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ndonesian foreign policy observers have wondered whether President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who took his oath of office on Oct. 20, 2014, really has a foreign policy.

There have been frequently asked questions about diplomacy a la Jokowi in the last three years. Why does President Jokowi take a different approach toward foreign policy and international issues compared with that of his predecessor? Does he have a vision of international relations? He always talks about competition among nations as upcoming challenges for Indonesia, which is strategically located in a crossroad of great powers’ competition and cooperation. Is foreign policy not a matter of priority given his local political background, or is it because he simply lacks the prerequisite understanding of the dynamism of world affairs?

We have observed him touring many countries for bilateral and multilateral talks only to fulfill his duties as the President of the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation. He has met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on five occasions, giving a perception that Indonesia is leaning toward China as a source of investment for his signature infrastructure projects.

As the leader of an ASEAN member state, he has visited ASEAN neighbors Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Thailand, but has yet to visit Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

He sent his foreign minister to Myanmar to offer the so-called 4+1 formula to solve the humanitarian tragedy in Rakhine state. The framework prescribes self-restraint, protection, humanitarian assistance and regional peace and security, plus an idea to establish an advisory commission

But President Jokowi failed to order his chief envoy to sort out the most appropriate form of mediation — which is an important aspect of diplomacy — that Indonesia can offer to Myanmar to reduce tension in Rakhine.

The question pertaining to diplomatic efforts to end the violence in Rakhine state is whether Indonesia is ready to talk and negotiate a settlement to the problems that have already existed for centuries. Is approaching Bangladesh and Turkey to be part of the comprehensive mediation the right move? What happens if ASEAN does not support the 4+1 scheme? Is humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya sufficient to prevent the crisis and calm domestic outrage in the name of Islamic solidarity?

There are many elements about Jokowi’s foreign policy that we need to outline to understand the course of Indonesia’s endeavors to accomplish its interests in global affairs. Indonesia cannot do much to address the nuclear and missile crisis in the Korean Peninsula, the overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea, the spread of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to Southeast Asia, inability of the global maritime fulcrum strategy to enhance regional security, polarization of regional mechanisms of cooperation and competition in ASEAN, the lack of foreign direct investment in Indonesia and many others matters.

Indonesian infantilism in foreign policy has been translated in several key agendas of Indonesian diplomacy. First, Indonesia’s bid to sit as a non-veto member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) does specify a target. Besides, the world would not be convinced by Indonesia’s ambition due to the absence of President Jokowi in the last three occasions of the UN General Assembly.

Second, in projecting the foundation of Indonesian foreign policy, there has been a trend of Indonesia’s failure to secure top posts in formal global institutions in the last three years, including the judges election of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), a nomination for the post of director general of the Food Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) director general position, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) presidency, a seat on the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) council, the undersecretary post of the UN Secretary-General and membership in the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

In all fronts, Indonesian diplomacy is lightweight in nature.

Third, in the regional security environment, Indonesia’s foreign policy projection failed to differentiate radicalism from separatism in Marawi, the southern Philippines, which otherwise would provide moral support to President Rodrigo Duterte.

Furthermore, in the South China Sea issue that has been held hostage by China, Indonesia tends to disregard the 50th joint communique of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila, namely paragraph 194 on “the importance of non-militarization” in the overlapping claims of Parcel and Spratly Islands.

Fourth, we cannot transform the initiative of a world maritime fulcrum — which seems to be a presidential campaign promise — into an operable concept. There is a prevailing misconception that the idea only concerns border issues by seeing maritime as a performance index in implementing maritime diplomacy.

Indonesia does not have the capability to match China’s Maritime Silk Road strategy and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.

Fifth, there is a lack of coordination between the Foreign Ministry and other ministries, sending a confusing signal to international communities, as in the case of naming the North Natuna Sea. While the move is deemed as strategically unsound as it would trigger Beijing’s anger, it would undermine Indonesia’s role as an honest broker in the South China Sea dispute settlement.

All of this serves as a reminder of how Indonesia should translate its active and independent doctrine of diplomacy in a vast changing nature of regionalism and multilateralism of international order.

The nature of competition and cooperation amid great powers will diminish Indonesia’s strategic position and stabilizing role that would otherwise enable it to participate in the fight for a better world order based on freedom, eternal peace and social justice.
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The writer is a researcher and chair of the foundation for the Center for Chinese Studies.