar unrest boils over
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